Reconceptualizing hospital chaplaincy in an age of "spirituality" by Harrison, Mary
Boston University
OpenBU http://open.bu.edu
Theses & Dissertations Boston University Theses & Dissertations
2018
Reconceptualizing hospital
chaplaincy in an age of
"spirituality"
https://hdl.handle.net/2144/30023
Boston University
  
 
BOSTON UNIVERSITY 
 
SCHOOL OF THEOLOGY 
 
 
 
 
Project Thesis 
 
 
 
 
RECONCEPTUALIZING HOSPITAL CHAPLAINCY  
 
IN AN AGE OF ‘SPIRITUALITY’ 
 
 
by 
 
 
MARY S. HARRISON 
 
 
 
B.A., Amherst College, 1981 
M.T.S., Harvard University, 1985 
S.T.L., Boston College, 2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
 
requirements for the degree of 
 
Doctor of Ministry 
 
2018 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   ©  Copyright by  
       MARY S. HARRISON 
       2018 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Approved by 
 
 
 
 
Project Thesis Advisor  ________________________________________________ 
Chris R. Schlauch, Ph.D. 
Associate Professor of Counseling Psychology  
and Psychology of Religion  
 iv 
RECONCEPTUALIZING HOSPITAL CHAPLAINCY  
IN AN AGE OF ‘SPIRITUALITY’ 
 
MARY S. HARRISON 
 
Boston University School of Theology, 2018 
Project Thesis Advisor:  Chris R. Schlauch, Ph.D., Associate Professor of    
Counseling Psychology and Psychology of Religion  
 
ABSTRACT 
 
In response to a changing cultural landscape, especially the movement away from 
traditional religion and the emerging practice of diverse members of health care teams 
addressing existential or spiritual pain as a quasi-medical problem, hospital chaplaincy is 
(re)conceptualized in terms of two concepts intelligible and meaningful to people within and 
outside religious traditions: narrative and witness. The project examines hospital chaplaincy in 
an age of spirituality, and to elaborate on the notions of narrative and witness, reviews the Book 
of Job; the Holocaust narratives of Elie Wiesel and Judith Sherman; the philosophy of Emmanuel 
Levinas and the liberation theology of Gustavo Gutiérrez, as well as selected case studies.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
A. Statement of the Problem 
Hospital chaplains have long held an important role in addressing existential and spiritual 
pain – both the pain of patients experiencing trauma or loss and that of family members who may 
equally be distraught, confused, or experiencing other emotional upheaval. But this role may be 
changing and becoming more challenging as a result of important shifts in the landscape. 
Changed relationships to religion and spirituality and changes within the culture of medicine 
itself, together with multiculturalism and religious pluralism, all invite new expression of what it 
is that is essential in, and that is core to, hospital chaplaincy.  
Like theology, chaplaincy as a vocation, and hospital chaplaincy in particular, takes place 
within the broader culture and generally changes through critique and self-reflection in light of 
changed social conditions, or risks irrelevance and loss of meaning. Thus, the research that 
follows undertakes, first, description of sociocultural shifts that necessitate a reconceptualization 
of what is core to hospital chaplaincy, followed by, second, a suggestion of narrative as a lens for 
focusing the central activity of the hospital chaplain, defined as compassionate presence with 
another in the face of the dual existential challenge of meaning and loss.1 The critique and 
reflection that structure the project are warranted by recent, dramatic changes within the cultural 
landscape within which chaplaincy takes place, changes that render the role of the hospital 
                                               
1 It should be noted that hospital chaplains’ board certification is in part dependent upon 
relationship to a sponsoring religious denomination, although these range from the highly 
orthodox to ethical humanism.  
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chaplain, a role that has always been a highly liminal one,2 still more unsettled and in need of 
clarification. 
Among the changed social conditions that the project addresses is a widespread cultural 
shift away from traditional religion and toward a more amorphous concept of “spirituality” 
divorced from traditional religious affiliations.3 Of course, many people still embed their 
spirituality in religion; nevertheless, it is the case in every Christian tradition, with the exception 
of evangelical Christianity, that numbers of adherents have been steadily diminishing. This 
results in a unique situation in which chaplains endeavor to address the existential needs of 
patients in the absence of a shared language or tradition that can serve as a touchstone for 
communication regarding, for example, issues of bereavement and mortality. In effect, chaplains 
must often approach patients not as a member of a particular religious community – the patient’s 
own, or what was the patient’s, or that of the chaplain – which may or may not be common to 
both, but rather as forming, in every instance, a more or less unique relationship. This is not in 
itself a detriment, but it does substantiate the need for fresh resources, or new approaches to 
older ones, and literatures that may resonate regardless of religious background or the lack 
thereof. The appropriation of a variety of literatures, literatures that address existential concerns 
across traditions, as well as in their absence, is one of the goals of this thesis.  
A second change is a cultural shift within medicine itself, one that sees other members of 
the health care team increasingly addressing existential or spiritual pain as a quasi-medical 
                                               
2 For a rich and wide-ranging discussion of liminality, see Victor Turner, The Ritual Process: 
Structure and Anti-Structure (Abingdon-on-Thames: Routledge 2017), 94-131. 
 
3 Kathleen Garces-Foley, “Hospice and the Politics of Spirituality,” in Spirituality in Hospice 
Palliative Care, ed. Paul Bramadat, Harold Coward, and Kelli I. Stajduhar (Albany, NY: SUNY 
Press, 2013), 18. 
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problem. The contemporary literature is replete with efforts of nurses, medical doctors, 
psychologists, and social workers to address spiritual or existential distress.4 While this is in 
many ways laudable, it also creates unique challenges inasmuch as chaplains are inevitably 
forced to reconceive their roles in light of changing needs among a changing population if they 
are to avoid being consigned to a purely sacramental or liturgical role. Chaplains must find 
unique ways to articulate their contributions in a medical setting in which people are increasingly 
unlikely to affiliate with traditional religious institutions.  
These are only two among many cultural shifts, but they are nonetheless significant. The 
decline of organized religion has opened a vacuum that health care professionals, as well as 
chaplains, are seeking to fill. The question is: How can chaplains respond? More particularly, 
                                               
4 Megan Best, Phyllis Butow, and Ian Olver, “Doctors Discussing Religion and Spirituality: A 
Systematic Literature Review,” Palliative Medicine 30, no. 4 (April 2016): 327-337; Ingela 
Henoch et al., “Training Intervention for Health Care Staff in the Provision of Existential 
Support to Patients with Cancer: A Randomized, Controlled Study,” Journal of Pain and 
Symptom Management 46, no. 6 (Dec. 2013): 785-794; Wilfred McSherry, “The Principal 
Components Model: A Model for Advancing Spirituality and Spiritual Care Within Nursing and 
Health Care Practice,” Journal of Clinical Nursing 15 (July 2006): 905-917; Wilfred McSherry, 
Keith Cash, and Linda Ross, “Meaning of Spirituality: Implications for Nursing Practice,” 
Journal of Clinical Nursing 13,  no. 8 (May 2004): 934-941; Susan Ronaldson et al., 
“Spirituality and Spiritual Caring: Nurses’ Perspectives and Practice in Palliative and Acute Care 
Environments,” Journal of Clinical Nursing 21 (August 2012): 2126-2135; Mary E. Minton et 
al., “A Willingness to Go There: Nurses and Spiritual Care,” Journal of Clinical Nursing 27 
(June 2017): 1-9; Danielle Rodin et al., “Whose Role? Oncology Practitioners’ Perceptions of 
Their Role in Providing Spiritual Care to Advanced Cancer Patients,” Support Care Cancer 23, 
no. 9 (September 2015): 2543-2550; Hossein Ebrahimi, “Health Care Providers’ Perception of 
Their Competence in Providing Spiritual Care for Patients,” Indian Journal of Palliative Care 
23, no. 1 (Jan.-Mar. 2017): 57-61; Andrea C. Phelps et al., “Addressing Spirituality Within the 
Care of Patients at the End of Life: Perspectives of Patients With Advanced Cancer, Oncologists, 
and Oncology Nurses,” Journal of Clinical Oncology 30, no. 20 (July 2012): 2538-2544; 
Margaret Tarpley and John Tarpley, “Spiritual Dimensions of Surgical Palliative Care,” Surgical 
Clinics of North America 91, no. 2 (2011): 305-315. The preceding list represents a sampling of 
the literature on diverse health care professionals’ recent interest in spiritual care. 
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how can they do so in a manner that maintains fidelity to their own religious values,5 attends to 
the needs of an increasingly diverse patient population, and reinforces their value as an important 
part of the health care team? This is the problem. 
 
B. Significance of the Study 
The phenomenon of religious institutions undergoing radical change is not unusual, but 
the contemporary scene is different in two ways. First is the sheer number of people who are 
leaving traditional religion. And second is the fact that these people are not forming new 
religious communities, but rather seeking understanding outside of any formal structure – indeed, 
a 2012 Pew Research Center report shows that the fastest-growing group within the current 
Western religious landscape is “Nones,” or those who self-identify as having no formal religious 
affiliation at all.  
As a result, it becomes less clear what exactly chaplains do. Such lack of clarity leads to 
wasted opportunity. There is no question that patients experiencing illness (and their families) 
frequently have grave existential concerns, and that these are important in medical care – they 
can affect patient attitudes, trigger depression and other mental and emotional issues, alter end-
of-life decision-making, and even affect what symptoms are experienced and reported.6 But 
                                               
5 “Religious values” may be understood as encompassing religious identity, self-understanding, 
and a sense of vocation. 
 
6 Katerine LeMay and Keith Wilson, “Treatment of Existential Distress in Life-Threatening 
Illness: A Review of Manualized Interventions,” Clinical Psychology Review 28, no. 3 (March 
2008): 472-493. 
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without a traditional religious structure, the bright line between the domain of religion and the 
domain of medicine begins to be erased.7  
This is in no way to suggest that traditional religion is “good” and less traditional 
modalities are “bad,” and moreover, while I think there is a causal connection between the 
decline of organized religion and the mutability of the distinction between spiritual care in 
medicine and hospital chaplaincy, my comment is meant to be descriptive. I do not intend it as a 
value judgment regarding changes affecting traditional religion per se. Rather, I am suggesting 
that our understandings undergo permutations in time. At the moment, the “spirituality” of 
patients in hospitals has become a quasi-medical subject.8 This clearly represents a shifting 
understanding, as in the not too distant past (the 1950s to the 1980s), spirituality would have 
been considered wholly outside the domain of medicine, which at the time preferred to 
understand and present itself as “objective” and “scientific.” However, “objective” and 
“scientific” are adjectives that are more conflicted in their contemporary use, largely as a result 
of social changes (e.g., feminism, the sexual revolution, civil rights) and intellectual changes 
(e.g., Thomas Kuhn and shifting scientific paradigms) that date at least as far back as the 1960s 
that have radically challenged and readjusted our boundaries, our subjectivity, and our very sense 
of ourselves as persons – indeed, what constitutes “personhood” and “community.” Therefore, 
although it may be less common to speak of objectivity in a positivist sense,9 it is rather 
aggravatingly the case that professionals, whose domain enjoys the still reverential status of 
                                               
7 Tracy Balboni et al., “Support of Cancer Patients’ Spiritual Needs and Associations With 
Medical Care Costs and the End of Life,” Cancer 117, no. 23 (Dec. 1, 2011): 5383-5391. 
 
8 McSherry, “The Principal Components Model,” 905-917; McSherry, Cash, and Ross, 
“Meaning of Spirituality,” 934-941. 
 
9 I am indebted to Chris Schlauch, Ph.D. for this observation. 
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being related to science, now seem free to “borrow” without attribution from the humanities. For 
example, in the case of medicine, the discipline has complied with consumer demand that it 
become more responsive to patients’ subjective experience, and consequently fields of inquiry 
have opened up in which physicians have appropriated the space of interpersonal and subjective 
concern which hospital chaplains traditionally addressed. At the very least, the focus of hospital 
chaplains’ previous ministry, which in one respect could be described as “interpersonal 
subjective experience,”10 has become intellectual capital that is newly in demand. That 
interpersonal, subjective domain is what hospital chaplains are in danger of losing. Far from 
lamenting a loss of traditional (i.e. sectarian, formal, and liturgical) religion, the latter is exactly 
what physicians, nurses, and social workers, in possession of a new intellectual terrain previously 
of little interest to them, may leave for chaplains, thus creating a restrictive association of 
chaplains with purely liturgical roles.  
What can be done?  Chaplains could simply reposition themselves as “spiritual pain 
specialists.” This, however, could be interpreted as suggesting, or at least cause it to appear that, 
they are abandoning the millennia-old religious traditions that undergird their work and give it 
purpose and meaning.11 On the other hand, chaplains must find new and better ways to reach out 
and speak to people whose spirituality is vague, obscure, highly personal, idiosyncratic, and/or 
resistant to institutional structures. And while doing this, they must also find a way to justify 
                                               
10 Clearly, there are multiple other areas of concern implicit in chaplaincy. I draw attention to 
interpersonal subjective experience because it is this aspect of chaplaincy that most clearly 
overlaps with new focus in doctor-patient relationships to be discussed in Chapter Four. 
 
11 For a thorough discussion of the advantages and disadvantages attending to abandoning the 
rubric “pastoral care,” see Raymond J. Lawrence, Nine Clinical Cases: The Soul of Pastoral 
Care and Counseling (n.p.: CreateSpace, 2015), 81-87. 
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their existence within the medical establishment – to show that they make a unique contribution 
that cannot be provided by other members of the health care team. 
I believe that there are at least several responses which, taken together, reconceptualize 
chaplaincy in a manner that renders it more relevant in the present moment and more sustainable 
in the future. Several of these responses will be only briefly noted, owing to limitations of time 
and space. Among the most important of these is the undertaking of quantitative and qualitative 
research. In the current climate of evidence-based medicine, it is incumbent upon chaplains to 
engage in, or be literate in regard to, research that demonstrates the difference chaplain 
interventions make as well as the value they add.12 Efforts currently underway include 
Transforming Chaplaincy, a project based at Rush University in Chicago, headed by George 
Fitchett and colleagues. Another research center is the Duke University Center for Spirituality, 
Theology and Health. Recent research projects include Joel Berning's development of a protocol 
using charts with illustrations of spiritual symbols to enhance communication with mechanically 
ventilated patients,13 as well as Kate Piedman's work with patients nearing the end of life to 
create Spiritual Legacy Documents for themselves, their families, and their loved ones.   
Still, quantitative research, while valuable, must not obscure the importance of the 
qualitative experience of patients, nor in any case does it or can it resolve the very significant and 
glaring contemporary issue of the relevance of religious and or spiritual language in a post-
Holocaust, post-Hiroshima, post-multi-genocidal world. 
                                               
12 This is common language used by hospital administrators when evaluating the benefit of 
employing chaplains, hence a key criterion of study in the area of “evidence-based chaplaincy.” 
 
13 Joel N. Berning et al. “A Novel Picture Guide to Improve Spiritual Care and Reduce Anxiety 
in Mechanically Ventilated Adults in the Intensive Care Unit,” Annals of the American Thoracic 
Society 13, no. 8 (August 2016): 1333-1342. 
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However, I propose to reconceptualize chaplaincy somewhat differently, that is, returning 
to earlier sources and demonstrating their continuing relevance for a changing patient population. 
The first step in this effort involves re-examining the Judeo-Christian theology of spiritual pain. 
The Judeo-Christian literature of existential and spiritual pain goes back to the Book of Job, 
which is the ur-text of spiritual pain literature. Following from this are two critical theological 
concepts: witness and narrative.  
These concepts relate directly to the verbatim, the traditional training tool used by 
chaplains. I believe that by reimagining and reinterpreting the traditional role of chaplains in the 
light of the concepts of witness and narrative, which are religious in nature but not tied to any 
specific doctrine or denomination, chaplains can both respond better to the contemporary scene 
and explain as well as legitimate their unique contribution to patient care. Indeed, by reflecting 
on the traditional learning tool of the verbatim in light of these concepts, particularly narrative, 
best practices in chaplaincy are facilitated, rendering the contributions of chaplains more 
valuable to patients and demonstrable to other members of the health care team.  
Here, an explanation of the significance accorded witness and narrative in what follows is 
in order. Chapter Five presents a close reading of selected passages in Job. The discussion turns 
on Job’s witness before God, on his giving testimony, almost in a juridical sense, of his 
suffering. Moreover, Job’s friends, Eliphaz the Temanite, Bildad the Shuhite, and Zophar the 
Naamathite, are ordinarily considered to provide cold comfort to Job in his misery. However, 
Carol Newsom raises the question whether the friends suggest narrative visions to Job in an 
effort to help him survive. 
Chapter Six considers narratives of suffering offered by Holocaust survivors Judith 
Sherman and Elie Wiesel. The discussion concerns the significance of the voice in contributing 
 9 
 
to one’s sense of agency and personhood under the most inhuman conditions. The narratives of 
Sherman and Wiesel articulate not only their authors’ specific suffering, but human suffering. 
The theme of suffering is continued through Chapter Seven in the somewhat unlikely 
comparison of philosopher and Talmudic scholar Emmanuel Levinas and liberation theologian 
and Roman Catholic priest Gustavo Gutierrez. Levinas and Gutierrez both place the suffering of 
the Other and our responsibility to the Other prior to metaphysics. Donna Orange quotes from 
the Levinasian critique of metaphysics, calling this “a devastating critique of objectifying 
reductions”:  
 
 
Knowledge reveals, names, and consequently classifies. Speech addresses itself to 
a face. Knowledge seizes hold of its object. It possesses it. Possession denies the 
independence of being, without destroying that being – it denies and maintains. 
But the face for its part, is inviolable; those eyes which are absolutely without 
protection, the most naked part of the human body, none the less offer an absolute 
resistance to possession, an absolute resistance in which the temptation to murder 
is inscribed: the temptation of absolute negation.14 
 
As there is an emphasis upon the voice in Chapter Six, there is abundant emphasis upon 
the face in Levinas: “According to Levinas … before the face I do not simply remain there 
contemplating it, I respond to it.”15 Indeed, the subject of the body itself occupies significance in 
these writings, calling to mind its centrality in framing and even creating the experience of the 
sick. Moreover, in Levinas the concept of witness recurs. That is, an ethic of responsibility to the 
Other takes shape through what Levinas calls “a passivity more passive than any passivity,” a 
                                               
14 Donna M. Orange, Thinking for Clinicians: Philosophical Resources for Contemporary 
Psychoanalysis and the Humanistic Psychotherapies (New York: Routledge, 2010), 82.  
 
15 Quoted in Orange, Thinking for Clinicians, 83. 
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“being hostage” or a “state of subjection to the neighbor,” but through which is a witnessing of 
the Infinite or the Transcendent.16 
A comparison of these literatures, emphasizing Levinas and Gutiérrez, with additional 
reference to Sherman, Wiesel, Hannah Arendt’s The Human Condition,17 Elaine Scarry’s The 
Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World,18 and other writers, offers fresh 
approaches to theist, and, sometimes, using Richard Kearney’s term, “anatheist” language and 
conceptuality in the practice of post-modern pastoral care.19  
In summarizing, there are several premises underlying the decision to emphasize witness 
and narrative. The concepts figure significantly in all these writers, beginning with Job and 
continuing even in Levinas inasmuch as, for Levinas, not to respond to the face of the Other is in 
some measure to negate it. Rahel Naef writes: 
 
Based on Levinas’ writings, I suggest that bearing witness is a form of ethical 
resistance, whereby a moral responsibility toward the other, is explicitly 
recognized. Levinas’ ethic of responsibility suggests that one cannot turn away 
from the other without negating the other, which is an act of violence.20 
 
                                               
16 Emmanuel Levinas, Of God Who Comes to Mind (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 
1986), 73. 
 
17 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958). 
 
18 Elaine Scarry, The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1985). 
 
19 Richard Kearney, Anatheism: Returning to God After God (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2010). 
 
20 Rahel Naef, “Bearing Witness: A Moral Way of Engaging in the Nurse-Person Relationship,” 
Nursing Philosophy 7, no. 3 (2006): 146-156. 
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Understood in this way, bearing witness is as central to the activity of hospital chaplains 
as facilitating narrative. These assumptions likewise inform the choices of literature this project 
considers. Again, the project is premised first upon a conviction that the term “spirituality,” as it 
is frequently employed by chaplains, is frequently “muddied” and often intellectually incoherent; 
at worst, it represents an insult to the depth of genuine religious and existential questioning. This 
is by no means to say that all uses of the term “spirituality” are superficial. Spirituality, however 
little it may be appreciated by many, is born of religion. Rather, I refer to a specific 
contemporary and highly marketable corruption of the term that is increasingly common and 
which, in my opinion, undermines the good work of properly trained hospital chaplains.  
Second, the project is premised upon the suggestion that patients encountered by 
chaplains today, as well as chaplains themselves, share a religious and theological consciousness 
that is deeply conditioned by the traumatic events of recent history. Significantly, trauma 
assumes a place of importance in Levinas, who describes the “ordering of the neighbor to me” 
(which requires a response lest I negate the Other) as “[slipping] into me like a thief, despite the 
taut weave of consciousness; a trauma that surprises me absolutely.”21 Indeed, while it is not 
necessarily the case that the concerns patients bring to speech in talking with chaplains have to 
do with trauma (although frequently they do), it is, in my view, always the case that the 
collective mental and emotional matrix in which these concerns come to recognition is implicitly 
and very deeply informed by historical trauma.22 Of course, it cannot be emphasized enough that 
                                               
21 Levinas, Of God Who Comes to Mind, 75. In reflecting on Levinas’ use of the word “trauma,” 
it is deeply sad and noteworthy that he, alone among all his family, survived the Holocaust. 
 
22  The term “historical trauma” has a very specific meaning among social workers, 
psychologists, and historians. That is not the sense in which it is used here. Rather, here I refer to 
incidents of history that have been of deep consequence with respect to the contemporary 
intelligibility of religious language. Historical trauma in the other sense refers to a complex and 
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the historical trauma I refer to is very different (and probably merits a different name; perhaps 
“crisis”23) from the individual psychological trauma experienced by many of the authors 
considered in the latter half of the project. Nonetheless, the world of which they write and in 
which they endured true psychological trauma is the history bequeathed to us, and in which we, 
admittedly in a far lesser way, struggle to employ religious language with integrity. Moreover, I 
wonder to what degree a dependence upon a superficial spirituality represents a flight from the 
very deep and substantial challenges implicit in using religious language today. I further believe 
that the collective religious consciousness (I use the term “collective consciousness” as a 
metaphor only) exists, in my view, in a continual state of quiet desperation. The belief-deflating 
historical atrocities of the last century24 continually dog the heels of hospital chaplains whether 
they recognize it or not. I admit that the latter view may be idiosyncratic and specific to my own 
consciousness, and not necessarily descriptive of other chaplains. However, with this disclaimer 
                                                                                                                                                       
collective trauma experienced over time and across generations by a group of people who share 
an identity, affiliation, or circumstance. Although the term was originally introduced to describe 
the experience of children of Holocaust survivors, in the past two decades it has been applied to 
numerous colonized indigenous groups throughout the world, as well as African-Americans, 
Armenian refugees, Japanese-American survivors of internment camps, Swedish immigrant 
children whose parents were torture victims, Palestinian youth, the people of Cyprus, Belgians, 
Cambodians, Israelis, Mexicans and Mexican-Americans, Russians, and many other cultural 
groups and communities that share a history of oppression, victimization, or massive group 
trauma exposure. See generally Nathaniel Vincent Mohatt et al., “Historical Trauma as Public 
Narrative: A Conceptual Review of How History Impacts Present-Day Health,” Social Science & 
Medicine 106 (April 2014): 128-136. 
 
23 Richard Kearney, On Paul Ricoeur: The Owl of Minerva (London: Ashgate, 2004), 364. 
 
24 Examples include the First and Second World Wars, including the Holocaust and Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki; the Armenian Genocide; Stalin and the gulags; the Vietnam War; Rwanda; 9/11; 
etc. 
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regarding the “extremer examples”25 of my own choosing, I argue that the contemporary 
religious consciousness is deeply wounded by memory. The atrocities of the last century that 
fomented the Death of God theology (and recall its earlier avowal in Nietzsche with its profound 
influence upon so much Continental thought) are no less present to us, however much we may 
choose to refocus our attention and retreat from them, and it is partly for this reason that I choose 
to reflect upon writers who give powerful expression to those experiences that have shaped our 
modern world-view. Of course, there are positive events which have likewise shaped and molded 
modern sensibilities, but these have less bearing on the issues of suffering, transition, and loss 
that more frequently characterize the concerns that patients and chaplains together address. 
Again, it is admittedly an idiosyncratic choice, steeped in post-Auschwitz, post-modern 
skepticism, but that same skepticism may ground any of us as we seek meaning, possibly 
religious meaning, in confronting the inevitable existential challenges in life.  
Lastly, surely, that which one understands as “ungodliness” varies depending upon 
personal history and location, individual temperament, and a host of other variables. For me, 
“ungodliness” is unquestionably present in the Holocaust. The Holocaust, more than any other 
atrocity in history, forms the horizon of evil against which any continuing use of Christian 
religious or theological language must justify itself. This project is rooted in the difficulty of 
continuing to employ religious language in the wake of the Holocaust, and so it turns to writers 
whose experience gives utterance to that seeming impossibility, as well as to the still more 
                                               
25 William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience (New York: Viking Penguin, 1982), 
486: “If any of you are enemies of what our ancestors used to brand as enthusiasm, and are, 
nevertheless, still listening to me now, you have probably felt my selection to have been 
sometimes almost perverse, and have wished I might have stuck to soberer examples. I reply that 
I took these extremer examples as yielding the profounder information. To learn the secrets of 
any science, we go to expert specialists … and not to commonplace pupils. We combine what 
they tell us with the rest of our wisdom, and form our final judgment independently.” 
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fundamental challenge of maintaining the integrity of the self in the face of inhuman horror, 
recognizing that what is writ large in the profound experiences of the authors surveyed may be 
present to a far lesser degree in that of hospitalized patients.  
Levinas, whose entire family was murdered in the death camps, “precisely because of the 
danger of reducing the Shoah … normally avoided speaking of it, preferring to allow the 
unspeakable its hallowed ground.”26 There is a danger in speaking of literature written by 
survivors of the Holocaust alongside other descriptions of trauma of neglecting to recognize and 
articulate the unique and incomparable horror of that historical event. I have tried to avoid that 
danger; but if I have to any extent not succeeded, I offer my sincere apologies. 
Nevertheless, I believe there is value in my “extremer examples,” and that the problem of 
“comparative grief” is inherent in any attempt to ground chaplaincy in a larger philosophical 
context, or more broadly, in any attempt to ground praxis in theory or pastoral application in 
theological principle. The mother who loses a newborn, the patient who receives a surprise 
diagnosis of pancreatic cancer, and the young wife whose husband is killed in an auto accident 
suffer a disintegration of their sense of meaning, and indeed trauma. It is trauma writ small, in 
contrast to historical trauma writ large. But philosophers and theologians seldom write about 
highly specific incidents of pain or loss; their writing is often painted on a larger societal canvas, 
both to underscore the sweep of their thoughts and to be assured of universal subject matter 
recognition. Any attempt to ground pastoral application in philosophy will therefore inevitably 
necessitate working backward from historical issues of great moment to highly personal ones. 
Indeed, Scripture itself invites this process, drawing lessons for believers not from isolated 
medical tragedies but from slavery in Egypt and captivity in Babylon. When it comes to 
                                               
26 Donna M. Orange, Thinking for Clinicians, 84-85. 
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individual human suffering, of course, there is no “extremer example” than the Book of Job, and 
readers are invited to view their theodicy questions through this ultimate prism. Indeed, the 
lessons of the book would likely have far less power and credibility if the experience of Job were 
more ordinary and quotidian.  
 
C. Sources 
 Sources for this project fall into five main categories: 
 (a) Medical and nursing journal articles outlining the efforts of health care professionals 
to address spiritual, existential pain. These include articles pertaining to doctors, nurses, and 
other health professionals. A search for journal articles was conducted using keywords 
existential pain, chaplain, spiritual pain, palliative, qualitative, and end of life. Databases 
searched include MEDLINE/PubMed, nih.gov., and Google Scholar.  
 (b) Works by hospital and hospice chaplains addressing the contemporary challenges 
they face in the medical setting. These include, but are not limited to, Fitchett and Nolan’s 
Spiritual Care at the End of Life: The Chaplain as a ‘Hopeful Presence,’ Bramadat, Coward, and 
Stajduhar’s Spirituality in Hospice Palliative Care, Coward and Stajduhar’s Religious 
Understandings of a Good Death in Hospice Palliative Care, and Murphy and Whorton’s 
Chaplaincy in Hospice and Palliative Care. 
(c) Theological/philosophical works, particularly focusing on narrative, witness, and the 
Book of Job, including Emmanuel Levinas’s Of God Who Comes to Mind and Gustavo 
Gutiérrez’s Job: God-Talk and the Suffering of the Innocent. 
(d) Secondary sources pertaining to the theological/philosophical works, including 
Emmanuel Levinas: Basic Philosophical Writings by Peperzak, et al. 
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(e) Works on narrative, including Mattingly and Garro’s Narrative and the Cultural 
Construction of Illness and Healing, Mattingly’s Healing Dramas and Clinical Plots, and 
Hauerwas and Jones’s Why Narrative? Readings in Narrative Theology. 
 
D. Methodology 
 Sometimes a return to roots, or origins, is the most effective way to create something 
new. In this case, the effort is to create a new, or reconceptualize an old (which is often the same 
thing), understanding of chaplaincy that is sustainable for a changed and ever-changing 
population. The project begins with an overview of the historical roots of the current multiplicity 
of understandings of spirituality. In this section, no analysis of spirituality per se is offered for 
the simple reason that such analyses are too numerous.27 Rather, the emphasis is on the historical 
changes that have led to the contemporary scene, particularly to the emergence of a growing 
number of people who describe themselves as “spiritual but not religious.” This is followed by a 
review of the literature showing other professionals’ increasing interest in addressing this type of 
suffering, as well as a discussion of the unique strengths that chaplains bring to this endeavor. 
Finally, the project takes up the challenge of reinterpreting the traditional role of chaplaincy in a 
way that responds to contemporary needs.  
As to this last point: Western religious traditions do not attempt to “solve” the problem of 
spiritual pain, of death and loss; it is, as Job discovers, humanly incomprehensible. There is no 
intervention, medical or otherwise, that can “fix” grief and mourning and fear. But one can be 
present with someone experiencing it, and can serve as a companion on the journey. As 
                                               
27 A. Edwards et al., “The Understanding of Spirituality and the Potential Role of Spiritual Care 
in End-of-Life and Palliative Care: A Meta-Study of Qualitative Research,” Palliative Medicine 
24, no. 8 (December 2010): 753-770. 
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chaplains’ experience has long shown, this role as witness to others’ pain, of being with them as 
they cope with and seek to manage or even negotiate it, is capable at times of generating both 
deep comfort and genuine personal transformation in the face of tragedy.  
As the biblical literature demonstrates, we cannot understand the mystery of suffering 
and pain through simple explanations and bromides, which always tend to leave the person 
actually experiencing them deeply unsatisfied. But we can tell stories, both our own and those of 
others, using the power of parable and metaphor to shed light on our existential condition. This is 
why the Bible consists so largely of narrative. This is why, for example, Carrie Doehring in her 
book The Practice of Pastoral Care: A Postmodern Approach describes “storytelling as the heart 
of pastoral care.”28 And this is why chaplains employ narrative skill and understanding in their 
interactions with patients, in effect encouraging and enabling them to “write their own stories” as 
a way to cope with the emotional pain they are experiencing.  
Tying these together is the fundamental learning tool in the training of chaplains, the 
verbatim, in which chaplains recount as meticulously as possible the actual process of a patient 
encounter. This technique allows them to reflect directly on their role as witness, as well as on 
the way in which a narrative is constructed.  
Seen in this way, chaplains are uniquely positioned to respond to spiritual and existential 
pain, through their religious and theological background, their training, and their specific way of 
interacting with patients and families. It should be kept in mind that all other members of the 
health care team have other, primary jobs, of which attention to spiritual care is a component of 
the care they offer. But chaplains can respond to this pain directly; it is their primary role on the 
team. And because they are (if properly understood) focused on witness and narrative instead of 
                                               
28 Carrie Doehring, The Practice of Pastoral Care: A Postmodern Approach (Louisville, KY: 
Westminster John Knox Press, 2015), xiv. 
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simply on ritual and prayer, they can do this effectively for people who have a “spiritual but not 
religious” orientation – or, indeed, even a purely atheist or humanist orientation. 
The concept of narrative structures the second half of the project. While the first half 
discusses the role of the chaplain in the health care setting, and the need for a new understanding 
– a new narrative – of what exactly chaplains do and what they add to the care of patients, the 
second half addresses narrative as an interpretive tool in itself. Going deeper, it examines the 
literature of narrative with particular emphasis on an ancient narrative, the Book of Job, and 
newer ones in the form of a reflection on the writings of Levinas in Of God Who Comes to Mind 
and Gutiérrez in Job: God-Talk and the Suffering of the Innocent. All three offer interesting 
paths forward. Job is in part a reflection on questions of theodicy that may appeal and apply 
equally to religious and non-religious persons, while Levinas and Gutiérrez both articulate a 
manner of presence in the face of suffering that is instructive for chaplains, and illuminating 
whether one is theist, atheist, or agnostic. 
This second portion of the project will also include a case study illustrating the role of 
narrative in chaplain interventions. The case study is qualitative in nature, and all identifying 
information is changed to protect the privacy of the individuals involved. As the study was not 
undertaken to advance a theory, it is not research in the regulatory sense, and therefore does not 
require IRB approval.  
 
E. Definitions 
 The key definitional challenge in this project is what is meant by “existential pain” or 
“spiritual distress,” especially when these terms are divorced from the traditional religious 
context in which they in the past have usually been expressed. 
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Tatsuya Morita et al. define spiritual pain as “pain caused by the extinction of the being 
and the meaning of the self.”29 Strang et al. contend that physicians commonly refer to the fear of 
annihilation, while chaplains more often cite guilt and other religious issues, and pain specialists 
note that living itself is painful.30  
In the end, the exact nature of existential pain may be different for each person, but this 
argues persuasively for an open-ended approach grounded in narrative and witness, one that is 
open to changing needs in a rapidly changing society. 
 
F. Limitations 
 This project seeks to identify a problem in contemporary chaplaincy practice and to offer 
a way of thinking that can lead to more successful patient interactions as well as greater 
understanding of the role of chaplains in medical settings. 
 As such, it is not intended to be a theoretical discussion of existentialism, a treatise on the 
psychology of grief and loss, or a theological consideration of end-of-life issues in general. 
While I believe that the theological observations are well thought out, they are grounded first and 
foremost in practical necessity – the need for a language to address the concerns of the “spiritual 
but not religious” population and to explain the value of chaplaincy beyond the narrow confines 
of sacraments, prayers and liturgy. The project will be successful if it helps chaplains to do their 
jobs better. 
 
                                               
29 Tatsuya Morita et al. “Meaning in Terminally Ill Cancer Patients: A Randomized Controlled 
Study,” Journal of Pain and Symptom Management 37, no. 4 (April 2009): 649-658. 
 
30 Peter Strang et al., “Existential Pain – An Entity, A Provocation, or a Challenge?” Journal of 
Pain and Symptom Management, 27, no. 3 (March 2004): 241-250. 
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Chapter 2: Preface 
 
 
 
I met Maria in March 2006. Maria was 82, and at the time I met her had recently 
undergone an emergency surgery to which not she, but one of her three sons, had consented. This 
occurrence is unfortunately not unusual in that, in emergency settings, where a decision whether 
to perform surgery is required quickly, family members attempt to act in good faith on behalf of 
their loved one in a very short time. Often, family members have not discussed the patient’s 
wishes in advance. An abdominal surgery on a woman in already compromised health not 
wholly surprisingly led to complications that were “no one’s fault,” apart from the “normal” and 
inevitable process of aging and bodily decline. Unfortunately, Maria experienced continual pain 
owing to an infection after a surgical procedure to which she had never given her consent. 
As I met with her over the course of four or more weeks, Maria freely shared with me her 
remarkable life story. As a young woman living under Soviet rule in Hungary, Maria had been 
quietly raised Catholic but then, like other Catholics in Hungary at that time, chose discretion as 
the best course of action. As a young woman, she was the close friend of P., who eventually 
entered religious life and founded an order of Sisters. That P. founded an independent order of 
nuns certainly owes much to the political and religious climate of the time and to the latter’s 
“underground” activities. Maria and P. remained close friends through adulthood, Maria’s 
marriage, and P.’s undertaking of vowed religious life. Eventually Maria and her husband moved 
to the United States, as did P.’s order of Sisters. 
From the beginning, Maria was grateful for pastoral visits from the Catholic chaplain 
and, most importantly, for the opportunity to receive the Eucharist. Maria, a highly intelligent 
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and articulate woman, generously shared her story with me. Maria maintained her close 
friendship with P., whose order of nuns had eventually found a home in southern California. 
Interestingly, one of Maria’s sons had become a lawyer in southern California. Another was a 
scientist at U.C.L.A. The third son, who had at least for a time worked as a photographer, resided 
with Maria; apparently this son suffered certain mental impairments. As a result, this son 
happened not to be Maria’s health care proxy. Instead the question of which treatments should be 
employed in treating Maria fell to sons who lived 3,000 miles away. Near the end of Maria’s life, 
during which she was still being treated aggressively per the direction of her lawyer son in 
California, Maria sought not only my intervention but her nurse’s intervention as well: “Please, 
please tell them to let me go! I’m suffering. Why? Why? Please tell them to let me go!”  
Maria should never have found herself in this perplexing situation. A health care proxy is 
not applicable in the case of patients still competent and able to make their own health care 
decisions and choices. Instead, Maria was assumed by a member of the medical staff to be 
suffering from depression – and this fact, he said, accounted for Maria’s desire not to undergo 
further curative medical treatment.  
Maria experienced her life as being a full one and pleaded that she now be relieved of 
further aggressive treatment and consequent suffering. She looked forward to peace and relief of 
physical pain. In response, the resident physician in charge of Maria’s immediate care ordered a 
psychiatric evaluation. Maria was evaluated as being of sound mind. However, in spite of this, 
and perhaps owing to the geographical remoteness of the son who was formally her health care 
proxy, Maria’s wishes did not prevail. Unfortunately, the easy, and in this case false, assumption 
continued that so long as Maria continued to be of sound mind she would of course want to be 
aggressively treated.  
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One day, the nurse caring for Maria approached me after my visit with her. She felt that 
Maria’s wishes were not being respected. This was what Maria had told me as well. As a result 
of a surgery to which she would not have consented in the first place if she had had the 
opportunity to speak, Maria suffered complications requiring further invasive treatment, 
including additional surgery. Maria was miserable and experiencing great pain. She believed, 
and probably correctly, that given her physical frailty no amount invasive medical treatment 
would restore to her a sufficient quality of life. 
When Maria’s nurse attempted to convey her sense of the situation to the resident 
physician in charge of Maria’s case, the physician became angry and accused the nurse of 
interference. It was after this event that Maria’s nurse requested I make a note in the medical 
chart reflecting the desire that Maria daily expressed.  
Notably, Maria’s husband had died decades earlier, and the son who had the most recent 
and intimate contact with her was precluded from the decision-making process. 
When the lawyer son arrived from California, I happened during a regular visit to have an 
opportunity to meet him. He was extremely cordial and polite. He was very devoted to the 
Church and attended daily Mass. Matters are infrequently what we presume. I had expected 
someone colder and more distant. Instead, I found this son to be gentlemanly and concerned for 
his mother’s welfare. 
Finally, Maria’s wishes were given precedence and she chose not to undergo further 
invasive treatment.  
Maria was transferred to a local rehabilitation facility/nursing home. After that, we knew 
only that Maria died. I and the nurses who had cared for her had at first waited for news and 
afterward looked for her name among the obituaries. There was nothing. One day the coordinator 
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of the senior center where Maria was “well-loved” called to say that, although she herself had 
heard nothing from Maria for a very long time, she was recently told by “a friend of a friend” 
that Maria had died. After that, the coordinator and those of us who had known Maria watched 
for details of a memorial service. We never found any. Maria had “vanished,” and those of us 
who knew her were very sad not to be able to pay a final tribute to a woman who had touched us 
deeply. 
Perhaps Maria’s sons who lived in California arranged for Maria’s burial there. It would 
certainly have been appropriate, given the presence of Maria’s dear friend P. and her order of 
Sisters in southern California. I simply don’t know. 
Of course, Maria’s story is one that articulates the ambiguity, complexity, and frequent 
lack of closure so common in pastoral interactions. However, equally important, Maria’s 
Catholic spirituality, once common, is today nearly unique. It pervades her story, and indeed in 
many ways it is easy to write about Maria in part because she seems to experience the Catholic 
theological language she employs as adequate in expressing her emotions and her sense of 
meaning and insight. 
This is not so in the next case. Earlier I referred to the verbatim, a learning tool of long 
standing within clinical pastoral education. Again, I believe it may be possible to engage in some 
useful reinterpretation and reimagining of the traditional role of the chaplain in light of the 
concepts of witness and narrative. The verbatim is a vehicle uniquely useful for this sort of 
reflection, and so the following case is presented in verbatim form.  
 
Unit of Hospital: Emergency Department 
 
Religious Preference: Unknown 
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Admitting Diagnosis: Death of a 22-month-old child. 
 
Factual Information: 22-month-old child is admitted and treated in MAH Emergency 
Department. Attempts to resuscitate child are unsuccessful. 
 
Patient’s Initial Concern: Parent(s) distraught because the child has died. 
 
Age: 22 months                                                       Sex: Female 
 
M—Mother                     C--Chaplain                        OBN—Obstetrics Nurse           
F—Father                        PR—Priest               
N—Nurse                        NM—Nurse Manager 
 
 
ADDITIONAL FACTUAL INFORMATION 
 
PLANS 
 
There was no mistaking it. Even if I hadn’t known the deceased baby was in ED room 8, the 
trauma room, I could not, nor could anyone, have missed it – the mother’s loud wailing, her 
anguish. This was the first thing I experienced upon entering the ED. My plan developed in the 
moment. My plan was to “hold her,” the child’s mother, either physically or through emotional 
presence with her. Whatever would be helpful to her. My plan was also to provide support to 
staff. Mount Auburn staff infrequently deal with the death of a child as Mount Auburn does not 
have a pediatric floor. Labor/Delivery has experience in caring for patients who have 
experienced a fetal demise, but the death of a 22-month-old child is relatively unusual for ED 
staff. 
 
OBSERVATIONS 
 
In the trauma room the mother sobbed and wailed. As the ET tube had to remain in place, the 
mother literally lay down over her daughter, Felicity, sobbing. The mother desperately needed to 
cradle her daughter in her arms but could not because the ET tube had to remain in place until 
the Medical Examiner arrived. 
 
THE VISIT 
 
C1: (Drawing open the glass door and the curtain inside it, then drawing both closed again 
behind me) I enter trauma room 8. The lights have been lowered; the room is darkened. Felicity’s 
mother, Anna, is lying over her 22-month-old daughter, sobbing. A nurse stands behind Anna, 
holding her and rubbing her back. Two other nurses are in the trauma room. One holds tissues. 
The other stands by, quietly. I take a position near the nurse who is rubbing Anna’s back. I 
extend my hand to gently touch Anna’s shoulder. (I am also communicating to the nurse rubbing 
Anna’s back that I will be with Anna, in the event there are other things she needs to do. 
Unfortunately, this tragedy has occurred on an evening that is already a busy one in the ED.) 
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N1: (Continues to rub Anna’s back, then steps away.) 
 
C2: I step forward and continue (literally, physically) holding Anna as she wails and sobs over 
her baby. (Anna clearly needs to weep and grieve, and my goal is to create a “space” in which 
she can.) 
 
(I know from having spoken with the ED nurse manager upon receiving the initial page that we 
are awaiting the arrival of the baby’s father. I know also from my previous conversation that the 
circumstances of Felicity’s death are ambiguous. Felicity was in the care of a friend of her 
mother, who operated a day care center. It seems that Anna’s friend put Felicity down for a nap 
around 2:00 p.m., then in checking in around 4:00 p.m. discovered Felicity unresponsive and 
called Emergency Services. Felicity had no known pre-existing conditions. There is a very 
evident police presence in the ED. The Medical Examiner will take the case, and at some point 
he will come to the hospital for the child’s body.) 
 
C3: I continue literally holding Anna as she weeps and sobs over her daughter. I say nothing 
(there are no words). 
 
F1: (Bursting in) I’ll kill him! Whoever did this – I’ll kill him! I killed hundreds of men to keep 
you safe! I killed to keep you safe! God, I hate you! (Over and again) I killed men to keep you 
safe! 
 
M1: Continues weeping. 
 
C4: The ethnicity of the family and the extremity of the situation suggest that they might like a 
priest/clergyperson to support them. I take a chance in asking if they would, and Felicity’s 
mother says yes (that they are Catholic, as I guessed), they would like a priest to come. 
 
M2: (Turning to me) We tried for eight years to get pregnant through IVF! And there was 
nothing wrong with her! And now … (dissolving into tears). 
 
C5: I’m so sorry, Anna! 
 
(The child is beautiful. Apart from the presence of the ET tube she appears to be sleeping. Her 
face still has color and she has tousled blonde hair.) 
 
M3: (Between sobs) She liked the dog … She played with the dog all the time … The dog loved 
her so much! She was healthy … There was nothing wrong with her! 
 
C6: (There are two nurses together with us in the trauma room and now seems a good time to 
call the priest on call) Anna, I am going to call the priest now. I will be right back. 
 
M4: (Weeping) Okay. 
 
C7: (I return to trauma room 8) Anna, the priest will be here soon. 
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F2: You tell me why this happened! You tell me! 
 
C8: I honestly do not know. I really don’t. I am so very sorry. 
 
M5: Felicity’s mother continues to weep, her own body heaving with sobs while lying over that 
of her deceased baby. 
 
PR1: (Some minutes later, Father Mike Antonio arrives). 
 
F3: (Felicity’s father continues raging) (Then, addressing Father Mike) Padre! You tell me why 
this happened! 
 
M6: (Turning toward me) Please, I just can’t be with him (her husband) right now! (We leave 
trauma room 8 and go to the ED quiet room.) 
 
M7: You know, we couldn’t live together in the same house after he returned from Iraq. His 
PTSD was so severe we couldn’t live in the same house! We were just now beginning to be able 
to live together under the same roof. 
 
C9: That’s so difficult and painful! I’m so sorry! Anna, I cannot begin to imagine … 
 
M8: I left my baby with my friend! She should have been safe! Why wasn’t she safe? Why?! 
 
(We sit together. Anna weeps. I rub her shoulder.) 
 
C10: (On a hunch) You know, this is not your fault. 
 
M9: It sure feels like it is! 
 
C11: Anna … you left your daughter in the car of a trusted friend … you did what any of us 
would do. 
 
(We continue to sit together while Anna weeps.) 
 
M10: We tried for eight years to get pregnant through IVF. Finally we did (sobbing). 
 
C12: Speechless … pause …  
 
M11: (Rising) I want to see my baby. 
 
C13: (Quietly) Lets go. 
 
(We return to the trauma room where Fr. Mike and the baby’s father, Bill, are sitting side-by-
side, silently on the floor. Neither rises. Anna goes to her baby.) 
 
M12: Anna lies over Felicity, quietly weeping. 
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F4: Bill leaves to speak with the state troopers who are standing outside in the hall. Fr. Mike and 
I, together with two nurses, stay with Anna and Felicity. I rub Anna’s back. One of the two 
nurses has the presence of mind to grab a tissue and wipe Anna’s nose. Bill is gone for more than 
15 minutes. With Fr. Mike inside the trauma room, I step out to speak with the nurse manager. 
 
NM1: (Guessing my concern and with a nod in the direction of the police officers) First the M.E. 
said he’d be here in an hour or so. Then we got a call that he won’t be here until morning. 
(Exasperated, frustrated) But these people are not leaving their baby here alone. The M.E. needs 
to come tonight. We’re working on that now. 
 
C14: Wow. I’m so sorry. This is tough for you guys as well. 
 
NM2: (Looking down at the computer screen) … And it’s busy here … (harried and hurriedly) 
Thank you for coming. 
 
(It’s evident that it’s a very busy night in the ED, in addition to the baby death in trauma room 8. 
Staff are overloaded.) 
 
C15: Of course. 
 
C16: (Returning to the trauma room) I continue to quietly attempt to support Anna. 
 
PR2: (Very quietly) Can I speak with you for a moment? 
 
C17: Sure. (Together we step outside the room.) 
 
PR3: I don’t know what to do. I’m happy to stay … but I don’t want to stay if they don’t want 
me here. 
 
C18: (Shaking my head and sighing) And I don’t know what to tell you. They haven’t told you to 
leave. Just follow your instinct, your sense of things. Just trust yourself. They haven’t told you to 
leave. Whatever you do, I am so grateful for your coming here tonight. Thank you so much for 
coming. 
 
(Frankly, neither Fr. Mike nor I know what Fr. Mike should do … stay or leave. As it turns out, 
Fr. Mike stays. Almost until the M.E. arrives.) 
 
(Fr. Mike and I return to trauma room 8.) 
 
OBN1: (Quietly) Mary, here is (handing me) a memory box with some mementos of Felicity. 
Perhaps you could give it to the parents … when you think the time is right. 
 
(The OB L&D Nurse had spent some time with Anna before I was paged to the ED.) 
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C19: Thanks. (I am feeling very cautious regarding handing over this memory box to parents 
whose loss is so raw, and whose anger, on the part of the father, is apparent. So is the OB L&D 
Nurse.) I lay the memory box aside for the time and continue “holding” Anna as Anna continues 
to hold (as best she can) her daughter Felicity. 
 
 
ANALYSIS OF THE PATIENT 
 
THEOLOGICAL CONCERNS 
 
God is absent. He is absent from Anna and Bill. This is a question of theodicy. Why does God 
permit the innocent to suffer? Both Anna and Bill feel betrayed. Why does God permit betrayal 
of the innocent? Anna and Bill each, in different ways, protest that they tried to keep their baby 
safe. What happened? How could this happen?  
 
PSYCHOLOGICAL CONCERNS 
 
I believe there is no loss more difficult to bear than the loss of a child. Anna’s grief is 
overwhelming. Our minds “run empty” as there are no words for Anna’s loss, or Bill’s. Bill, 
Felicity’s father rages, and besides giving our attention to Anna, we (myself and the nurses) feel 
safer with the policemen near. That the father suffers from PTSD comes as no surprise. Anna and 
Bill grieve very differently. This new grief re-opens the wound that has barely begun to heal, the 
psychological wounding Bill experienced in Iraq and that has continued to fester as PTSD. And 
then there’s the M.E. who must, by law, take Felicity’s body.  
 
SOCIO-CULTURAL CONCERNS 
 
Anna and Bill’s surname is Portuguese. I strongly suspect they are Catholic, and if I’m wrong, 
I’d rather simply apologize than ask what is their religious preference, or if they have one, at a 
time like this. Also, there is no sacramental need for a Roman Catholic priest, and if this were 
like many other deaths I’ve attended, I wouldn’t call one. However, this is the death of a baby 
under unexplained circumstances, and if ever the ritual representational presence of a priest is 
appropriate, it is now. Although the dialogue above doesn’t particularly evince theological 
reflection or participation in a church community as being significant in Anna and Bill’s 
everyday lives, the presence of Fr. Mike and of myself carries a representational significance. 
Interestingly, apart from Fr. Mike, all the people caring for Anna are women. The physician, who 
I’m certain spoke with Anna previously, does not reappear. Comforting the grieving is most 
often women’s work. Anna herself is awaiting her grandmother. Her grandmother, when she 
arrives, brings the greatest comfort to Anna. Anna’s grandmother offers some amount of 
“structure” to the chaos of death and loss. 
 
ANALYSIS OF THE CHAPLAIN 
 
Rachel weeping for her children. The language, the image, comes to me immediately, when I 
hear wailing, even before drawing the curtain and stepping into the room. A mental image can 
have an orienting effect in a disorienting moment, but in spite of its surfacing almost 
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automatically, it is always specific in its meaning to the person in whose mind it occurs (in this 
case, mine) and I am careful not to overgeneralize it to the people before me. Also, inwardly, I 
experience something like, but not exactly, a shiver as I approach the room. This is a familiar 
sensation, and not without some value as it forces me to stop psychologically, recognize my 
inevitable limitations, and slow down, or in other words to attempt to quiet any distractions or 
chatter in my mind. In such circumstances, a moment of prayer can be useful in enabling me to 
transition to a setting in which I have no control, just as I’ve observed many times before in 
being present with bereaved families that prayer can quiet and focus the mind. The most I can 
offer, and indeed all I can offer, is simple presence. I can listen. 
 
 
In my understanding, simple presence and listening, long the skills clinical pastoral 
education supervisors have sought to inculcate in chaplains, constitute a form of witness. In this 
case, witness functions as the only action that can be undertaken. Subsequent chapters discuss 
Levinas’ “passivity before the Other,” “one’s state of being hostage to the face of the Other.”  If 
there is in this situation little if anything possible other than witness, it seems nevertheless that 
the passivity of which Levinas speaks is paradoxical. Remaining hostage to the face of the other 
does not “feel” passive; rather, it seems to assume effort in not turning away. What I refer to as 
witness could equally be described as compassionate presence and active listening. However, 
new language is sometimes helpful in moving the needle forward, so to speak, in our reflection. 
It is for this reason that the pages that follow take up the subject of Levinas and hint at a 
Levinasian pastoral care. It could be described as different language for old or similar 
phenomena, but new language, even if similar, never simply mirrors the old. Perhaps its unique 
nuance and detail can open up something new.  
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Chapter 3: Hospital Chaplaincy in an Age of Spirituality 
 
The decline of organized religion has opened a vacuum that health care professionals, as 
well as chaplains, are seeking to fill. The question is: How can chaplains respond? More 
particularly, how can they do so in a manner that maintains fidelity to their own religious and 
spiritual values, attends to the needs of an increasingly diverse patient population, and 
reinforces their value as an important part of the health care team? This is the problem. 
                                                                                                                        
 What is hospital chaplaincy and what are its core concerns? Most people, even people 
working in hospitals, either don't know or, were they to hazard an informed guess, would 
probably say, “Hospital chaplains are priests, ministers, and rabbis who deal with religious issues 
that may arise in a hospital. They provide ‘Last Rites,’ preside at funerals and burial services, 
and officiate at the occasional in-hospital emergency baptism or wedding.” This is not a wrong 
answer, but it is extremely limited. And this is a problem in a time when “spirituality” is 
accorded increasing significance in medicine, nursing, social work, and end-of-life care. 
Spirituality, by contrast, although a relative newcomer on the hospital scene, has been 
welcomed, researched, and written about by physicians, psychologists, nurses, and social 
workers, as well as chaplains. Moreover, given the relative unpopularity of religion in 
contemporary secular society, spirituality is often seen as entirely separate from religion. In view 
of its contemporary popularity, spirituality seems capable of generating its own domain, one that 
hospital chaplains are seeking to occupy. But should they? Although chaplaincy is easily 
misconstrued as having exclusively to do with religion, “spirituality” is often used broadly, 
having little specificity or continuity in use, and bearing little, no, or even a vaguely antagonistic 
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relationship to what is often perceived as its “geriatric” cousin, religion. 
My goal is to offer an alternative reconceptualization of chaplaincy that is fundamentally 
a return to earlier sources within the Judeo-Christian literature of existential and spiritual pain. 
The examination is grounded in the theological concepts of witness and narrative. There is an 
irony, of course, in suggesting alternative concepts, witness and narrative, concepts which I have 
before described as not tied to any one religion, in a thesis that critiques the eclecticism of 
spirituality and champions in its stead, religion. This double-bind seems inescapable. I can only 
offer witness and narrative are concepts that I find more substantial and credible, in reflecting 
upon chaplaincy in a multi-faith setting, than the many alternatives popular at the moment.  
 
 
A.  Spirituality 
 
The concept of, or rather the use of the term, “spirituality” is today ubiquitous in pastoral 
care departments. There are numerous attempts to define spirituality, some of which are 
discussed below. One goal of the discussion that follows is to bring a degree of caution and 
reflection to the widely popular use of “spirituality,” particularly as regards its current usage in 
pastoral care. 
The current use of the term, as well as “spinoff terms” such as “spiritual but not 
religious” or even “spiritual and definitely not religious,”31 represents, at least in part, an effort to 
speak of an individual’s pursuit of wholeness and meaning. Nina Redl, a conservative rabbi and 
board-certified chaplain, writes: 
 
                                               
31 Paul Bramadat, Harold Coward, and Kelli I. Stajduhar, eds., Spirituality in Hospice Palliative 
Care (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2013), 2. 
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I define spirituality broadly, based on its primary translation as ‘breath.’ For me 
spirituality is not just religious, nor is it bound to a belief in a higher power. 
Rather it entails everything that makes us breathe and breathe freely, everything 
that defines us and identifies us. Hence, I believe everyone has a form of 
spirituality whether it be related to something sacred or something profane; even 
the profane becomes ‘sacred’ if it makes us feel alive and gives us the power to go 
through challenging situations.32 
 
Admittedly, Redl acknowledges defining spirituality broadly, but here it is used so 
broadly that, to be frank, while as a chaplain I believe I understand that to which Redl refers, as a 
reader I cannot make heads or tails of it. For that matter, I believe few people who are not 
chaplains would feel comfortable with such a definition. I do appreciate Redl’s reference to 
spiritus and its identification with “breath” and life; it is an effective metaphor and I think quite 
lovely aesthetically. However, Redl’s description of the sacred as that which allows us to go 
through challenging situations seems to me indistinguishable from good mental health. In 
addition, Redl asserts that “everyone has a form of spirituality.” This view is frequently 
expressed by chaplains and thinly disguises an anxiety regarding relevance, and worse still, feels 
imperious, even colonizing, in its implicit suggestion that “you have a spirituality,” presumably 
whether or not you think you do.  
By way of another definition, editors Bramadat, Coward, and Stajduhar, in the 
introduction to Spirituality in Hospice Palliative Care, attempt to differentiate spirituality from 
religion and define “spirituality” as follows: 
 
In this book we acknowledge the difficulty of defining ‘spirituality.’ For our 
purposes, however, we suggest the following operational definitions: ‘Spirituality’ 
relates to an individual’s pursuit of wholeness, well-being, transcendence, and 
                                               
32 Nina Redl, “What Can You Do for Me?” in Spiritual Care in Practice, ed. George Fitchett and 
Steve Nolan, 223-241. London: Jessica Kingsley Publishers, 2015. 
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oneness with the universe, whereas ‘religion’ typically denotes an 
institutionalized system within which the individual’s experiences are thought to 
unfold and be regulated.33 
 
 
Once more, while I initially credit the authors with acknowledging that their proposed 
definition is for operational purposes, I disagree with their use as a foil for spirituality the straw 
man-like definition of religion as “an institutionalized system within which the individual’s 
experiences are thought to unfold and be regulated.” Surely this is a flat and colorless statement 
of religion’s core propensities against which spirituality cannot help but sound more inviting. 
Distinctions made between religion and spirituality very often cast religion as “regulating,” if not 
positively arthritic, and moreover, I find myself disappointed and again befuddled by Bramadat 
et al.’s definition of spirituality as a person’s pursuit of “oneness with the universe,” something 
which sounds like an unfortunate and ill-advised inclusion of a line from a Beatles’ song. Such 
problems are common in proposed definitions of spirituality, and perhaps inevitable in 
attempting to find language for how a contemporary popular spirituality is understood. 
Dyson, Cobb and Foreman, in a literature review regarding the meaning of spirituality, 
write: 
 
…the self, others, and ‘God’ provide the key elements within a definition of 
spirituality, and that other emerging themes, namely meaning, hope, 
relatedness/connectedness, beliefs/belief systems and expressions of spirituality, 
can be articulated in the context of those three key elements. In particular, it is 
proposed that the nature of ‘God’ may take many forms and, essentially, is 
whatever an individual takes to be of highest value in his/her life.34 
 
                                               
33 Bramadat, Coward, and Stajduhar, Spirituality in Hospice Palliative Care, 2. 
 
34 Jane Dyson, Mark Cobb, and Dawn Forman, “The Meaning of Spirituality: A Literature 
Review,” Journal of Advanced Nursing 26, no. 6 (December 1997): 1183-1188. 
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In fairness, Dyson et al. acknowledge that their definition may not offer a definitive 
understanding of the phenomenon of spirituality, but they argue that it does provide “a direction 
for healthcare practitioners and researchers.”35 Their stated goal is to reintroduce into the nursing 
literature a form of holistic spiritual care that they feel has always been important in nursing, but 
lately has been overshadowed by prevalent scientific paradigms:  
 
If spirituality is recognized as such a key element in the delivery of holistic 
nursing care, why does its definition continue to elude the nursing profession? ... 
the dominance of the scientific paradigm within healthcare may be … a partial 
reason for inadequate spiritual care in nursing over the past decades, [and] the 
lack of agreed definition of the meaning of spirituality … This paper, therefore, 
seeks to review and elucidate some of the available literature … in order to 
identify appropriate assessment frameworks [italics mine] and methods of 
providing for spiritual needs.36 
 
Elsewhere, in describing “why millions of people describe themselves as ‘spiritual but 
not religious,’” so many in fact that the term has become a readily understood designation, Roger 
Gottlieb draws attention to “modern spirituality” as stressing virtues such as “awareness, 
generosity, and compassion” but not requiring “one particular description of God or a single 
sacred text.”37 
Gottlieb further considers: 
 
 
the idea that a single person can, say, benefit from the teachings of Buddhism and 
Christianity and Islam, that the differences between them (and there are many) are 
                                               
35 Dyson, Cobb, and Forman, “The Meaning of Spirituality,” 1187. 
 
36 Dyson, Cobb, and Forman, “The Meaning of Spirituality,” 1184. 
 
37 Roger S. Gottlieb, Spirituality: What It Is and Why It Matters (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2017), 1. 
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spiritually less important than the way they invite us to a life shaped by a shared 
understanding of spiritual virtues – this is new.  
 
Once more, the view of religion implicit in Gottlieb’s description of “modern spirituality” 
seems wholly innocent of syncretist tendencies present in religion as well as of religions 
themselves representing cultural phenomena that likewise evolve organically, just as he 
predicates of spirituality. 
To the credit of those who use the term, spirituality so defined may equally represent in 
part an accommodation to an increasingly culturally and religiously diverse society. To the 
degree that is linked with a recognition of increasing religious diversity, its popularity stems 
from an egalitarian impulse to survey a broad range of religious traditions, attributing a sense of 
value and respect to each, inclusive of religious orientations that may be vastly different in both 
substance and detail. It may function as a kind of shorthand for recognition of content and 
meaning across a broad spectrum of cultural expression, in a time when many may be seeking 
insight in an increasingly religiously diverse society. In particular, there may be value in 
distinguishing a construct of “spirituality” independent of “religion” that encompasses and 
supports compassionate care on the part of hospital chaplains, as well as of physicians, nurses, 
social workers, and other health care professionals, who come into contact with patients of vastly 
differing religious orientations as well as of no religious orientation.  
It is only fair to point out that there exist more as well as less persuasive and compelling 
accounts of the phenomenon of spirituality. Steven Sandage treads a road less frequently taken, 
at least less frequently taken as compared to writers on pastoral care, in beginning by addressing 
distinctions between religion and spirituality in social scientific and psychotherapy literature. 
Rather than attempting one more definition of spirituality, Sandage takes a less ontology-based 
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approach and instead considers differences in the way the words “religion” and “spirituality” are 
used. Religion, writes Sandage,  
 
is best understood as a multi-dimensional construct that can include an ultimate 
concern, social and communal identity, ritual and symbolic mediators of sacred 
space and experience, sacred forms of text and media, and moral and spiritual 
practices. The word ‘spirituality’ comes from the Latin root spiritus, which means 
‘breath’ or ‘life.’ This meaning is reflected in the many historical associations 
between spirituality and meditative breathing. A diverse array of definitions of 
spirituality have been offered by social scientists with little consensus. But like 
religion, spirituality involves multiple dimensions, including the social, cultural, 
cognitive, affective, behavioral, neurobiological, and existential. Many people 
interpret their spiritual experience through a worldview lens informed by their 
religious communities and traditions. Increasing numbers of individuals in 
western societies, however, do not view their spirituality as embedded with 
religion, and others are spiritually and religiously eclectic.38 
 
 “Spirituality” is, nonetheless, as both Sandage and Bramadat et al. point out, famously 
difficult to define. It may be helpful, in reflecting on its use and meaning in pastoral care, to 
begin with spirituality’s recent history in health and healing. Indeed, contemporary uses of the 
term “spirituality,” at least in the context of medicine and palliative care, descend directly from 
Cicely Saunders’ introduction of “a new way of treating the terminally ill … called ‘hospice 
care.’”39 Saunders, who was trained as a nurse, social worker, and physician, believed that 
terminally ill patients “should be able to die with dignity and at peace.”40 Far less known is the 
fact that Saunders was a Christian, and that her commitment to Christianity greatly influenced 
and shaped her ideas of care for the dying: 
                                               
38 F. LeRon Shults and Steven J. Sandage, Transforming Spirituality: Integrating Theology and 
Psychology (Ada, MI: Baker Academic, 2006), 155-156. 
 
39 Bramadat, Coward, and Stajduhar, Spirituality in Hospice Palliative Care, 2. 
 
40 Bramadat, Coward, and Stajduhar, Spirituality in Hospice Palliative Care, 2. 
 37 
 
 
Saunders developed a program for care of the dying based on three key principles: 
pain control, a family or community environment, and an engagement with the 
dying person’s most deeply rooted spirituality. Although the hospice movement 
began in a Christian context, it was clear from the start that there was to be no 
‘forcing of religion,’ and openness to all religions and understandings of 
spirituality was encouraged. Saunders view was that ‘… a good death’ is one that 
respects the entirety of a person’s life, in its material, human, and spiritual 
qualities and achievements. Spiritual concerns, for Saunders, meant the spirit of 
higher moral qualities especially as they may be related to religious beliefs and 
practices, and even more than that, for Saunders, spiritual included those concerns 
that may be raised by the immanence of death. Here, Saunders had in mind the 
feelings of anger, sadness, loss, fear, and even guilt and unworthiness, that may 
attend a person’s experience of dying. Saunders considered this sort of pain, and 
the desolation and anguish that may accompany it, as a ‘spiritual pain’ that may 
exist parallel with and interpenetrate physical pain, and she combined both sorts 
of pain under the term ‘total pain.’41 
 
 
 Although Saunders, operating in the 1960s, interacted primarily with a Christian 
worldview, she clearly intended hospice care respect the faiths of persons of diverse religious 
views. 
 
Although the 1960s saw the field of pastoral care opening up to non-ordained 
chaplains and greater interfaith cooperation between Protestant, Catholic, and 
Jewish chaplains, at St. Christopher’s the chaplain position was filled by an 
Anglican priest who was assisted by half a dozen seminary students and regular 
visits by a Roman Catholic priest … Saunders struggled for some time over how 
to define the religious basis of St. Christopher’s and whether it ought to be strictly 
Church of England or, in her words, ‘more interdenominational.’42 
 
Nevertheless, while at the time most of those served by her movement in the U.K. were 
Christians, more recently attempts have been made to accommodate persons from non-Christian 
traditions, as well as agnostics and atheists.  
                                               
41 Bramadat, Coward, and Stajduhar, Spirituality in Hospice Palliative Care, 4. 
 
42 Bramadat, Coward, and Stajduhar, Spirituality in Hospice Palliative Care, 18. 
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In order to adapt to the American secular and religiously plural, the notion of 
spirituality in the hospice movement ‘has come to mean a universal dimension of 
human life, shared by agnostics and atheists as well as traditional religious 
people’ … Indeed, it is this understanding of spirituality that has increasingly 
come to dominate academic thinking in nursing and medicine generally – and not 
just in hospice palliative care.43 
 
Within contemporary medical settings that employ the use of chaplains, the use of the 
term “spirituality” as distinct from “religion” is pervasive and likely will remain so. With that 
acknowledgement, however, comes an array of important variables to be pondered in connection 
with the construct of spirituality as sometimes overlapping with, but equally at times distinct 
from, religion. In what follows I undertake a discussion of what seem to me to be among the 
most important of those variables. 
 
B. Cautionary Notes 
The shift toward a more inclusive understanding of spirituality has had very significant 
consequences for the popular understanding of religion, and however well-intentioned the 
movement toward greater inclusivity, not all those effects have been positive, at least in regard to 
religion. For example, Kathleen Garces-Foley, in her article “Hospice and the Politics of 
Spirituality,” gives critical attention to examining how “spirituality and religion must be 
interpreted in relation to each other, especially when we consider that spirituality is often 
implicitly framed as ‘good’ or at least unproblematic and religion … as ‘bad’ and problematic.”44 
                                               
43 Bramadat, Coward, and Stajduhar, Spirituality in Hospice Palliative Care, 5. 
 
44 Bramadat, Coward, and Stajduhar, Spirituality in Hospice Palliative Care, 5. 
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Unfortunately, the recognition of there being a relationship between spirituality and religion is 
not always a welcome one.  
Perhaps of equal concern is the recent use of the term “spirituality” not just as an attempt 
to refer to implicit values “across traditions” but rather as having a specific content in itself that 
is reflected within each of diverse religious traditions. While there is value in current endeavors 
to establish a construct of spirituality as distinct from religion, an over-generalizing use of 
“spirituality” imperiously locates meaning within the word itself as though referencing the 
specific value to be found in religious traditions with vast cultural differences. Its use raises the 
danger of a possible “grinding down” or “leveling” of a meaning common to all religious 
traditions. This is obviously tinged with a reductionist tendency that fails to recognize the value 
in the particularity of religious experience and tradition. Perhaps still more significant, a 
reductionist, one-size-fits-all use of the term “spirituality” runs the risk of becoming not only 
descriptive but prescriptive. Rather than describing a concept differently constituted depending 
on the cultural tradition under consideration, its contemporary use may endow “spirituality” with 
a popularly constituted meaning that stands apart from any single religious tradition. This in 
itself can carry negative implications even as it may reflect the activity of any new, and even 
perhaps of all, organically developing religious movements. Again, without rejecting the 
construct of spirituality out of hand, I believe it is important to prioritize caution and reflection in 
it use. 
For example, to the degree that its use becomes not only descriptive but prescriptive, 
“spirituality” may become an attribution of value within a bias-vulnerable lexicon in which there 
are definite winners and losers. Indeed, there is evidence that the very terms of spirituality’s 
contemporary acceptance into popular parlance require that “spirituality” offend no one, and that 
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it be mutable and highly responsive to social critique. There is great value in the vulnerability of 
“spirituality” to social critique, and again, new religious movements are by their very nature 
representative of changing social perception and needs and are organically evolving. However, 
the implicit requirement that “spirituality” offend no one and be ever ready to adapt to the 
demands of social critique may render “spirituality” easily manipulated, both economically and 
ideologically, and, arguably and perhaps ironically, hamstrung in its ability to itself mount a 
social critique or mandate social change.  
This is in stark contrast to the long history of organized religion’s founding of hospitals, 
clinics, schools, and manifold other charitable endeavors, as well as to the ability of religion to 
inspire movements for social reform. Recent examples that come to mind include Dr. Martin 
Luther King and Nelson Mandela. To be sure, religion has inspired mobilization for ill as well as 
for good, and this fact has had a determining influence in the genesis of contemporary 
spirituality’s popular acceptance. But, while well-intentioned people may disagree, it seems 
doubtful that a wholly inoffensive spirituality unlikely to inspire systematic social change is 
preferable to religion and religion’s historical reflection of a humanity that often falls far short of 
ideal but is also capable at times of the greatest generosity of heart and mind. Perversely, 
spirituality’s assumed inoffensiveness is subtly and progressively rendering the moral challenge 
that issues from mainstream religious traditions an object of scorn. Rabbi David Wolpe 
acknowledges: 
 
All of us can understand institutional disenchantment. Institutions can be slow, 
plodding, dictatorial; they can both enable and shield wrongdoers. They frustrate 
our desires by asking us to submit to the will of others.45 
                                               
45 Rabbi David Wolpe, “The Limitations of Being Spiritual but Not Religious,” Time, March 21, 
2013. 
 41 
 
 
However, if the inability of one-size-fits-all spirituality to mandate social critique is 
among its most lamentable characteristics, 
 
institutions are also the only mechanism human beings know to perpetuate 
ideologies and actions. If books were enough, why have universities? If guns 
enough, why have a military? If self-governance enough, let’s get rid of 
Washington … Spirituality is an emotion. Religion is an obligation. Spirituality 
soothes. Religion mobilizes … Religion is dissatisfied with the world. Religions 
create aid organizations; as Nicholas Kristof pointed out in a column in the New 
York Times two years ago: the largest U.S.-based international relief and 
development organization is not Save the Children or Care, it’s World Vision, a 
Seattle-based Christian group.46 
 
Nonetheless, one-size-fits-all spirituality is, however improbably, the foundation of the 
greater part of hospital and hospice chaplaincy today. Again, the responsivity of generalizable 
“spirituality” to social critique may have roots in a laudable endeavor to be inclusive and non-
discriminatory. Moreover, as Wolpe suggests, “spirituality soothes.” At the same time, too much 
transparency to social criticism results in a lack of meaningful content and a highly unsatisfying 
response to the existential challenge that traditionally forms the raison d’être of religion. By way 
of one example, a hospital’s newly hired Wellness Coordinator leads a group of patients 
undergoing chemotherapy in a kind of arts-and-crafts therapy wherein they make colorful self-
expressive wall hangings. A highly placed hospital administrator, however, requires that only 
those tapestries evincing positive messages of hope and healing be displayed.47 It is certainly 
understandable that hanging art that expresses only cynicism and despair could be experienced as 
garish, unpleasant, and limited in outlook. It is also nevertheless striking that neither the 
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47 The name of the hospital is withheld. 
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administrator nor the Wellness Coordinator seems to hear in the directive issued what can only 
be described as institutionally ordained “double-speak” wherein patients are directed to express 
only “positive” emotions in their art while participating in an activity whose stated goal is self-
expression. Such activities are often claimed to have a “spiritual” component. However, a 
moment’s thought reveals the institution’s interests in ginning up patient satisfaction numbers. 
Presumably, the thought is that if people “say” they feel optimistic regarding treatment, they 
indeed will feel that their future is “bright.” The presumption that such a flexible and 
intellectually underdetermined concept of spirituality is socially enlightened and more 
benevolent than its cousins in mainstream religious traditions may be woefully blind to the 
possibilities for economic and ideological manipulation.  
Or, again, a Jewish chaplain, offering pastoral care to an elderly, distressed Jewish 
patient, hums and sings a traditional Jewish melody which the patient would know from her 
childhood. A nurse manager reprimands the chaplain for not offering instead a more “cheerful,” 
uplifting melody. Certainly, the nurse has the patient’s best interests at heart; however, the 
example nonetheless reflects the rather odd (but all too common) preconception that the 
chaplain’s role is to “cheer patients up.” In some respects, this is a case of the nurse being 
unaware of what constitutes trained pastoral care; however, the prevalent conflation of hospital 
chaplaincy with wellness and other self-care modalities looms large. 
Indeed, why a seeming majority of hospital and hospice chaplains lean toward this bland 
spirituality, which is ever the subject of social critique rather than an agent of it, can seem at 
times bewildering. However, here I’d like to suggest a caveat. Having suggested that there may 
be liabilities in some contemporary usages of “spirituality,” and that its use is problematic, it 
should not be assumed that the better recourse is back again to a “traditional” mainstream 
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religious exclusivity. Rather, there may be possible a retrieval of tradition and history, and of 
witness and narrative, without the imposition of religion in a narrow, caricatured sense,48 while 
the critique of limitations and obstacles experienced by many in response to conventional 
religious language interpretations may lead to better innovations in approach. In fact, a critique 
can be made that while “spiritual but not religious” may signal physical non-participation in 
mainstream congregational religious practice, it in no way follows that it is always consonant 
with a departure from the concepts and language of those communities, nor possibly from the 
(now unacknowledged) liabilities they may continue to carry.   
In “Disembodied Souls or Soul-Less Bodies: Spirituality as Fragmentation,”49 Rosalie 
Hudson asks: 
 
How is spiritual care distinguished from emotional, psychological and social 
care? Where does religion fit into this framework? Have we so broadened the 
concept of spirituality in our endeavor to divorce it from religion that we’re left 
with nothing other than existential questions to be addressed by any humanist?50 
 
Still more to the point, Hudson addresses three overlapping questions: 1) Has the new 
spirituality pushed religion to the margins? 2) Has “spirit” language been overtaken by what 
Hudson refers to as “systemspeak”? and 3) “What happens to our humanity when we separate 
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soul from the body?”51 In this last point Hudson addresses a dualism lurking in the contemporary 
use of “spirituality.” There is irony here. Hudson, a nursing scholar, writes: 
 
To reduce the spirit to a mere component part is to turn it into a problem waiting 
to happen. For example, the website for Palliative Care Australia refers to 
‘spiritual problems that are present with a terminal illness.’ While the intent is to 
remind the reader that palliative care is holistic, the reference can be construed as 
artificially isolating the spirit, turning it into a problem. To spot a problem is 
(especially for nurses) to try to solve it. So, the logical consequence is to adopt the 
language of diagnosis, flow charts, processes, pathways, goals, measurements, 
and outcomes, using engineering terms such as tools and instruments and other 
‘technospeak’ for the profound mystery that is the human person.52 
 
Hudson herself acknowledges using spiritual assessment forms and notes, but adds that 
the problem with spiritual assessments is that too often they are carried out by staff lacking “the 
necessary sensitivity, maturity, experience, and professionalism to use them wisely; they are … 
treated as a prompt sheet for interrogation rather than the basis for ongoing discussion.”53 
Hudson continues: 
 
Is there another way to reach the human person in his or her body/spirit unity than 
to quickly grab a digging tool, or to search for the perfect instrument that will 
provide an inviolable measurement that will comply with the inescapable auditing 
requirements that will qualify us for the highest funding, that will help us to 
provide the spiritual care, that will further justify our systems in our well-meaning 
attempt to provide holistic care?54 
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Hudson speaks from her perspective as a nursing scholar but her comments are equally 
appropriate regarding hospital and hospice chaplains. Again, Hudson is at pains to note that her 
critique is not intended as a wholesale rejection of the use of current assessment methods: 
 
This is not to suggest we do away with all spiritual assessment in whatever form 
(or forms). Rather, we should ask ourselves what is the best way to discover the 
essence of each particular person in our care, and to find a way of documenting 
the continuity of that unique life narrative.55  
 
Hudson warns: 
 
If we see the soul or spirit as a separate entity, particularly as the most private of 
all a person’s ‘private parts,’ we will not be characters in the final chapter of that 
person’s life story; we will merely be custodial caretakers of a physical body. If 
we enter the stories of those entrusted to our care we will see spirituality in its 
bodily reality, the ‘real stuff’ of aging, death, and dying.56 
 
Central to Hudson’s paper is a critique of at least some (certainly, not all) “spirituality” 
questionnaires and assessments as attempting to explore a potential mind-body dualism that no 
doubt would disconcert proponents of “spiritual but not religious” descriptive categories. 
Chaplains’ use of a concept of spirituality “now so broad that it lacks any specificity at all”57 is 
nonetheless thought to encompass body as well as spirit through recourse to complementary 
modalities including Reiki, meditation, healing touch, and other New Age borrowings. Still, 
given the premises of many of these complementary modalities, for example Reiki’s drawing of 
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“energy” to ailing parts of the human body and spirit, it seems difficult to dispute S. Pattison in a 
chapter titled “Dumbing Down the Spirit” in which he describes these amalgams as “floating 
spiritualities” and “metaphysical marshmallow that is non-specific, unlocated, thin, uncritical, 
dull, and un-nutritious.”58 
 
In the rapidly emerging spirituality literature (described in Baldacchino and 
Draper, 2001) sadly much of the language is ‘systemspeak,’ full of ‘spiritual 
coping strategies’ and ‘spiritual orientation inventories,’ not to mention double-
blind randomized control trials for measuring the effectiveness of prayer, and 
Likert scales for calculating belief. The new religionless spirituality has, in effect, 
become another ‘religion,’ reviving the ancient heresy of Gnosticism.59 
 
 
Such shifts in understanding unquestionably coincide with shifts in the understanding of 
what constitutes “care.” These dovetail with historical shifts in emphasis, marking a transition 
from attention to what can be known “objectively” to an increased awareness of the determining 
influence of subjectivity, and with the advent of more relational models of care and with a 
multiplicity of “shifts in practice and theorizing, [a movement] away from things to persons and 
from entities to the experience of what is happening, from a single person point of view to a 
relational point of view.”60 Yet, perhaps precisely in view of these shifts in emphasis, it is 
perhaps surprising that so much recent research in spiritual care takes as a starting point 
quantitative and statistical measures of care. Or, perhaps better expressed, at the same time that 
physicians are seeing the limitations implicit in quantitative emphases that bring to light certain 
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aspects of experience while leaving others wholly unattended, hospital chaplains, whose 
expertise is in these more subjective areas of experience, are well-advised to be circumspect lest 
they rush headlong toward the same myopic point of view from which physicians are beginning 
to disengage. 
Again, as stated at the outset, my intention is not to dismiss as wholly negative current 
trends, including quantitative and statistical tools currently in use, but rather to attempt to walk a 
thin line that differentiates, to the degree possible, between advantages and possible 
disadvantages, recognizing that benefits and liabilities inevitably go hand-in-hand.61  
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Chapter 4: A Review of the Literature 
 
A. Introduction 
While the first half of this project discusses the role of the chaplain in the health care 
setting, and the need for a new understanding – a new narrative – of what exactly chaplains do 
and what they add to the care of patients, the second half addresses narrative as an interpretive 
tool in itself, wherein my thesis is that patients experiencing illness that significantly affects their 
lives experience potential narrative loss. Narrative loss here refers to the experience of a loss of 
structure in regard to experience, in the midst of disabling illness.62 I begin with some attention 
to narrative’s response to narrative loss; narrative’s structuring of experience. This introduces 
Cheryl Mattingly’s description of “brute sequence” as modified by narrative. This discussion is 
followed by remarks on Paul Ricoeur’s thoughts on narrative, including Ricoeur’s discussion of 
his debt to Freud’s essays “Mourning and Melancholia” and “Recollection, Repetition, and 
Working Through.”  Subsequently, the discussion takes up the subject of literature representing a 
“turn to the subject” which has occurred in medicine itself, and which forms the background to 
more recent attention to the relationship between healing and narrative. Finally, there follows an 
example of narrative and some accompanying comments.  
For Cheryl Mattingly, narrative loss refers to the dull meaninglessness of sequential 
experience unmediated by anything other than its own repetitiveness. 
                                               
62Cheryl Mattingly, Healing Dramas and Clinical Plots: The Narrative Structure of Experience 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 52.  
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Formlessness is not so much a description of the structure of everyday life as a 
depiction of despair. The essence of meaninglessness is when lived experience 
seems to be driven by no form other than brute sequence.63 
 
 
Mattingly refers to this “formlessness” as an experience of “brute” sequence, 
emphasizing the unassimilable aspect of such experience in the absence of a narrative capable of 
construing experience in new ways. In Healing Dramas and Clinical Plots: The Narrative 
Structure of Experience,64 Mattingly, an anthropologist by training, presents her conclusions 
premised on a year of ethnographic work studying occupational therapists and their patients in a 
major Boston hospital. Her thesis is that narrative does not merely mirror and comment on 
experience; rather, narrative itself may be said to, in a certain sense, create (or very nearly so) 
experience. In this, her conclusions are similar to Stephen Crites’ thoughts on narrative: 
 
In principle, we can distinguish between the inner drama of experience and the 
stories through which it achieves coherence. But in any actual case the two so 
interpenetrate that they form a virtual identity, which, if we may pun a little, is in 
fact a man’s very sense of his own personal identity.65 
 
 
Like Crites, Mattingly “follow[s] Aristotle’s insight that narratives and experiences are 
deeply intertwined”;66 however, she adds “but I ascribe a very different cause to this close 
connection.”67 She continues: 
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Aristotle argued that narratives imitated life not in the sense of literally copying it, 
but through the poetic capacity to turn the noise and incidentalness of everyday 
life into a compacted causal argument (a plot) in which one thing after another 
was transformed into one thing because of another. This poetic extraction of 
events from their immersion in the everyday was an imitation which involved a 
kind of clearing away of the accidental and contingent to reveal an underlying or 
deeper “logic” that uncovered life as it truly was. For Aristotle, appearance served 
as a kind of mask, a camouflage, and narrative provided the poetic means for 
clearing the path obscured by the sheer multitude and triviality of historical 
events. 
 
I contend, instead, that narrative imitates experience because experience already 
has in it the seeds of narrative. Further, the narrative structure of action and 
experience emerges in large part because actors have a need for narrative [italics 
mine].68 
 
 Thus, the making of a story, or the telling of it, is to have made a whole out of what 
would otherwise be experienced as “brute sequence in time.” Mattingly borrows from Paul 
Ricoeur: “action can be understood as an as yet untold story.” Or in his provocative phrase, 
“action is in quest of a narrative.”69 
Ricoeur’s thought adds to the discussion that deeply embedded in what I am referring to 
as narrative loss is “suffering.” Richard Kearney paraphrases Ricoeur as writing about “the 
power of narrative to provide people with a sense of identity and cohesion [and] the fact that 
human existence is always in quest of narrative by way of providing us with a historical memory 
or future.”70 In a transcript of a conversation between Kearney and Ricoeur,71 Ricoeur responds 
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that he would like to enrich Kearney’s paraphrase by adding the adjective, “suffering.”72 Ricoeur 
asks rhetorically what he might add to an ensemble of stories [Joyce’s Ulysses, Freud’s Dora, 
and Spielberg’s representation of Schindler compared with Lanzmann’s Shoah; “case histories” 
treated in Kearney’s book, On Stories73] generated in some way or other by the innumerable 
figures of sorrow.”74 To this, Ricoeur proposes “a reflection on the capacity ‘to bear’ – to endure 
– that is generated by narrative.”75  
 
[Addressing Kearney] This topic [suffering] is not absent in On Stories. Its three 
‘case histories’ … are about sorrows, whether they be the torments of hysteria or 
the unspeakable horror of the death camps. In this way sorrow is in each case the 
answer to the question which opens the book: ‘Where do stories come from?’ 
However, in none of these cases does the ‘story’ make sorrow bearable: Molly’s 
final soliloquy in Ulysses does not achieve this effect; similarly, Dora is not cured 
… and the sufferings of extermination exceed the resources of narrative, 
cinematic as much as literary … 
 
What then can I add to this ensemble of stories generated in some way or other by 
the innumerable figures of sorrow? … a reflection on the capacity “to bear” – to 
endure … generated by narrative.76 
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Ricoeur references Freud’s essay “On Mourning and Melancholia” in noting that while 
the title of the essay in no way references narrative, it introduces the idea of the “work of 
mourning.”77 
 
… the work of mourning … consists of this: the test of reality showed that the 
loved object ceased existing and the entire libido is commanded to give up the 
bond which attached it to this object. It is against this that there is an 
understandable revolt … Is the feeling of mourning based on complaints that 
melancholy has transformed into accusations? Is it not these complaints and 
accusations that narrative struggles to tell differently?78  
 
Ricoeur considers that this interpretation is supported by Freud’s essay “Recollection, 
Repetition, and Working Through.” Ricoeur understands the essay as suggesting that the 
tendency to “act out” is a substitute for memory and that it is this which brings about a transition 
to narrative. The forgotten fact is not reproduced through remembering but rather through an 
“acting out,” albeit the patient isn’t aware that this is a repetition. Freud explains this in terms of 
the relationship between the “compulsion to repeat” and resistances.  This represents an obstacle 
to remembering, which then renders recollection a labor or the “work of memory.” Ricoeur 
points to this nexus as a “contact point” with the work of narrative, which Ricoeur calls the 
narrative form of “working through.”79 
Indeed, the sense of “brute sequence” or “meaninglessness” to which Mattingly refers is 
the opposite of what might be described as the experience of spiritual well-being. However, even 
“well-being” fails to capture the elusive and difficult-to-describe sense of integrity that may 
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accompany sadness and, frankly, pain, while yet reflecting a sense of wholeness and meaning. 
This points to another among various shortcomings of the hackneyed use of the term 
“spirituality.” Too often, “spirituality” understood in this way is intended as being synonymous 
with satisfaction and a degree of contentment. Moreover, “spirituality” is, in common usage, 
without any particular relationship to moral integrity. 
 In the discussion that follows, I explore instead the concept of narrative in pastoral care. 
Narrative modifies what Mattingly so powerfully describes as the experience of “brute 
sequence,” an experience that is frequently encountered among hospitalized patients. Moreover, 
the concept and construction of narrative are arguably deeply constitutive of human subjectivity. 
This is the argument I propose to make; however, I pause to highlight first some points of 
historical and topical significance. Going forward, I examine the relevance of narrative for 
describing the value added by pastoral care in the treatment of hospital patients as well as offer a 
theological grounding in narrative literature with particular emphasis on an ancient narrative, the 
Book of Job, and newer 20th century narratives, culminating in a reflection on the writings of 
Levinas in Of God Who Comes to Mind and Gutierrez in Job: God-Talk and the Suffering of the 
Innocent.  
 
B. On the Growing Importance of Narrative in Medicine 
What follows is a brief history of paradigmatic changes in medicine that have created a 
growing interest in narrative. These changes represent an increasing emphasis upon subjectivity, 
the subjective experience of both physician and patient.80 The trajectory toward the current 
interest in narrative medicine begins in the 1950s and earlier. I lift this up in this chapter, 
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dedicated to narrative, in light of increasing recognition within medicine of the importance of 
narrative. This attention to narrative should be of significant interest to chaplains as well. 
Talcott Parsons introduced the concept of the “sick role” in the 1950s; however, the role 
of research into the lived experience of illness has broadened greatly since that time. Kokanovic 
and Flore point out that recent work in the social sciences, psychology, and medical humanities 
has expanded and problematized Parsons’ introduction in 1951 of a sociology of illness,81 while 
Parsons’ treatment of the “role” of the sick person has undergone significant critique since that 
time. 
 
A functionalist sociologist, Parsons, has been criticized for overlooking or 
glossing over several facets of the illness experience, for example, aspects of the 
doctor-patient relationship and power differentials, patients’ challenges to medical 
expertise and agency, the role of carers, as well as dimensions of gender, class 
and race … To address these complex questions, scholars in the medical 
humanities have increasingly turned to the narrative as a potent format to study 
and produce meaning on illness and existence.82  
 
Kokanovic and Flore further refer to scholarly research “informed by or located in in the 
critical medical humanities”83 that: 
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continuously identifies novel ways of understanding (and problematizing) health 
and illness by questioning structures of authority and expertise, interrogating the 
production of subjectivities and their fluid placements within socio-political and 
cultural changes …. [Addressing] not only the social, historical and cultural 
contexts of health and illness, it importantly investigates the ‘production, 
concrescence and dispersal’ of such contexts ‘across the precarious, unequal and 
environmentally degraded societies in which we live.’84 
 
Today, important concerns with inequalities embedded in the social, historical and 
cultural contexts in which ill persons find themselves are supplemented by an outreach to both 
scholarly and popular audiences, as exemplified by Arthur Kleinman’s The Illness Narratives: 
Suffering, Healing and the Human Condition and Arthur Frank’s The Wounded Storyteller: 
Body, Illness, and Ethics, as well as applications of narrative theory to medical ethics as in Hilde 
Lindemann Nelson’s Stories and their Limits: Narrative Approaches to Bioethics and Rita 
Charon and Martha Montello’s Stories Matter: The Role of Narrative in Medical Ethics, to 
mention only a few.85 Indeed, it is hardly possible to overstate the significance that patient 
experience has acquired in the medical setting. It may be useful to briefly outline some of the 
dynamics of the shift to an emphasis upon patient experience, a shift that continues apace with an 
ever-increasing attention to narrative.  
Among the most recent reflections, the study of and attention to patient narratives have 
perhaps their clearest beginnings in Arthur Kleinman's above-noted seminal The Illness 
Narratives. However, the intellectual background to Kleinman's work reaches back even earlier, 
                                               
84 Kokanovic and Flore, “Subjectivity and illness narratives.” 
 
85 Arthur Kleinman, The Illness Narratives: Suffering, Healing and the Human Condition (New 
York: Basic Books, 1988); Arthur W. Frank, The Wounded Storyteller: Body, Illness, and Ethics 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1995); Hilde Lindemann Nelson, ed., Stories and 
their Limits: Narrative Approaches to Bioethics (Abingdon-on-Thames: Routledge, 1997); Rita 
Charon and Martha Montello, ed., Stories Matter: The Role of Narrative in Medical Ethics 
(Abingdon-on-Thames: Routledge, 2002). 
 
 56 
 
again to the study of the sociology of medicine undertaken by Parsons, but also to Parsons’ 
student, sociologist Renee Fox, who in 1979 (the year of Parsons’ death) published Essays in 
Medical Sociology: Journeys Into the Field.86 In Essays in Medical Sociology Fox takes up such 
topics as medical education and socialization, recipients of organ transplantation and 
hemodialysis, human subjects, and bioethics.  
As Eric Cassell points out in the “Preface to the Second Edition” of The Nature of 
Suffering and the Goals of Medicine: 
  
Fifty years ago the sociologist Renee Fox showed that a basic part of the 
education of medical students was training for uncertainty, which was considered 
an ineradicable fact of medicine. No more. The medical science of our era has 
delivered on the general promise of science that nature can be known – all truths 
revealed.87 
 
Cassell’s view nicely elucidates what are historically competing trajectories in care, one 
that places emphasis on subjective experience and another that seeks a more quantitative 
rationale for best practices. Moreover, there are assets and liabilities that accrue to each of these 
approaches. Among physicians, within the last three decades there has developed a marked 
interest in the subjective experience of the patient, and not only of the patient but of the 
physician as well. In what might be described as a turn, or, in consideration of Fox’s observation, 
perhaps a return to the subject demonstrable in multiple domains in medicine (including 
oncology, palliative care, and biomedical ethics), there has been a movement away from the 
positivist philosophies that flourished in the 1950s and coincided with a confidence in the ability 
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of science to resolve if not eradicate the need for epistemological humility in the face of human 
illness. Beginning in the late 1980s, with Kleinman’s The Illness Narratives, Mary Jo Good, Paul 
Brodwin, Byron Good, and Arthur Kleinman’s Pain as Human Experience,88 Walter Frank’s The 
Wounded Storyteller, Rita Charon’s Stories Matter and Hilde Lindemann Nelson’s Stories and 
Their Limits, a new body of medical literature began to appear that gave greater emphasis to the 
relationship between the observer and the observed, between physician and patient. Among other 
things, this new approach turned the gaze of inquiry back toward the patient and his or her 
experience. Moreover, since then, Atul Gawande’s Complications: A Surgeon’s Notes on an 
Imperfect Science89 and Jerome Groopman’s The Anatomy of Hope90 and How Doctors Think91 
represent only a few in a general trend of granting greater attention to the issue of medical 
fallibility, and in so doing, continuing the theme of attention to the subjective experience of the 
patient and of the physician as well. The most recent of these is Paul Kalanithi’s When Breath 
Becomes Air92, an autobiographical account of Kalanithi’s own experience of living with 
terminal illness. Thus, until relatively recently overshadowed by the greatly idealized role of the 
physician and of medicine in general as purveyor of cures for suffering and disease, attention has 
shifted in the direction of the subjective experience of both physician and patient, as well as 
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away from the vanquishing of disease and toward greater concern with living in the presence of 
it. What became interesting was not only the chemistry and physiology of disease but the 
experience of it, for physician and patient. Similarly, what had previously been a role relation 
sometimes characterized as physician/secular priest and patient/supplicant93 now underwent a 
reformation in which, at least ostensibly, physician and patient found themselves to be co-
journeyers through what was now more likely to be approached as the chronicity of disease 
rather than as a “physician as hero” conquest of disease.94 The new questions being asked were 
to be further shaped by such initiatives as the Schwartz Center at Massachusetts General 
Hospital, founded by Kenneth Schwartz, a successful lawyer and a patient treated at MGH who 
ultimately succumbed to lung cancer.95 Schwartz observed during the course of his treatment that 
compassion on the part of caregivers, including physicians, nurses, and other medical staff, had a 
profound influence on the quality of his experience of his remaining months and weeks. The 
questions that were salient now were not only those concerning best practices in regard to the 
treatment of disease itself, but also the patient’s, not to mention the physician’s, experience. In 
one sense this was heralded not only by Arthur Kleinman’s The Illness Narratives and Eric 
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Cassell's 1991 first edition of The Nature of Suffering and the Goals of Medicine,96 but also, I 
believe, by the growing awareness of the fallibility of medicine in regard to curing many of the 
most ravaging diseases.97 
Acknowledgement of uncertainty in the context of medical treatment, as Fox described, 
was again the order of the day, and questions regarding the quality of life of patients, and the 
psychological effects of the inability to ultimately stop disease on both patients and physicians, 
were now recognized and, importantly, acceptable to ask. Certainly, the burgeoning hospice 
movement founded by Cecily Saunders played a role in this refocusing of attention on quality of 
life and respectful recognition of patient experience,98 but so also did a realignment in many 
cases of the goals of treatment from an eradication of disease (which was often not possible) to a 
re-visioning and acceptance of the chronicity of disease together with concomitant efforts to 
improve patient experience.99 As attention flowed into new avenues regarding patients’ 
experience of disease, so too rivulets of recognition of the frustration and emotional pain, not to 
mention psychic burnout, experienced by physicians unable to ultimately halt the destructive 
course of their patients’ illnesses appeared as well. Another factor, and one that can be 
acknowledged without cynicism, is the influence of measures of patients’ satisfaction in regard 
not only to their physicians’ medical management of their disease but likewise to their 
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physician’s respect for patients as subjects and not merely “objects” of medical care (Shelton, 
2000). Medical schools now took very seriously the dehumanizing effects of care that many 
patients reported, and a new discipline within the medical curriculum was born – medical 
humanities.100 
         Together with a shift in the direction of greater attention to and a more sensitive 
recognition of both patient and physician experience has developed a more personalized 
approach to ethical quandaries that occur in medical settings.101 Indeed, the 1980s saw the 
federal mandating of institutional research boards (IRBs) in U.S. hospitals102 in an effort to 
protect the rights of individuals who were participants in research studies. Among hospital ethics 
committees, while initially a principalist approach to discussion of ethical quandaries prevailed, 
around the beginning of the second millennium a more “situational” and more personalized 
consideration of ethical dilemmas was everywhere in evidence.   
In retrospect, it seems less than startling that attention has shifted from a perhaps naive 
and what is historically a somewhat disappointed expectation that a new era in medical science 
would result in unequivocal “cures” and release from the burden of human suffering brought 
about through disease. The “War on Cancer” that was proclaimed in 1971 during the Nixon 
administration is still underway, while research continues to seek treatment and, in the best case, 
cure, for other diseases that ravage human lives. This is in no way to dismiss remarkable medical 
advances that have been made in many areas, nor to say that these will not continue. On the 
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contrary. It is simply to say that almost two decades into the second millennium, existing 
diseases and new ones yet to occur continue to devastate human lives, and the interstices of 
medical scientific endeavor where cure is still wanting and human suffering continues have been, 
and should be, addressed through attention to what can be made better in the lives of patients and 
of the caregivers who tend them. 
 Much of this has occurred in and through careful reflection on narrative and its role in 
patient-caregiver interaction. Cheryl Mattingly describes past studies in patient-doctor interaction 
as revealing a power dynamic evident in language.103 For example, patient experience is often 
filtered through the medicalizing language of the physician. Simultaneously, the patient’s 
expression is cast in the passive voice, stripping the patient of agency. Parenthetically, this is 
most definitely not the “passivity before the suffering of the Other” described by Levinas. 
Mattingly refers moreover to “doctor talk” of the sort gradually abandoned (or in the process of 
being abandoned) through the historical developments detailed above. Mattingly describes this 
“doctor talk” as an anti-narrative speech act104 inasmuch as its imperiousness in point of view 
suppresses the personal narrative of the patient. Indeed, for a very long time, “doctor talk” was 
taught; it was considered a means of procuring information from a patient who might talk about 
many different things if not strictly constrained by the doctor’s manner and line of questions. 
One had continually to get the patient off the subject of whatever it was he or she wished to talk 
about in order to remain with the topic that was important to the doctor and with the questions 
that would provide the answers the doctor was seeking. With the advent of attention to narrative 
as described in the brief history above, much has changed. Indeed, attention to and reflection 
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upon narrative is among the most promising and interesting consequences of this 
contemporaneous “turn to the subject.” Still, there remains much (narrative) work left to do.   
 
C. The Checkers Game 
Now, for another case study: 
Anthropologist Cheryl Mattingly offers an illustration of narrative through a recounting 
of an interaction that she observed between an occupational therapist, Lin, and two young adult 
male patients in a spinal cord unit during the year she spent studying occupational therapists in 
one of the larger Boston hospitals. In the case below, Lin works with Matt, a handsome high-
school senior who suffered an injury in a soccer game that left him a quadriplegic, and John, a 
slightly older but still young man, also quadriplegic as a result of a devastating accident. While 
working with the two men, Lin attempts to engage them in playing a game of checkers.105 
 
Lin: (to Mat): OK, you wanna come over here, Mr. Reilly? 
Mat: Mumble (in protest) Ah, ahm, ahm, why? 
Lin: Just so you can chat with us while we do this. Come on over. Hello, 
there. Oh, he’s a smart driver (proudly, to Mat). Do you have a license? (she 
laughs) Do you have a driver’s license? 
Mat: Should get one. 
Mat pulls alongside Lin and John. They all pose for camera, giving silly 
grins. Mat waves. Lin then turns to face the two men, ignoring the camera. 
Lin: (to both) I’ll tell you what I was thinking, and let me know what you 
think. Ah (to John) do you have anything else scheduled for this afternoon? 
John: I was gonna go see my hair stylist, but …  
Lin: (laughs) What time’s your appointment? (challenging voice, with 
teasing mixed in) 
John: 2:30. 
Lin: (startled, slightly uncertain) Do you really? 
John: No. (grins) 
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Lin: (laughs) Oh, God. Um, I thought it may be fun if you guys played a 
game of checkers (question intonation) or something, where I’d have you (turns to 
John) do it with a mouthstick … and have you (now turning to Mat) do it with 
your splint. 
John: Move the pieces? 
Mat: Sure. How are we going to jump each other? 
Lin: (gives him a look) Wise guy. (laughs) Well that’s what I’m here for. 
I’ll help out with that. But John has a pincer mouthstick that might work out for 
that too. So, we could try that. OK? (John shrugs OK) 
Having secured their unenthusiastic permission, she returns to physically 
manipulating John’s right hand. This manipulation, known as passive range of 
motion, is done to prevent stiffness and swelling in his hands. For John, who will 
almost never have any capacity to use them again, it is largely a cosmetic 
exercise. Lin continues her conversation with the two men in the desultory 
mocking way characteristic of talk on the spinal unit. 
The sheer physical stillness of the men’s bodies, nearly inert in their 
chairs, seems to provoke this style of interchange, as though nothing on earth 
really needed to get done, as though this were an afternoon of beer drinking in the 
backyard. It is a style of muted desire, of anger turned into an informal 
omnipresent derision, of extreme truth-telling in the jocular mode. One gets the 
distinct impression that people are hanging about, lolling in their chairs, because 
they have chosen a different tack on life. They have recognized the futility of 
aggressive acts and are relaxing in their chosen spot. It is an air reminiscent of a 
neighborhood bar on weekday down time, comfortably settled by the unemployed 
regulars. Lin, John, and Mat are careful to preserve this atmosphere in their 
conversation. However, Lin’s eyes and the energy of her manner belie her 
nonchalant style, revealing her determination to organize things, move things 
along. Lin inquires how these two men are doing, deploying the correct bantering 
tone. 
Lin: How are you guys today? 
Mat: I’m wonderful. 
Lin: Are you? Mahvelous? 
Mat: Yeah, he took a shower. 
Lin: To get all spiffed up. 
John: I took a shower.106 
 
[Mat, a high school senior, is going to attend his prom with his girlfriend.] 
Lin: I asked if you were going to be in a tux, but I don’t remember what 
your answer was. 
Mat: Suit. 
Lin: Suit. No monkey suit for him. 
(John laughs, grins) 
Lin: (to John) Do you own a monkey suit? 
                                               
106 Mattingly, Healing Dramas and Clinical Plots, 55. 
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(John nods) 
Lin; Yeah? You do? You own one? 
John: Of course. 
Lin: (mimicking him) Of course. Like all good O’Sheas do. (teasing 
voice) (she is ranging his hands) Did you go to all your proms when you were a 
kid? 
John: No, I missed ’em all. 
Lin: Did you really? Nobody wanted to go with you. (she laughs) 
John: (with small grin) I was afraid of rejection so I didn’t ask anyone. 
Lin: Are you really – are you serious? Kinda surprises me. 
John: You shoulda seen me in high school. Do you think I look young 
now? 
Lin: You looked younger in high school? (short laugh at herself) Well, 
obviously, that would make sense. 
John: At 17, I looked about 12. Mat: Tsk, tsk, tsk. (Lin looks at Mat, 
frowning) I hadda reject people. 
Lin: You hadda reject people? (Lin looks at John, rolls her eyes, grins) 
John: High school wasn’t fun. 
Lin: No? My high school wasn’t always fun. Mat liked high school, huh? 
Mat: Yeah, up till January. (his accident) 
John: (short laugh) Yeah. 
Lin: Something happened in January that changed your mind? 
Mat: Yeah. 
Lin: Yeah? 
Mat: I left school for a while. 
Lin: Yeah? The truant officer come get ya? 
Mat: No, now my teachers come here. 
Lin: (seriously, dropping all banter) That’s pretty nice. Do you (John) 
know that? That his teachers come here to tutor? 
John: Oh, yeah. 
Lin triggers another conversational turn, focusing suddenly on John’s 
body and the physical manipulation she had been carrying on during the earlier 
conversation. She looks at John. 
Lin: Your hands – what’s the spasm story today? 
John: It must be ’cause I took a shower (laugh) I don’t know. 
Lin: You’re not spasming at all! (surprised intonation) (they talk about the 
physical therapist who will come over to talk with Lin about letting Mat double 
up with John) 
Lin: Actually, do you (Mat) want to go over and ask her if she [whether a 
change in schedule can be made that would better accommodate setting up the 
game of checkers] – no, I don’t want her to feel like I’m pressuring her. (to John) 
Hold on for just a sec, OK?  
John: Alright. 
Lin: Chat, you guys. 
Mat: (mugs at the camera) Hi, Mom. 
Mat: (to John) So, how was your shower? 
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John: It was most refreshing. It’s different, ’cause they have to lay me 
down. 
Mat: I’m leaving now. I just heard the news. (he goes over to the physical 
therapist) Bye! 
Lin: (to Mat on the way) OK, sport, we’ll see you later. (Mat will get his 
physical therapist appointment now) 
 
 
 
With Mat’s exit from the scene, Lin proceeds to negotiate afternoon therapy with John, 
and then to ask him, in a much more serious manner than she used when Mat was present, about 
a training session given to his mother and sister the day before. As they broach the touchier 
subject of John’s missing legs, their comportment shifts again, back to the flippant tone 
characteristic of the most fragile matters. 
  
 
Lin: (to John): You know what I’ll do, though, I’ll show you, I don’t know 
if I’ve shown you, ‘member when you played cards with that mouthstick, do you 
think that mouthstick opens wide enough to fit checker pieces? 
John: I can’t remember. 
Lin: OK. So how did your Mom and sister do yesterday with the teaching?  
John: Good. 
Lin: Yeah? Excuse me. (she moves in front of him to his other side) 
John: They um, last night… 
Lin: (talks briefly to the maintenance man in the clinic) Yes? (back to 
John) This is not even causing a spasm! Did they increase your medication? 
John: Yeah. 
Lin: Good John! Oh! Wise guy! (he got a spasm) Much different than 
yesterday. 
John: They put me back to bed last night -- 
Lin: (concerning spasm) But that’s still not as bad… (trails off) Your sister 
and Mom did? 
John: Yeah. And my mother, right (he spasms), they set up the slide board, 
(spasms again) 
Lin: (noticing that her massaging seems to be causing John’s spasms) I 
won’t do it (the massage to increase passive range of motion) while you tell me. 
(with a laugh) 
John: My mother picked me right up over the slide board! (he is grinning) 
Lin: (laughs) 
John (whispering) She’s strong. 
Lin: She’s strong? She didn’t need to – 
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John: Wicked strong. Yeah, she don’t need it. 
Lin: She didn’t really need the slide board. I wonder how much you weigh 
now. 
John: Hundred. 
Lin: Do you really? That’s a pretty good amount of weight for you. 
John: (disbelieving) It is? 
Lin: How much did you used to weigh? 
John: With or without legs? (he looks at her sideways, mischievously) 
Lin: With legs (they both laugh) 
John: About 130. 
Lin: ’Cause I think legs are more than fifteen pounds a piece. 
John: Maybe yours are. (both laugh, she mock-slaps his hand and he 
whispers) Just kidding. 
Lin: I know, but it’s a sensitive spot for me. (they both have wide grins) 
John: I know. (grins) 
Lin: (laughing) You do know, don’t you? Like the time you told me that 
skirt made me look fat? Remember that? 
John: No couth, I’m sorry. 
 Lin: None, not a bit of it. God! (sigh) 
 
There is no mistaking the sting in John’s smile as he tells the story about 
his mother lifting him over the slide board. Former bartender and drug dealer 
reduced again to a child in his mother’s arms. Lin deflects the cruel image his 
story creates, turning the humor on herself. If John has too little body, Lin has too 
much. She encourages John to tease her about her own imperfections, even 
reminding him of earlier barbs he has flung her way …. 
While Lin and John look for Mat’s return, Lin asks John more about the 
training session with John’s mother and sister. As she speaks, it becomes apparent 
that she was also there and thus that she has not been asking for information from 
John, but engaging in another kind of speech act, one prevalent in therapy 
sessions, a reminiscing and reflecting upon events where both patient and 
therapist has been present. She tells a brief story about his sister, which they both 
laugh about. This narration of earlier hospital events is commonplace, particularly 
in wards like the spinal cord unit, where patients may stay for several months. The 
present is always saturated with anecdotes from shared past therapy times. 
Lin: Anyway, so your mother did well, they put you back to bed. (he nods) 
They seemed a little exhausted by the time they were done out here. 
John: Uh, huh. 
Lin: How do you think they feel about learning all this care? 
John: Alright. 
Lin: yeah. It seems like they’re feeling more confident. Your sister said 
something funny. We’re talking about the suctioning and she said, it wasn’t the 
suctioning she minded. (pause) Oh! It was getting the gloves on. 
John: Oh, yeah. (they both laugh and grin) 
Lin: I thought that was pretty funny. 
John: Yeah, ’cause it’s the way you gotta do it, keep ’em sterile …  
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Lin: Yeah, she had a hard time doing that. She had her thumb in the finger 
and all that.107 
 
 
In a passage of dialogue that’s omitted here, Lin provides Mat a pressure relief. Mattingly 
notes that ordinarily this is done by the physical therapist or a nurse, but neither is near and Lin is 
available. Mat instructs Lin in how to administer the pressure relief. Mattingly’s commentary 
continues: 
 
Mat’s body becomes an object apart from Mat himself. It emerges in their 
discourse as an unwieldy but precious commodity in [an] elaborate series of jokes 
about whether Lin will really be able to prevent him from falling or not. “Now 
what do you do with your arms when I do this? Do they get all mangled when you 
go over?” Lin asks. Mat replies “I dunno.” “You don’t know?” she repeats in her 
ironic way. “Great.” The joking also reinforces a certain practical attitude toward 
one’s new and broken body. The brokenness becomes an irritating impediment, 
like a car that has gone on the blink and must be coaxed and reasoned with to get 
started. The very prosaicness of this attitude gives a certain message about 
disability. Disability not as horrifying shame, not as existential drama, but as 
inconvenience – something that calls for clever practical sense rather than deep 
anguish.108 
 
 
Returning to the subject of the checkers game: 
 
Lin: No one has any suggestions for me, huh? 
Mat: Yeah, you should put us over on that table. 
Lin: On what table? That one? 
Mat: On the corner, yeah. 
Lin: Well, see, that table has to be a certain height, so John can do it with 
his mouth. But if –  
Mat: That table moves. (Lin laughs) 
Lin: I know, but you won’t be able to be facing each other. I’m thinking, if 
I can get you a bedside table, so that you can go to one side and you can go to the 
other … Hold on a minute … (she leaves and Mat and John joke between 
themselves while awaiting her return) 
                                               
107 Mattingly, Healing Dramas and Clinical Plots, 56-59.  
 
108 Mattingly, Healing Dramas and Clinical Plots, 60. 
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Lin (returning) Uh, what are you guys … ? 
Lin: Well, improve number 2. Can I … (all three speak at once) 
John: Nice nail polish (she’s drummed her fingers, painted bright red, on 
the table) 
Lin: You like that? It’s a little – oh, OK. (realizes he is teasing her) It’s a 
little on the bright side. 
John: A little. 
Lin: To match my glow-in-the-dark pocketbook. (she happens to move 
suddenly toward his chair) 
John: Watch my feet! 
Lin: (inadvertently looking down and then laughing) Watch your feet?! 
Ahmm. (looking back at the board) This is not going to work, folks. (sighs) (John 
laughs) C’mon, somebody, give me a suggestion.  Well, Mat maybe we could try 
your idea? 
John: Katie, how about a suggestion? 
Lin: (to Katie) Any ideas? No?109 
 
 
The interaction continues a bit longer; however, this is a good place to stop. In 
commenting on the above exchange Mattingly notes first that although the three actors, Matt, 
John, and Lin, are ostensibly about setting up a checkers game, none exhibits much enthusiasm 
for it. Instead there is a great deal of what Mattingly describes as  
 
time spent in dull interruptions, minor difficulties (how to adjust the table height? 
Where are the mouthsticks?) and side tracks … Where is the drama? The 
suspense? The excitement? The sense of beginning, middle, and end? In short, 
any of those elements which would characterize an experience we might think of 
as a dramatic moment, the enactment of a narrative?110 
 
                                               
109 Mattingly, Healing Dramas and Clinical Plots, 61. 
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 In writing further about the exchange, Mattingly points out that there are two important 
ways in which the snippet of dialogue above, and the actions of therapist and patient it describes, 
“come to take on narrative meaning.”111 
 
While no elegant plot structure can be found in this twenty-minute segment, there 
are two important ways that the actions of therapist and patients come to take on 
narrative meaning. First, time, while it may display a certain random quality, is 
definitely not ‘clock time,’ as literary theorists would have it. The structure of 
small events is more complex than mere ‘brute sequence.’ Although things 
happen one after the other in a kind of desultory fashion, the meaning of this order 
is less linear or additive than it is narrative. The therapist, in particular, struggles 
to create a sense that each small therapeutic event points toward a much larger 
time horizon, and is but a moment in a ‘three-fold present.’ Second, the therapist 
works to make therapy a time which is about ‘becoming,’ about transformation. 
This theme is deep to Western narrative and it also runs deep to notions of 
healing. Recovery, in the world of rehabilitation, rarely means a return to a life 
one once had.  It means, rather, the remaking of a life.112 
 
 
 
Of course, chaplaincy and occupational therapy are very different things. In chaplaincy 
there are for the most part none of the discrete goals, or sense of “things happening one after 
another in a desultory fashion,” alluded to by Mattingly. There are goals, to be sure, but these 
tend to be more global in the way they are described: compassionate presence, emotional and 
spiritual support, active listening. In one sense, the very broadness of description of chaplain 
activities may be a difficulty in itself. This broadness is part of my interest in reflecting on 
witness and narrative in chaplaincy, because witness and narrative have a substance that bears 
reflection and study, while compassion, although critically important, has a more subjective 
character. More than that, there is an inevitable tendency to assume that we know what is meant 
by “compassion” and “active listening” and “spiritual support,” because we use these words so 
                                               
111 Mattingly, Healing Dramas and Clinical Plots, 64. 
 
112 Mattingly, Healing Dramas and the Clinical Plots, 64. 
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often. Over time, we can become inured to recognizing the often-subtle distinguishing detail that 
renders every situation and every person unique. The language of narrative is, for chaplains, 
somewhat newer, and fresh language can trigger new insight. I would venture also that in the 
language of narrative there is something less wholly identified with chaplaincy, and also 
something more tangible, for which reasons it may more easily become part of a shared dialogue 
with other professionals who inhabit the world of the hospital. Moreover, narrative’s long 
standing in religion makes it such that one can participate in shared dialogue while 
simultaneously remaining related to one’s own tradition. 
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Chapter 5: Narrative in Scripture: An Analysis of Job 19:13-22: 
Encounter With Suffering, Encounter With God 
 
 
A. Introduction 
In this section, I propose to reconceptualize chaplaincy somewhat differently from those 
approaches implicit in preceding pages, that is, by returning to earlier sources and demonstrating 
their continuing relevance for a changing patient population. The first step involves re-examining 
the Judeo-Christian literature of existential and spiritual pain reaching back to the Book of Job, 
the ur-text of spiritual pain literature. A fundamental thesis in what follows is that the sometimes 
insufficiently examined concept of “spirituality,” together with current attempts to validate the 
significance of pastoral care through quantitative analysis, may be complemented by attention to 
the actual language used by suffering persons. The latter may be assessed through qualitative 
research, and through the use of the fundamental learning tool in clinical pastoral care education, 
the verbatim. Undergirding this approach is a premise that effective pastoral care requires 
theological grounding and reflection. However, a challenge today is finding grounding for 
theological concepts that are useful in considering, and faithful in attention to, the experience of 
persons in an increasingly religiously pluralistic and secular society. Moreover, the extremity of 
experience, whether of Job or of victims of trauma in recent history, pushes the limits of 
religious language, and may push or collapse the language of theism, and even “push beyond the 
limits of language itself.”113 Does this mean that religious and/or biblical language is so foreign 
as to not be meaningful in describing experience today? Perhaps overlooked is the possibility of 
experiencing language, even biblical language, differently from conventional linguistic 
                                               
113 Comment by Chris Schlauch, Ph.D. 
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structures. Or, perhaps, readers might actively confront the failure of biblical language to engage 
their experience? Is there meaning beyond the failure of biblical language to describe 
contemporary experience? The present project embraces the very real experience of many today 
(and historically) that religious and biblical language may fail to engage. And yet, as E.L. 
Doctorow writes in the novel City of God, speaking through the words of the young rabbi, Sarah: 
 
My husband, Rabbi Gruen, said to me once, ‘Reconstruction is only a start.’ He 
meant that by its means we can presume to examine every element of the tradition 
without bias and decide what to dispense with and what to keep. But not merely 
for the sake of making linguistic sense, not for the cherishing of beauty, or 
consolation, not for preserving our cultural identity for its own sake, because that 
finally is insufficient, a theology in neutral, idling. No, you subject the tradition to 
your irreverence to get back to where it began, only that, back down to the ground 
level of simple … unmediated awe. It is there, which is necessarily the state of 
reverence, the sharp perception of God’s presence in the fact of our consciousness 
… and therefore everywhere and in everyone and everything – it is that constancy 
of awe we hope for, a pre-Scriptural state as alive to us as the contemporary 
moment, and which, of course, comes with absolutely no guarantees. That is 
where we begin …114 
 
Doctorow seems to suggest that somehow and somewhere beyond struggling against the 
resistance of Scriptural language to a modern sensibility lies the possibility of renewed meaning. 
Indeed, there is possibly a striking similarity between Job’s struggle with God and the modern 
reader’s struggle against the resistances of an ancient text. Moreover, in view of the same, the 
present project, in part, grounds theological meaning in a markedly different starting point, the 
philosophy and theology of Emmanuel Levinas, whose God is a God that cannot be predicated 
by “adverbs of height,”115 a God that is not the God of ontology. 
 
                                               
114 E. L. Doctorow, City of God (New York: Random House, 2000), 194. 
 
115 Levinas, Of God Who Comes to Mind, 56. 
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Rational theology, fundamentally ontological, endeavors to accommodate 
transcendence within the domain of being by expressing it with adverbs of height 
applied to the verb ‘to be.’116 
 
 
But for Levinas, these represent “modifications of meaning” that fundamentally distort 
the idea of the Infinite. Nor is Levinas’ God wholly dissimilar to that of Jean-Luc Marion, who 
similarly rejects ontology: 
 
The godless thinking which must abandon the God of philosophy, God as causa 
sui, is thus perhaps closer to the divine God. Here this means only: god-less 
thinking is more open to Him than ontotheologic would like to admit. The casua 
sui offers only an idol of ‘God’ so limited that it can neither aspire to worship and 
adoration nor even tolerate them without immediately betraying its 
insufficiency.117 
 
 
Marion addresses the reality of atheism in our time. Indeed, for all of us today, living as 
we do in the shadow of scientific method and the remnants118 of a materialist project coinciding 
with the advent of the Newtonian world-view, “adverbs of height applied to the verb to be,” to 
put it crudely, suggest the once-popular, now much-maligned “old man with a beard” god in the 
sky. Or, recall the Russian cosmonauts of the 1960s’ famous declaration while in space, “We 
don’t see any god!” To speak more carefully, the western philosophical tradition descending 
from the Greeks contemplates Being or ontology, and Levinas’ complaint regarding rational 
theology is that that the latter sort of thinking, when applied to God, undermines the very radical 
nature of transcendence. To be clear, the former caricature of God has, of course, never at any 
                                               
116 Levinas, Of God Who Comes to Mind, 56. 
 
117 Levinas, Of God Who Comes to Mind, 56. 
 
118 An interesting question is whether quantum mechanics’ casting into question of certain tenets 
of Newtonian mechanics may influence theologians’ writing, and the reception those writings 
receive. 
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time been the view of theology,119 or even, I would argue, of the simplest and humblest 
believers; however, it has long been the tired property of the popular cultural imagination. Even 
if the “old man in the sky” is a product of popular culture, it is the very same straw man that is 
currently assailed by several quite erudite scientists, the “New Atheists,” Daniel Dennett, 
Richard Dawkins, and Sam Harris, to name a few. Levinas’ critique of rational theology is subtle 
and informed in that he refers to the inadequacy of predicates to express the nature of 
transcendence. I understand Marion as similarly rejecting the casua sui, or God as God’s own 
cause, and pointing out that as soon as we conceive of God as first cause, we must step back at 
once and say “and yet that God is itself only a limited, human conception of God and as such 
does not, cannot, capture God.” It could even, as Marion suggests, be described as idolatrous. 
Marion’s position bears comparison with Levinas’ thought, which carries resonances of biblical 
Judaism, in its reluctance to attach “predicates of height” to God. In continuing that “god-less 
thinking is more open to Him than ontotheologic” and that “it [cannot] aspire to worship and 
adoration nor even tolerate them without immediately betraying its insufficiency,” Marion 
suggests that atheism rightly corrects common habits of thought and speech that undermine the 
singularity of transcendence. This is a far more powerful critique than the New Atheists’ straw-
man argument, and yet I believe it may lie solidly within a canon of theological literatures, from 
Pseudo-Dionysius’ Via Negativa through and arguably continuing even today in Derrida’s On 
the Name.120 
                                               
119 I refer to the study of the Abrahamic religions of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. More 
traditions could be invoked, but the scope of this project precludes doing so. 
 
120 Jacques Derrida, On the Name (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993). 
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Levinas’ critique deserves particular attention because it responds to atheism, specifically 
to Death of God theology. Interestingly, Levinas answers “And there is no atheism in this way of 
not taking God for a term. I think that God has no meaning outside the search for God.”121  
Again, affiliation with Christian (with the exception of evangelical Christianity) and 
Jewish congregations122 is diminishing. Less frequently is religious identification a significant 
element in self-understanding and identity. And yet, chaplains must demonstrate to 
administrators the value they add to the institutions that employ them. The term “spirituality” is 
useful in referring to the new hybrid religious identifications espoused, and in a variety of other 
contexts. However, “spirituality,” used in the sense this project undertakes to criticize, can be a 
“cover-up” of the grossest proportions, wherein the real and important question of the relevance 
of religion is hastily plastered over with new spiritual modalities. Here, Reiki, Healing Touch, 
Tapping, and other newcomers unencumbered with relationship to any religious tradition are the 
order of the day – or, if a relationship to tradition is invoked, it is inevitably (and inaccurately) to 
Buddhism. The real existential concerns so profoundly addressed by religion seem ignored.  
 
B. The Text: 19:13-22 
Norman Habel writes of the author of Job,  
 
The artist’s way of integrating materials does not reflect a pedantic, point-for-
point correspondence between argument and rebuttal, or between challenge and 
response. The approach is tangential; verbal associations are made by indirect 
allusion; and literary connections are often playful. Style corresponds to theology; 
                                               
121 Levinas, Of God Who Comes to Mind, 95. 
 
122 Alan M. Dershowitz, The Vanishing American Jew: In Search of Jewish Identity for the Next 
Century (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1998). 
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ambiguity is a mark not only of the literary design but also of the paradox 
apparent in the design of the cosmos.”123  
 
This is significant in considering the contemporary pastoral use of traditional religious 
language. The seeming lack of meaning in the use of theistic language in a post-Holocaust, post- 
Hiroshima, post-genocidal world finds a resonance in Job’s words of forlorn abandon. 
Indeed, paradox is as appropriate a starting point as any in considering the Scriptural unit 
Job 19:13-22, (NRSV): 
 
 
 
       13   He has put my family far from me, 
                and my acquaintances are wholly 
                       estranged from me. 
       14   My relatives and my close friends 
                       Have failed me; 
       15   the guests in my house have 
                        forgotten me; 
               my servant girls count me as a 
                        stranger; 
               I have become an alien in their 
                         Eyes. 
       16   I call to my servant, but he gives me 
                         no answer; 
                  I must plead with him. 
       17   My breath is repulsive to my wife; 
                  I am loathsome to my own family. 
       18   Even young children despise me; 
                  when I rise they talk against me. 
19 All my intimate friends abhor me, 
                     and those whom I loved have 
                            turned against me. 
20 My bones cling to my skin and to my 
                         Flesh 
                  And I have escaped by the skin of 
                          My teeth. 
21 Have pity on me, have pity on me 
                   O you my friends, 
          for the hand of God has touched 
                      me! 
                                               
123 Norman C. Habel, The Book of Job (Louisville, KY: Westminster Press, 1985), 51. 
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22 Why do you, like God, pursue me, 
                  never satisfied with my flesh? 
 
 
This unit may be described as paradoxical inasmuch as only five verses later Job speaks 
of expectation of redemption or vindication … 
 
        25    For I know that my Redeemer lives, 
         and that at the last he will stand 
                upon the earth; 
        26   and after my skin has been thus  
              destroyed, 
        then in my flesh I shall see God, 
        27   whom I shall see on my side, 
        and my eyes shall behold, and not 
               another. 
        My heart faints within me! 
 
 
… while the unit 19:13-22 speaks of anything but redemption. However, before 
examining it more closely, it may be helpful to in a very general way briefly situate its placement 
in the text as a whole.  
Norman Habel’s outline of the narrative plot treats chapters 1-2:10b as “Movement I. 
God Afflicts the Hero – The Hidden Conflict.”124 These chapters introduce the character of Job, 
both literally and figuratively. In them we learn of God’s boast concerning his righteous servant 
Job and of Satan’s ensuing challenge that were Job’s good fortune taken from him, Job would 
quickly fail in his fidelity to God. God accepts the challenge of Satan with the proviso that Satan 
may test Job through “trials of suffering,” but that the tester, Satan, may not afflict Job’s person. 
Satan complies and indeed Job passes this first test: Job submits to affliction and does not curse 
                                               
124 Habel, The Book of Job, 70. 
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God. Habel describes these events as constitutive of the Introduction and “Episode 1. The Hero 
is Tested.”125 
Subsequently, Satan issues another challenge to God. That is, he predicts that if Job’s 
own person is afflicted, then he will curse God. God accepts this second challenge, and Job 
suffers in his physical person; however, when even Job’s wife urges him “to curse God and die” 
and so be in some sense relieved of suffering, Job refuses and passes the (second) test.  
Following the conclusion of “Episode 2. The Hero is Tested Again”126 begins 
“Movement II. The Hero Challenges God – The Conflict Explored.”127 It is in these following 
chapters that Job’s friends are introduced, and albeit they try to comfort Job, their understanding 
remains dependent upon the Law of Retribution and hence they assume Job is guilty of some 
wrongdoing and that his suffering is deserved. Job rebukes his friends and accuses God of having 
become his enemy.128 It is here that we find 19:13-22. 
In what follows, I offer a discussion of Job’s various forms of alienation and their 
theological implications. 
 
C. Job’s Alienation From Family and Friends 
Job speaks of his family having been “put far from him” (19:13) and the reader knows 
already from Chapter 1 that in carrying out the “first test” allowed by God, in which God has 
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authorized Satan: “Very well, all that he has is in your power,” Satan has arranged that all Job’s 
sons and daughters are taken from him: 
 
another came and said, ‘your sons and daughters were eating and drinking wine in 
their eldest brother’s house, and suddenly a great wind came across the desert, 
struck the four corners of the house, and it fell on the young people, and they are 
dead.’ (1:18-19) 
 
 
Verse 13 concludes “…and my acquaintances are wholly estranged from me.” Moreover, 
Leong Seow in the notes on Job provided in the New Oxford Annotated Bible129 calls attention to 
the “motif of the alienation of the sufferer from friends and family” as occurring frequently in 
lament psalms and cites Ps. 31:11-13; 38:11; and 55:12-14.  
Job continues in a verse heavy laden with meaning, “My relatives and my close friends 
have failed me” (19:14).  First, as to Job’s relatives, we know that following Job’s loss of his 
wealth, servants, and children, his wife  
 
said to him, ‘Do you still persist in your integrity? Curse God and die.’ But he 
said to her, ‘You speak as any foolish woman would speak. Shall we receive the 
good at the hand of God, and not receive the bad?’ In all this Job did not sin with 
his lips. (2:9-10) 
 
 
Recalling Satan’s second challenge to God that issues in Job’s own person suffering 
affliction, he again refutes Satan’s hypothesis and does not curse God even when urged to by his 
own wife. These are Job’s relatives. Now, what of his friends? 19:14 and later 19:19 depend so 
heavily upon Job’s friends’ discourses that Job’s friends, Eliphaz, Bildad, and Zophar, will be 
introduced in turn and very briefly commented on as they appear in the text preceding 19:13-22.  
 
                                               
129 New Oxford Annotated Bible, 747. 
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1. Job’s Friends: Eliphaz the Temanite 
 Here arises the very important matter of Job’s friends and the “cold comfort” they offer 
him. Initially, the friends’ response to Job seems caring and appropriate: 
 
Eliphaz the Temanite, Bildad the Shuhite, and Zophar the Naamathite …. met 
together to go and console and comfort him. When they saw him from a distance, 
they did not recognize him, and they raised their voices and wept aloud; they tore 
their robes and threw dust in the air upon their heads. They sat with him on the 
ground seven days and seven nights, and no one spoke a word to him, for they 
saw that his suffering was very great. (2:11-13) 
 
 
However, eventually Eliphaz is unable to refrain from speech. He first reproves Job for 
“lacking patience.” Moreover, he invokes the Law of Retribution by way of explanation for Job’s 
sufferings. 
 
7   Think now, who that was innocent 
               ever perished? 
       Or where were the upright cut  
               off? 
8 As I have seen, those who plow 
                            iniquity 
                      and sow trouble reap the same.  (4:7-8) 
 
 
 However, Job responds: 
 
 
                      … I have not denied the words of 
                             the Holy One. 
11 What is my strength, that I should  
                             wait? 
                       And what is my end, that I should 
                               be patient? 
12 Is my strength the strength of stones, 
                       or is my flesh bronze? 
13 In truth I have no help in me, 
                      and any resource is driven from me.  (6:10-13) 
 
 
 81 
 
 That is, Job has done little or nothing to warrant his fate, which the reader knows is 
instead owing to a wager between God and Satan. Job is correct in asserting his innocence, an 
innocence which it seems God alone knows. Satan predicts that Job’s fidelity to God will 
collapse in the midst of misfortune. It does not. 
 
14 “Those who withhold kindness 
                              from a friend 
                      forsake the fear of the Almighty. 
15 My companions are treacherous like a 
                              torrent-bed, 
                      like freshets that pass away, 
16 that run dark with ice, 
                      turbid with melting snow. 
17 In time of heat they disappear; 
                      when it is hot, they vanish from 
                                their place. (6:14-17) 
 
 
 Job’s fidelity continues. However, one possible reading of the text is that the fidelity of 
Job’s friend, Eliphaz, to Job is not so steadfast. 
 But before giving greater scrutiny to such a reading, it is useful to note that, meanwhile, 
interspersed within these texts is much that supports Habel’s view that the author of Job makes 
ample use of “verbal associations through indirect allusion as well as playful literary 
connections.” For example, in 3:23 Job asks, “Why is light given to one who cannot see the way, 
whom God has fenced [italics mine] in?”  
 
Then Satan answered the Lord, ‘Does Job fear God for nothing? Have you not put 
a fence [italics mine] around him and his house and all that he has, on every side? 
You have blessed the work of his hands, and his possessions have increased in the 
land. But stretch out your hand now, and touch all that he has, and he will curse 
you to your face.’ (1:9-11) 
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 And just as Satan claims God has “put a fence” around Job and all he has in the interests 
of his “protection” from adversity, so Job later complains that he is one “whom God has fenced 
in.” (3:23).  
 In 7:17-19 the author writes: 
 
17   What are human beings, that you  
                             make so much of them, 
                     that you set your mind on them, 
18   visit them every morning, 
             test them every moment? 
19   Will you not look away from me for 
                             a while, 
                      let me alone until I swallow my 
                              spittle?  
 
 
 This is parody of verses 4-5 of Psalm 8: 
 
 
 4    what are human beings that you are  
                  mindful of them,  
           mortals that you care for them?”  
5 Yet you have made them a little lower 
                               than God 
                       and crowned them with glory and 
                                honor.     
 
 
That is, for Job God’s mindfulness of human beings is oppressive and is portrayed in 
starkest contrast to the psalmist’s celebration of it. For Job, indeed, so unrelenting is this 
“oppressive” attention that God allows Job not even, or so the author writes, the simplest and 
most basic of human dignities. Or as Habel writes, “Job’s agony is exacerbated by the realization 
that God, the eye, is forever watching Job.”130 Moreover, Habel writes: 
 
                                               
130 Habel, The Book of Job, 50. 
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The creative literary work of Job … does not conform to any single traditional 
genre structure. Traditional forms are incorporated, adapted, and transcended 
through the integration of curses, disputation, lament, trial speeches, wisdom 
poems, and hymnic materials into an underlying narrative plot. Plot and dialogue 
interact in a complex structure. Their interaction highlights counterpoint and 
controversy, [italics mine] ambiguity and audacity in the account of a mortal 
struggling to discover the meaning of life in the face of tradition, experience, and 
faith.131 
 
 
“Counterpoint and controversy” … As Habel implies, the structure of Job is punctuated 
with recurring leitmotifs, or differently put, questions variously nuanced but which taken 
together somehow mysteriously and effectively cohere in, as Habel describes it, “the account of a 
mortal struggling to discover the meaning of life in the face of tradition, experience, and faith.”  
 
2. Job’s Friends: Bildad the Shuhite 
Among other “close friends” of Job is Bildad the Shuhite. Bildad’s speech reiterates the 
Law of Retribution, like Eliphaz; however, Bildad goes on to query Job whether his children 
might have offended God and thus be the cause of Job’s own suffering.  
 
3 Does God pervert justice? 
          Or does the Almighty pervert the 
                 right? 
4 If your children sinned against him, 
                     he delivered them into the power of 
                              their transgression. 
           5    If you will seek God 
                      and make supplication to the 
                             Almighty, 
           6    if you are pure and upright, 
                      surely then he will rouse himself for 
                             you 
                       and restore you to your rightful 
                              place. (8:3-6) 
                                               
131 Habel, The Book of Job, 45. 
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 Bildad admonishes Job to recognition of wrongdoing, even on behalf of Job’s own 
children. Again, Bildad’s speech represents a strenuous effort to defend the Law of Retribution.  
 
11 “Can paprus grow where there is no 
                              marsh? 
                       Can reeds flourish where there is 
                              no water? 
12 While yet in flower and not cut 
                               down, 
                        they wither before any other plant. 
13 Such are the paths of all who forget 
                               God; 
                       the hope of the godless shall perish. 
           14    Their confidence is gossamer, 
                        a spider’s house their trust. (8:11-14) 
 
 
 Ultimately, Bildad places guilt with Job’s children, while his overall mood is 
uncompromising.132 
 
 
3. Job’s Friends: Zophar the Naamathite 
 
Thus, if Eliphaz is a proponent of the Law of Retribution, Bildad is likewise and adds 
further “insult” through his suggestion that Job’s children, earlier cruelly taken from him, might 
be the cause of Job’s suffering. As for Zophar, he might be dubbed the “impatient” friend. Like 
Eliphaz, Zophar implicitly defends the Law of Retribution, and like Bildad, Zophar would agree 
that the sins of one’s children might be a precursor to suffering on the part of the parent. In 
addition, Zophar criticizes Job as “one full of talk” (11:2). 
 
2 Should a multitude of words go 
                 unanswered, 
                                               
132 Habel, The Book of Job, 170. 
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         and should one full of talk be 
                vindicated? 
3 Should your babble put others to 
                 silence, 
          and when you mock, shall no one 
                   shame you?   (11:2-3) 
 
 
Thus, Zophar rather cruelly chastises Job’s unbridled expression of pain, to which Job 
replies 
 
 
             I will give free utterance to my 
                  complaint; 
          I will speak in the bitterness of my 
                  soul. 
2 I will say to God, Do not condemn 
                             me; 
                     Let me know why you contend 
                              against me.    (10:1-2) 
 
 
 Recall that earlier, Eliphaz complains of Job’s lack of patience:  
 
    
2 If one ventures a word with you, 
              will you be offended? 
       But who can keep from speaking? 
3  See, you have instructed many; 
            you have strengthened the weak 
                    hands. 
4 Your words have supported those 
                             who were stumbling, 
                       and you have made firm the feeble 
                              knees. 
5 But now it has come to you, and you   
                  are impatient; 
          it touches you, and you are 
                  dismayed. 
6 Is not your fear of God your 
                  confidence, 
          And the integrity of your ways your 
                  hope? (4:2-6) 
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Indeed, earlier in 11:2-3, Zophar would appear to be greatly provoked. Leon Seow in his 
notes on Zophar’s first discourse133 references “the wisdom tradition, which emphasizes 
prudence and restraint in speaking.” Arguably, Eliphaz in 4:2-6 might be similarly understood. 
However, Carol Newsom in The Book of Job: A Contest of Moral Imaginations brings 
quite another perspective to Eliphaz’s discourse. Newsom sets out “to attempt…a self-conscious 
rehabilitation of the friends.”134 Newsom’s reading emphasizes the friends as suggesting other 
narrative visions to Job in an effort to help him endure. Newsom thus construes Eliphaz in 4:2-6 
as an effort to encourage Job. Newsom’s argument, again very broadly and all too briefly put, is 
that the friends may be interpreted as employing available narrative structures in endeavoring to 
help Job transcend his present suffering.135 This is an extremely important perspective. Newsom 
observes that: 
 
Although Eliphaz is the friend who most extensively develops the resources of 
narrative in response to Job’s situation, Bildad’s [italics mine] allegorical 
narrative about the two plants (8:11-19) [see 8:11-14 above] recapitulates all of 
Eliphaz’s narrative patterns.136 
 
 
D. Job’s Alienation in His Own Household   
 
                                               
133 Michael Coogan, ed., The New Oxford Annotated Bible, Third Edition (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2001), 738. 
 
134 Carol A. Newsom, The Book of Job (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 90. 
 
135 Newsom, The Book of Job, 96. 
 
136 Newsom, The Book of Job, 104. 
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Job 19:13-14 describes Job’s deprivation of family, and Newsom’ view 
notwithstanding,137 Job also felt alienation from his friends. Likewise, verses 15-16 continue the 
motif through further detailing the complete upending of Job’s worldly status and fortune.  
 
 15    the guests in my house have  
                          forgotten me;  
                my serving girls count me as a 
                           stranger; 
                    I have become an alien in their 
                            eyes. (19:15) 
 
 
 Job has no home; he is deprived even of his birthright: “I have become an alien in their 
eyes” (19:15). His worldly status is beneath even that of a serving girl. The implication is that, 
however little the status of a female servant in Job’s time, Job’s is less. The theme of reversal of 
worldly status only continues in verse 16: “I call to my servant, but he gives me no answer; I 
must myself plead with him,” while verse 17: “My breath is repulsive to my wife;” adds depth to 
the earlier bespoken alienation of Job from his wife when the latter urged Job to “Curse God and 
die.” “I am loathsome to my own family. Even young children despise me; when I rise they talk 
against me” (19:17-18). Not only is Job’s status as head of a household and family utterly 
undone, but even children, who would presumably hold the least status in this society, disparage 
and even “despise” him.  
 
19   All my intimate friends abhor me,                      
             and those whom I loved have 
                               turned against me. 
20  My bones cling to my skin and to my 
                  flesh, 
           and I have escaped by the skin of my 
                  my teeth. 
                                               
137 This is certainly not to say that Newsom doubts the reality of Job’s own sense of alienation, 
but only that she construes the responses of the three friends differently. 
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21  Have pity on me, have pity on me, 
                  O you my friends, 
          for the hand of God has touched 
                     me! 
22 Why do you, like God, pursue me, 
          never satisfied with my flesh? 
 
 
Job exclaims “O that my words were written down! O that they were inscribed in a book” 
(19: 23).  
 
E. Job’s Alienation From God  
 
 
21  Have pity on me, have pity on me, 
                  O you my friends, 
          for the hand of God has touched 
                     me! 
22  Why do you, like God, pursue me, 
          never satisfied with my flesh? 
 
  Reduced to a skeleton of his former self (19:20), Job experiences his friends as 
“accusers” and “like God” as not satisfied even with the liquidation of Job’s former self to skin 
and bone. 
 
 
F. The Text in Context: Commentary and Broader Reference 
 
Two important commentators on Job, both referred to above, are Norman Habel and 
Carol Newsom. Interestingly, they take very different views of the three friends of Job and of 
their efforts at consolation.  
Job 19:13-22 may be very generally described as Job’s expression of his own painful 
experience. However, all of chapter 19 may be so described. Habel describes chapter 19 as “This 
celebrated speech of Job” and delineates it as consisting “of three major units (19:6-12, 13-20, 
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[and] 21-29.”138 However, the scriptural unit 19:13-22 may be seen as the core of Job’s 
expression of pain, and in contrast to Habel’s classification, if verses 21-22 are considered part 
of the central unit 13-20, arguably a new and very pastorally significant dimension emerges 
which will receive greater attention below.  
Habel and Newsom are in agreement as regards Job’s sense of alienation from family and 
friends. However, Habel’s interpretation emphasizes “Job’s experience” of his friends while 
Newsom attempts a different reading of “the friends’ motivations,” and in particular of 
Eliphaz’s. 
Habel writes, “Job’s appeal to his friends [21-22] to exhibit compassion is a sharp 
sarcastic barb. None of Job’s relatives or friends is empathetic; he is abhorred by all (vs. 13-
19).”139 Habel continues: 
 
His three companions sought to justify his disgrace rather than sympathize with 
his cause (v. 5) … With tongue in cheek, Job solicits their sympathy, not because 
of his emaciated appearance, but because he had been struck by the ‘hand’ of God 
(v. 21b) … Instead of being true friends, however, Job’s three companions act as 
enemies, like God, and ‘pursue’ … Job relentlessly (v.22).140 
 
 
By contrast, Newsom writes that because Job has described his experience as “rōgez” or 
turmoil, “Eliphaz and the other friends respond with the cultural resources available to resist 
such turmoil.”141 She continues that it is possible to categorize most of the friends’ responses 
under three headings: 
                                               
138 Habel, The Book of Job, 294. 
 
139 Habel, The Book of Job, 302. 
 
140 Habel, The Book of Job, 302. 
 
141 Newsom, The Book of Job, 96. 
 90 
 
 
1. The friends attempt to displace rōgez by employing narrative structures in an 
effort to construe Job’s experience in a manner that transcends present turmoil. 
2. They advocate the religious practice of prayer to enact a form of order that 
displaces rōgez. 
3. They offer iconic narratives (the “fate of the wicked” poems) “that combine 
narrative frameworks with a set of generative metaphors that reassert the moral order of 
the world and thus deny rōgez an ontological status.”142  
 
Newsom’s discussion depends heavily on her use of the term “rōgez” (3:26). She defines 
it as follows: 
 
This noun and its cognate verb and adjective denote a state of agitation. With 
respect to inanimate objects they describe a physical shaking (2 Sam 22:8; Amos 
8:8; Hab 3:7); when used of human or divine beings, they denote intense 
emotional agitation (2 Sam 19:1; Jer 33:9; Joel 2:1; Ps 99:1).143 
 
 
This term underpins Newsom’s subsequent discussion of the friends. Where Habel views 
the friends’ responses as “stock” and unsympathetic, Newsom considers the possibility that they 
might equally be seen as attempts to give narrative structure and form to experience that is for 
Job disruptive of any sense of moral and/or cosmic order. Under the subheading “Narrative and 
Meaning,” Newsom writes that: 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
142 Newsom, The Book of Job, 96. 
 
143 Newsom, The Book of Job, 94. 
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Job’s language has … configured himself as frozen in space, hedged in. He is the 
one who waits in dread, while ‘turmoil comes,’ bringing with it the ceaseless 
agitation that cannot be shaped into purposeful activity. In responding to Job, 
Eliphaz recognizes the necessity of restoring to Job a sense of the narratability of 
his experience.144 
 
 
For example, points out Newsom, following Job’s repudiation of the claims made about 
the miserable fate of the wicked (chapter 21), Eliphaz dramatically declares Job to be one of the 
wicked and his present suffering to be a consequence of wickedness. But rather than treating the 
application of that narrative pattern as a sufficient response, Eliphaz follows it with a repetition 
of the appeal to seek God (22:21-30).145  
In addition, Newsom’s perspective builds on selected passages from Emmanuel Levinas’ 
Totality and Infinity as well as Philippe Nemo’s Job and the Excess of Evil.146 Indeed, Newsom’s 
reference to Levinas is particularly relevant to 19:13-22 as is Levinas’ writing on Job in his essay 
“Transcendence and Evil.”147  
 Habel and Newsom note the continual appearance of language about “the face” in Job 
(citing 13:15, 13:16, and 13:20-21). Habel writes that, “The assumption in all these passages is 
that Job would see God face to face, not in some visionary, mystical, or metaphorical manner, 
but physically.”148 
                                               
144 Newsom, The Book of Job, 97. 
 
145 Newsom, The Book of Job, 97. 
 
146 Emmanuel Levinas, Ethics and Infinity (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969); 
Philippe Nemo, Job and the Excess of Evil (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1998). 
 
147 Levinas, Of God Who Comes to Mind, 122-134. 
 
148 Habel, The Book of Job, 308. 
 
 92 
 
 Moreover, the metaphor of the trial and the suit which Job wishes to press is inextricably 
connected to Job’s desire to argue his suit before God’s face. Not only will the theme of the face 
recur in discussion of Emmanuel Levinas, but it is significant also in relationship to Elie 
Wiesel’s Night. As might be extrapolated from Habel, Job’s assumption is that he will see God in 
God’s immanence. Indeed, as Habel observes: “When God came he overwhelmed Job with a 
whirlwind; nevertheless Job did ‘see’ God, even if not in the way he had expected (42:5).”149 
  
 
G. Theological Context 
 
 
19   All my intimate friends abhor me,                      
             and those whom I loved have 
                               turned against me. 
20   My bones cling to my skin and to my 
                  flesh, 
           and I have escaped by the skin of my 
                  my teeth.   (19: 19-20) 
 
 
It is difficult to imagine much of the significant literature of the last century in the 
absence of its inspiration in the Book of Job. The Book of Job is singular among ancient texts in 
its influence upon modernity, for the fundamental reason that it raises the perennial question of 
theodicy. More pointedly, comparing Habel and Newsom raises anew and in a very interesting 
fashion the question of what is a compassionate response to evil and to people who suffer on 
account of it. To be sure, Newsom’s argument is not that Habel and other commentators are 
“wrong” in viewing the responses of Job’s friends as traditional and of questionable inspiration, 
but rather that there is a polyphonic way of reading the Book of Job that should not be 
                                               
149 Habel, The Book of Job, 309. 
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discounted.150 Habel equally acknowledges the tangential approach of the text, verbal 
associations made by indirect allusion, playful literary connections, and use of ambiguity both in 
the service of literary design and yet also as a cosmological primer. In this way, the very 
structure of the text is in part its meaning. 
However, Newsom makes a fine point in her discussion of Eliphaz’s attempt to restore 
narratability to Job’s experience. Again, Newsom describes a “polyphonic” way of reading Job:  
 
[A] polyphonic reading attends with particular care to issues of genre and verbal 
texture, as well as to the multiple theological claims of the text. In addition it 
offers a means of conceptualizing the book as an unified composition without 
sacrificing the hermeneutical significance of the many genres that comprise the 
book. In many previous approaches to reading the book, the only voices taken 
seriously were those of Job and God. The others were mere foils. Not only do 
such approaches seem unnecessarily reductive, but they also flout the 
hermeneutical assumptions of the wisdom dialogue itself. Reading the book as a 
polyphonic text provides a model of reading that allows all of the voices to ‘mean 
directly’ and so to be taken seriously in the play of ideas.151  
 
 
Just as Newsom calls attention to the possibility that the friends’ monologues, often seen 
as stock restatements of a commonly accepted moral order, might also be seen as attempts to 
give narrative structure and form to experience that is for Job disruptive of any sense of moral 
and/or cosmic order,152 so she suggests likewise that there is a way of reading the text that 
recognizes and engages a multiplicity of voices and views. She cautions: 
 
The persuasiveness of a polyphonic reading, however, if it is to be accepted, must 
satisfy several criteria. It must, of course, be answerable to the text itself. In 
addition, it should be able to deal with some of the problems generated or left 
                                               
150 Newsom, The Book of Job, 261. 
 
151 Newsom, The Book of Job, 261. 
 
152 Newsom, The Book of Job, 97. 
 
 94 
 
unresolved by other approaches; however, it also needs to respond to something 
distinctive in the sensibilities of its own postmodern culture …. Perhaps the 
strongest motivation for invoking a … dialogic and polyphonic reading, however, 
is the desire to read Job as a book of our own age.153 
 
Newsom straightforwardly acknowledges her debt to Mikhail Bakhtin and to his 
“dialogic” understanding of literature.154  
 
There is no culture, no tradition, no society – indeed, no person – that is not itself 
composed of multiple voices, dialogically situated. This recognition is reflected 
also in postmodern aesthetics and forms of attention, from literary pastiche to the 
split screen to acoustic sampling. A polyphonic approach to the book of Job is a 
recognition of an evocative and productive correspondence between the structure 
of the book and the sensibilities of the present age.155 
 
 
Thus, just as Newsom calls attention to the possibility that the friends’ monologues, so 
often seen as callous, might also be seen as attempts to restore narratability to experience,156 so 
she suggests likewise that there is a way reading the text that recognizes and engages a very 
modern, even post-modern, multiplicity of voices and views. Moreover, Habel equally 
acknowledges the “use of ambiguity both in the service of literary design and yet also as a 
cosmological primer.” The sense of paradox is inescapable in Job. Even as there are multiple 
voices present throughout the text, each articulating in their way arguable points of view, the 
unbearable paradox of human suffering – allowed by a righteous God – remains. 
 
                                               
153 Newsom, The Book of Job, 261. 
 
154 Newsom, The Book of Job, 261. 
 
155 Newsom, The Book of Job, 261-262. 
 
156 Newsom, The Book of Job, 97. 
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H. Pastoral Application 
 Both Newsom and Habel raise the question of what is a compassionate response to evil 
and to people who suffer on account of it. There is a profound relationship between the 
challenges to Job’s friends and to Job himself and the question of what is a compassionate 
response to suffering on the part of the pastoral minister. Newsom makes the point that the 
friends may be seen as “trying to help,” even if clumsily and ineffectively, which is something 
we all do,157 and thus offers an alternative to the frequent reading of the friends as offering stock, 
standardized replies. 
Relatedly, Newsom calls our attention to the importance of narratability as a means of 
restoring (or at least attempting to restore) some degree of order to what is subjectively 
experienced as chaos. The next chapter considers the reflections of two holocaust survivors, Elie 
Wiesel and Judith Sherman, on the personal and ethical importance of telling a story, like Job’s, 
even when it is one of unspeakable pain. As Newsom writes: 
 
Job’s language has … configured himself as frozen in space, hedged in. He is the 
one who waits in dread, while ‘turmoil comes,’ bringing with it the ceaseless 
agitation that cannot be shaped into purposeful activity. In responding to Job, 
Eliphaz recognizes the necessity of restoring to Job a sense of the narratability of 
his experience.158 
 
Newsom’s reading is a somewhat isolated, if interesting and independent, interpretation 
of the relationship between Job and Eliphaz. However, the narratability she ponders has broader 
implications. Combining the resources of Mattingly and Ricoeur, narratability represents the 
ability to imbue the present with hints and nuances of meaning drawn from both past experience 
                                               
157 I am indebted not only to Newsom but also to Professor Daniel Harrington in the 
development of this point. 
 
158 Newsom, The Book of Job, 97. 
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and future expectation, such that the otherwise disparate and discrete experience of the present 
becomes assimilated within a larger organizing structure. That narrative structure, in turn, 
enables the sufferer to move toward future time such that his or her experience has undergone a 
transformation, one that makes the present bearable and the future possible. 
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Chapter 6: Narrative and Witness:  
Stories of Suffering and Their Tellers 
 
 
 
 “O that my words were written 
           down! 
    O that they were inscribed in a 
           book! 
 O that with an iron pen and with 
           lead 
    they were engraved on a rock 
           forever!    (Job 19: 23-24) 
 
 
 
A. Introduction 
 
In this chapter, an additional, important premise is introduced, that is, that the language of 
suffering reaches deliberately, powerfully, to narrative expression. The expression of suffering 
may embed itself in narrative. Narrative offers a special form of discourse that is uniquely 
expressive of existential and spiritual pain. In fact, used in this way, “spiritual” comes to have a 
genuine meaning inasmuch as its use in this context concurs with a deep, resonant meaning that 
is associated with seeking. Narrative is a medium uniquely capable of carrying the experience of 
inexplicable and confounding suffering and its human witness.   
 My particular interest here is in the sense of agency potentially reclaimed from the 
making public of the individual (and collective) experience of suffering and injustice through the 
mechanisms of witness and narrative. The chapter proceeds through attention to the writing of 
Judith Sherman, Elie Wiesel and Hannah Arendt on the power of narrative expression to 
transform personal and social realities.  
Arguably, the Scriptural referent that best expresses this thesis concerning the power of 
narrative voice is found in the Book of Job. Hence, I begin, again, with Job.       
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B. Vulnerability and the Narrating of Personal Experience: Testimony 
Job will be heard – he narrates his experience even though his “friends,” as traditionally 
understood, act to mute his self-expression. In addition, just as Job’s friends endeavor to silence 
the vivid pain of Job’s narration with what are arguably theological platitudes, it is also possible 
that Job represents an unwelcome reality to these men. This reality is that of Job as “the other 
suffering man.”  
Recall Zophar the Naamathite’s chastisement of Job 11:2-3 … 
 
“Should a multitude of words go 
                 unanswered, 
         and should one full of talk be 
                vindicated? 
Should your babble put others to 
                 silence, 
          and when you mock, shall no one 
        shame you?   (11:2-3) 
                    
 
… and indeed Job’s own words “provoking” Zophar’s response: 
 
 
I will give free utterance to my 
                  complaint; 
              I will speak in the bitterness of my 
                  soul.  
            I will say to God, Do not condemn 
                              me; 
                           Let me know why you contend 
                               against me.    (10:1-2) 
      
           
 Indeed, Zophar chastises Job’s unbridled expression of pain. However, it is the argument 
of this paper that the expression of human experience through narrative is necessary, dangerous, 
and potentially deeply transformative.  
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Narrative, especially the narrating of personal experience, inevitably leaves the narrator 
vulnerable. Judith Sherman in Say The Name: A Survivor’s Tale in Prose and Poetry describes 
this well: 
 
After class I stand in a line of students at Princeton University, where I, a recent 
retiree, sit in on courses. When my turn comes I hand Professor David Carrasco 
my brief four written lines – my reactions of long ago to God and the Holocaust – 
the reactions of a Ravensbruck Concentration Camp survivor. 
 
God, that particular pain 
is too much for me 
You have it and 
be branded 
 
Carrasco is immediately interested and asks if I would talk to the class about my 
Holocaust experiences. Amazingly, I nod yes. It is now 1998, some fifty-three 
years after the war, and I have kept silent.159 
 
  
 Sherman goes on to describe her silence – as she puts it, “Silent to the world, silent to 
friends, and especially silent to family.”160 She writes: 
 
Ora, our youngest child says, ‘You tell us nothing about your experiences so 
everything I hear or read about the Holocaust I imagine happened to you.’ So it is 
– I have the experiences, she has the imaginings. 
 
 Ora, it is my ardent wish to be a mother, oh yes a mother                 
            you can stand  
            up to  
 
and yet, you see me in that world of branding and shaming and vulnerabilities.161 
 
 
 Silence is an important theme in Sherman’s writing. Sherman speaks of “triggers”:  
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Inside me – the images, noises, brutalities of that world are present. Always. 
Reprieves are always subject to countless triggers – bread, snow, a child, hair, 
gray hair, a dog. The absence of things, the presence of things. Triggers. There are 
no non-triggers.162 
 
 
 Sherman’s description of these reminders of previous pain as “triggers” speaks volumes. 
The choice of words is anything but neutral and abstract. The word calls to mind the image of a 
gun, and its trigger. “Trigger” also connotes uncertainty, that is, the uncertainty whether the 
trigger will be pulled or not, an uncertainty of life or death. Moreover, a trigger represents what 
is always a death-threatening, aggressive stance before another human being. Poignantly, 
Sherman experiences these triggers internally, or as she writes, “Amazingly … amazingly to me 
… some fifty-three years after the war, and I have kept silent. Silent to the world…”163 In 
understanding the potential violence of memory itself, it becomes comprehensible why a victim 
of horrific violence would hesitate to share her memories of it with others. Silence before horrific 
violence seems universal.      
A friend once shared with me her memory of her grandmother who survived the 
Armenian genocide only to live daily with the memory of her father and her brothers being 
peremptorily shot: “We always asked her, please tell us about life there … what it was like. Why 
don’t you ever tell us about it?” As is well-known, Armenians of that time suffered a “death 
march” not dissimilar from that of concentration camp inmates in 1945. My friend’s 
grandmother always kept, wherever she was, stowed beneath her bed a packed suitcase together 
with fresh bread wrapped in a napkin. She was always ready – in case it (atrocity) would happen 
again. She kept vigil. Vigil for what? It is ironic that it is in the silence of this woman before her 
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grandchildren that we can begin to hear the words, her words, questioning and half-formed 
before that to which no words can be given. 
David Carrasco writes of Sherman’s book: 
 
While this Holocaust story might be read as a gripping example of women’s 
testimonial literature, it is important to emphasize that Sherman has written this 
book to testify, and sometimes we have the impression she is both a witness for 
the victims and the inquisitor of God in the courtroom of the Shoah.164 
 
 
The reader is reminded of Job’s desire to press a legal suit against God. Norman Habel 
writes of Job 19:23: 
 
Job’s hope is the recording of his legal case in materials which are more durable 
than scrolls or clay tablets …. he wants his claim to be inscribed in rock for all 
posterity to witness.165 
 
 
Moreover, Elie Wiesel in the preface to the most recent translation of Night writes of 
testimony and of bearing witness: 
 
For the survivor who chooses to testify, it is clear: his duty is to bear witness for 
the dead and for the living. He has no right to deprive future generations of a past 
that belongs to our collective memory. To forget would be not only dangerous but 
offensive; to forget the dead would be akin to killing them a second time.166 
 
 
These are strong words. Wiesel does acknowledge (“For the survivor who chooses to 
testify”) the challenge of such a choice and implicitly the many obstacles to it. One purpose of 
this chapter is to reflect on the challenge of narrating personal and collective pain.  
                                               
164 Sherman, Say the Name, xi. 
 
165 Habel, The Book of Job, 303. 
 
166 Elie Wiesel, Night (New York: Hill and Wang, 2006), xv. 
 102 
 
For example, In Sherman’s book there are references to screams again and again, to both 
audible and silent screams. Audible screams are dangerous and life-threatening. Sherman writes 
of “die Veruckten, the crazies.”167 These are women in the Ravensbruck camp who are labeled 
“mad” and presumably deemed worthless even for slave labor because they are unable to keep 
quiet, to maintain silence. Sherman writes: 
 
I do not know what constitutes madness in Ravensbruck – crying too much for a 
lost child? Getting into a squabble? Displeasing a person in authority? Losing 
one’s mind, attempting suicide at the electric fence? Ravensbruck is madness, but 
these women whom THEY label mad are locked up and soon taken away …. I 
hear the screaming ones and the silent ones.168 
   
 
Screams both silent and audible are a persistent theme in Say the Name. The Russian poet 
Yevgeny Yevtushenko writes similarly of screams that emanate from wordless depths in his 
poem “Babii Yar” based on the unthinkable massacre of Jewish men, women, children and 
infants that happened there. 
 
Quick, give me your lips. 
Are they smashing down the door? 
No, it’s the ice breaking … 
The wild grasses rustle over Babii Yar. 
The trees look ominous, like judges. 
Here all things scream silently, 
And, baring my head, 
Slowly I feel myself turning gray. 
And I myself am one massive soundless scream 
Above the thousand buried here. 
I am each old man here shot dead. 
I am every child here shot dead. 
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Nothing in me shall ever forget!169 
 
 
“Quick, give me your lips. Are they smashing down the door?” But there is here no time 
for intimacy, for an exchange of love. Or even speech, or for shared understanding. There is only 
an attempt at preparedness for that for which in fact there is no readiness possible. Psychiatrist 
and anthropologist Arthur Kleinman writes of a Chinese doctor living under the Maoist regime: 
“And I myself am one massive soundless scream … above the thousand buried here …. I am 
every child here shot dead. Nothing in me shall ever forget!”170 
Sherman dedicates her book to David Carrasco, of whom she writes: “You give ear to my 
silence.” Carrasco himself, who writes an introduction to Sherman’s book, acknowledges “a 
crisis of language” in confronting the horror of the Holocaust.         
 
I chastised myself, ‘What led me to give a single week in the semester’s course on 
the religious dimensions in human experience to the overwhelming story of the 
Holocaust? Who was I to interpret Elie Wiesel’s stunning account, Night? I don’t 
have the imagination, words, or knowledge to help students be attentive to this 
“human experience.”’ I admitted my crisis of language to the students, that talking 
about such a monumental horror was too much to handle. Words fail, utterly, in 
the face of the Holocaust.171  
 
 
Still, it must be spoken of even though one is fully aware of the failure of language to 
comprehend it, while it challenges or even accosts the writer who would give testimony, as 
though something of the terror that was the Holocaust continues on. Sherman writes of Carrasco: 
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“He pays attention. He does not protect himself, nor his students, nor me. He lets the terror of 
history terrify.”172 Sherman writes that Carrasco “propels [her] from silence to voice.”173 
Certainly, Carrasco is important in the development of Sherman’s book; however, as I’m sure 
Carrasco would acknowledge, it was ultimately Sherman who propelled herself from silence to 
voice. As Sherman indicates, this movement from silence to voice is a costly one. In the next 
section I consider what it is that makes it so costly and painful through consideration of the 
phenomenon of the loss of the voice under conditions of brutality and torture, as Elaine Scarry 
documents well in her book The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World.174 
 
 
C. The Voice of the Narrator vs. Silence 
 
Elaine Scarry writes: 
 
 
…what the process of torture does is to split the human being into two, to make 
emphatic the ever present but, except in the extremity of sickness and death, only 
latent distinction between a self and a body, between a ‘me’ and ‘my body.’ The 
‘self’ or ‘me,’ which is experienced on the one hand as more private, more 
essentially at the center, and on the other hand as participating across the bridge 
of the body in the world, is ‘embodied’ in the voice, in language. The goal of the 
torturer is to make the one, the body, emphatically crushing and present by 
destroying it, and to make the other, the voice, absent by destroying it.175 
 
 
These are the extraordinary conditions under which speech becomes a precious 
commodity. Like gold or jewels, or vastly better, like bread and water but to which only the 
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privileged few are entitled – or allowed. Why? How does this happen? And how can its effects 
continue in the experience of a Holocaust survivor for fifty years or more reinforced by the 
simple presence of a dog, or selecting apples in a grocery store?176 How can speech, our ability 
to communicate with one another which is arguably that which makes us human, and which 
differentiates us from animals – how can that be stolen? How can even the most basic speech of 
all as enacted through the body, through its movement and gesture, be torn from a human being?  
It can. Just so Sherman recounts177 the prohibition against helping a fellow prisoner who 
collapses during Appell, or against refusing to beat to death another inmate for the “crime” of 
stealing a single potato hidden in her sleeve, upon the order of female SS officers who stand 
watch while the killing takes place and laugh. One may not even take one’s own life, in this 
absurd reversal of human living, into one’s hands even though the destruction of that life is the 
ultimate goal of the SS. Such an action is punished by the more painful and more protracted 
death of being viciously mauled by a dog. Cruelty for cruelty’s own sake. Why? 
To be sure, there are no answers as to how human beings can make themselves capable of 
such monstrosity. However, the actions of torturers upon their prisoners may be described, 
recorded, and narrated. To do so requires a voice, and as Scarry describes, the methodology of its 
theft, which it is of the greatest interest of the torturer to conceal, may be revealed for what it is. 
Consider this example from Sherman: 
 
By now everyone has heard of Gestapo interrogations. Even in this universe of 
terror there are gradations. The Gestapo, whose specialty is interrogation, has the 
reputation for the worst torture. I know the story of Mr. Berger, a family friend. 
He is interrogated by the Gestapo. Interrogated and tortured. During one such 
torture session, the interrogator keeps asking him, ‘What do you say?’ Whatever 
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his response, the torturer continues the beating and repeats, ‘What do you say?’ 
Finally a local policeman whispers in his ear, ‘Povedz dakujem’ – say thank you. 
He does and is thrown back into his cell where he dies. His family is allowed to 
bury him. Later Gestapo victims have no family to bury them. They are already 
deported. I know of other Gestapo stories as well and my fear is commensurate. I 
am terrified.178  
 
 
“Later Gestapo victims have no family to bury them.” Again, Wiesel: 
 
For the survivor who chooses to testify, it is clear: his duty is to bear witness for 
the dead and for the living. He has no right to deprive future generations of a past 
that belongs to our collective memory. To forget would be not only dangerous but 
offensive; to forget the dead would be akin to killing them a second time.179 
 
We return to the burial places of our loved ones in an act of affirmation of the lives they 
lived. Not having anyone to bury you is the ultimate experience of invisibility. As Sherman 
notes, the goal is (during her own interrogation) to make her “feel invisible, worse – blotted out. 
Irrelevant.” 
 
Had they at least indicated a moment of discomfort on my behalf – a recognition 
that another human being was present! .... intensely, cravingly, I want some 
acknowledgement of my presence during this interaction. I want deliberate, 
intentional ignoring, a sign that I exist. This brief experience fills me with the 
dread of negation.180  
 
Even help from sympathizers necessarily acknowledges the prohibition against speech: 
 
‘Don’t make a sound and follow me,’ whispers a Slovak policeman during the 
night. He leads us out through a side door and instructs us to run to a waiting car 
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nearby. The driver takes us to Stara Lubovna, a town nearby where relatives are in 
hiding.181  
 
 
Throughout Sherman’s book there are references to the imperative of silence. Likewise, 
Wiesel writes of his father’s death: 
 
All around me there was silence now, broken only by moaning. In front of 
the block, the SS were giving orders. An officer passed between the bunks. My 
father was pleading: 
“My son, water … I’m burning up … My insides” 
“Silence over there!” barked the officer. 
“Eliezer,” continued my father, “water …” 
The officer came close and shouted to him to be silent. But my father did 
not hear. He continued to call me. The officer wielded his club and dealt him a 
violent blow to the head. 
I didn’t move. I was afraid, my body was afraid of another blow, this time 
to my head. 
My father groaned once more, I heard: 
“Eliezer …” 
I could see that he was still breathing – in gasps. I didn’t move.182 
 
 
In similar fashion, Scarry quotes Solzhenitsyn’s The First Circle, in which its author 
describes: 
 
…how prisoners, while sleeping, were forced to keep their hands outside the 
blanket, and he writes, ‘It was a diabolical rule. It is a natural, deep-rooted, 
unnoticed human habit to hide one’s hands while asleep, to hold them against 
one’s body.’ The prisoner’s body, in its physical strengths, in its sensory powers, 
in its needs and wants, in its ways of self-delight, and finally even, as here, in its 
small and moving gestures of friendship toward itself – is, like the prisoner’s 
voice, made a weapon against him, made to betray him on behalf of the enemy, 
made to be the enemy.183 
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How else may we understand the Ravensbruck mandate that the inmate (like an animal) 
keep her food bowl and spoon with her at all times, that her hair is shaved and her head bald, that 
young women do not menstruate, while older women are separated from the life they have 
birthed – from their children and grandchildren. Everywhere, life is turned on its head and the 
ordinary relations of women with one another, and with their children and grandchildren, are 
wholly subverted in the interests of, as Solzhenitsyn describes his own imprisonment, “a 
diabolical rule.” 
 
 
D. The Voice of Suffering: Agency Reclaimed 
 
 
All sorrows can be borne if you put them into a story or tell a story about them.           
 
                                                                      – Isak Dinesen184 
 
 
For in every action what is primarily intended by the doer, whether he acts from 
natural necessity or out of free will, is the disclosure of his own image. Hence it 
comes about that every doer, in so far as he does, takes delight in doing; since 
everything that is desires its own being, and since in action the being of the doer 
is somehow intensified, delight necessarily follows …. Thus, nothing acts unless 
[by acting] it makes patent its latent self. 
                                                                           – Dante185  
 
 
It is the “splitting of the human being into two” to which Scarry refers which the Nazi 
torturers seemingly came precariously close to accomplishing. But they failed. Their very 
evident failure is manifest in the testimony of Sherman and Wiesel. Their failure is manifest as 
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long as Wiesel and Sherman and other sufferers give voice to their experience. Hannah Arendt 
writes: 
 
Action and speech are so closely related because the primordial and specifically 
human act must at the same time contain the answer to the question asked of 
every newcomer: ‘Who are you?’186  
 
 
The name. What is your name? A name connotes a primordial unity of action and speech. 
However, it is precisely this, argues Scarry, that the torturer wants to destroy, and it is in doing 
so that his power consists. Again, as Scarry writes, “The goal of the torturer is to make the one, 
the body, emphatically crushing and present by destroying it, and to make the other, the voice, 
absent by destroying it.” Scarry observes: 
 
It is in part this combination that makes torture, like any experience of great 
physical pain, mimetic of death; for in death the body is emphatically present 
while that more elusive part represented by the voice is so alarmingly absent that 
heavens are created to explain its whereabouts.187   
 
 
Anyone who has experienced significant pain knows this fact. In the experiencing of 
great suffering not only the voice but also the sense of time and relationality wither under the 
weight of crushing pain. There is a turning in of the person upon herself. 
Scarry continues: 
 
 
…in this world of broken and severed voices it is not surprising that the most 
powerful and healing moment is often that in which a human voice, though still 
severed, floating free, somehow reaches the person whose sole reality had become 
his own unthinkable isolation, his deep corporeal engulfment. The prisoner who, 
alone in long solitary confinement and repeatedly tortured, found within a loaf of 
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bread a matchbox containing a small piece of paper that had written on it the 
single, whispered word ‘Corragio!’, ‘Take courage.’188  
 
 
Such an action subverts the effort of the torturer who “tries to make his own not only the 
body of the prisoner … but all his words and sounds.”189 Only recall the incident cited in 
Sherman in which the Gestapo interrogator beats the victim until finally the local policemen 
supplies him with the required word: “Thank you,” or of concentration camp inmates being made 
to sing German songs. Examples abound.  
Consider an incident with an SS overseer in which Sherman dares to look the Ausführerin 
in the eye. 
 
The dog is now standing and pulling the leash in my direction. I do not pull away. 
Strangely I do not feel fear. I feel calm. For the first time in this Ravensbruck I 
look at an SS directly and not down as required at pain of death. She rages and I 
keep looking. The dog pulls harder. She looks at the dog, at the whip, at me. 
Hesitates. Then yells, ‘Raus! Get out you swine. You will be dead before I give 
you permission of any kind! Niemals. Never. Raus!’190  
 
 
Daring to look the overseer in the eye subverts the “moral” as well as the linguistic 
universe in which her actions nonetheless have a certain, admittedly perverse, “meaning.” Still, 
Sherman reflects: “The horror of it – that I should see my behavior as an act of courage.”191 That 
is, the simple action of looking into the eyes of another human being becomes an action of self-
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acknowledgement as well as of acknowledgement of the other, both of which are at odds with 
the goal of the oppressor whose purpose is precisely to derail both.  
Subordination to another seems always and inevitably to entail a prohibition against any 
assertion of equality on the part of the subject against whoever holds authority over him or her 
within a given field of (indeed even of visual) reference.  
 In a chapter titled “Action,” Hannah Arendt begins her discussion under the subheading 
“The Disclosure of the Agent in Speech and Action.” Arendt writes: 
 
…only [man] can communicate himself and not merely something – thirst or 
hunger, affection or hostility or fear. In man otherness, which he shares with 
everything that is, and distinctness, which he shares with everything alive, 
become uniqueness, and human plurality is the paradoxical plurality of unique 
beings. Speech and action reveal this unique distinctness.192 
 
 
The effort of those who ran the camps was precisely to reverse this “equation” of what it 
is to be a human being.  
 
Action and speech are so closely related because the primordially and specifically 
human act must at the same time contain the answer to the question asked of 
every newcomer: “Who are you?” This disclosure of who somebody is, is implicit 
in both his words and his deeds…”193 
 
 
Most importantly, Arendt writes that  
 
 
Without the accompaniment of speech, at any rate, action would not only lose its 
revelatory character, but, and by the same token, it would lose its subject…194 
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Or in other words, that the human ability for speech betokens agency and likewise is 
constitutive of subjectivity. Michael Jackson in his book The Politics of Storytelling: Violence, 
Transgression and Intersubjectivity quotes Hannah Arendt’s The Human Condition: 
 
Compared with the reality that comes from being seen and heard, even the 
greatest forces of intimate life – the passions of the heart, the thoughts of the 
mind, the delights of the senses – lead to an uncertain, shadowy kind of existence 
unless and until they are transformed, deprivatized and deindividualized, as it 
were, into a shape to fit them for public appearance. The most current of such 
transformations occurs in storytelling…195 
 
 
It is not necessary here to distinguish between verbal and gestural and other forms of 
speech. Certainly, speech and what constitutes it is an increasingly broad category. Nevertheless, 
it remains fair to say that independent speech, in whatever form, on behalf the concentration 
camp inmate was “to be crushed.”  
Jackson writes about his own work: 
 
 
Two theses, then, are brought together in this work. The first derives from Hannah 
Arendt’s argument that storytelling is a strategy for transforming private into 
public meanings … the second is existential, seeing storytelling as a vital human 
strategy for sustaining a sense of agency in the face of disempowering 
circumstances.196 
 
 
 
Wiesel’s setting to paper his experience supports both Arendt’s argument and Jackson’s 
thesis that storytelling can be a means of transforming private into public experience, as well as 
Jackson’s second thesis that storytelling satisfies an existential necessity.  
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Writes Wiesel: 
 
There are those who tell me I survived in order to write this text. I am not 
convinced. I don’t know how I survived; I was weak, rather shy; I did nothing to 
save myself. A miracle? Certainly not. If heaven could or would perform a 
miracle for me, why not for others more deserving than myself? It was nothing 
more than chance. However, having survived, I needed to give some meaning to 
my survival. Was it to protect that meaning that I set to paper an experience in 
which nothing made any sense?197 
  
Wiesel’s (and Sherman’s) written witness to the horror of Auschwitz and Ravensbruck is 
an act of resistance against the Nazis’ attempt to rob Jews, all Jews, of a voice. Wiesel and 
Sherman defy the attempt of the torturer, as Scarry observes, to destroy the ability of the subject 
to answer the “primordially” human question: “Who are you?” As Arendt writes, action without 
the accompaniment of speech “loses its subject.” The loss, or more accurately, the “destruction” 
of the subject, is, as Scarry writes, the goal of the torturer: “The name? What is your name?” 
That is, the goal of the torturer is that the subject be rendered unable to answer this most basic of 
human questions, between one human being and another. Arendt suggests that our very 
subjectivity is coincident with the ability to answer the question, “Who are you?” As Arendt 
further suggests, “action, without the accompaniment of speech loses not only its revelatory 
character but also the subject itself.” 
It is significant that that Sherman’s book is titled Say the Name. Sherman describes the 
moments before her bold act of looking the SS woman directly and in the eyes. 
 
‘Wie heisst du?’ she asks me. What is your name? 
‘Judit,’ I say, and before I have time to give her my surname, she jumps 
up, grabs the whip and shouts, addressing the dog. 
‘What do you expect with a name like that?! Judit! Bragging about her 
Jewishness! The swine, does she think her damned star is a medal?! We will teach 
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them about Jewish pride! Why does she think she is here, in this Lager? 
Vernichtung!’ 
                                                                                                
 
Equally significant is what Sherman describes next.  
 
The dog is now standing and pulling the leash in my direction. I do not pull away. 
Strangely, I do not feel fear. I feel calm. For the first time in this Ravensbruck I 
look at an SS directly and not down as required at pain of death. 
                                                                                                           
 
Sherman is subsequently denied her request and told by the raging SS woman to “get 
out!” She recounts that once outside, her fear returns, “fear of the dog, of the whip, of the rage,” 
but that in the moment before, looking the SS woman directly in the eye, she experienced 
freedom: “She does not get my total subservience.” Sherman goes on to describe this as her 
“exodus moment.”  
Moreover, Jackson writes that giving voice to suffering, through storytelling, is a “vital 
human strategy.”  
 
To reconstitute events in a story is no longer to live those events in passivity, but 
to actively rework them, both in dialogue with others and within one’s own 
imagination.198 
 
 
 
As Wiesel writes: 
 
having survived, I needed to give some meaning to my survival. Was it to protect 
that meaning that I set to paper an experience in which nothing made any 
sense?199 
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Wiesel writes of his need and of the existential imperative to give meaning to that which 
seems utterly without meaning. Both Sherman and Wiesel reflect what Jackson describes as a 
“vital human strategy” for living in the midst of crushingly painful, meaningless experience. 
Their narratives set to paper are surely an attempt, as Wiesel puts it, to “give meaning to their 
survival,” “an experience in which nothing made any sense.”  
At the same time as they give “utterance” to that experience (something impossible at the 
time of their incarceration), their narratives also give utterance to who each of them were (and 
even continue to be) as a result of that experience. Narratives such as Sherman’s and Wiesel’s 
reconstitute the subjectivity, the human person, of both themselves and of the others they 
describe through their narratives, in that mass experience of torture that was the Holocaust. They 
do so at a great personal cost. 
 
I didn’t move. I was afraid, my body was afraid of another blow, this time 
to my head. 
My father groaned once more, I heard: 
‘Eliezer …’ 
I could see that he was still breathing – in gasps. I didn’t move.200 
 
 
There is at last perhaps nothing more painful than the frank knowledge of those acts of 
kindness we might have dealt those we love, but did not. For most of us, these failures of 
kindness are painfully regrettable acts on our part. However, among the cruelest actions of the 
SS was the imperative that no prisoner help another prisoner: A diabolical rule. Those who did 
had to do so in secret and upon pain of torture and often certain death.  
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If Hannah Arendt locates subjectivity in the ability of the newcomer to answer the 
question “Who are you?”, the philosopher Emmanuel Levinas finds that our very subjectivity is 
coincident with the imperative “to be” for others. Levinas writes: 
 
These are not totally disparate. Whether we are is an imperative we cannot hide 
from and reminds us of the God of the Hebrew Scriptures at Mount Sinai who 
answers Moses: ‘I am who I am.’   
 
We constitute ourselves, according to Levinas, from our response (consider the New 
Testament parable of the Good Samaritan) or lack thereof to the suffering of the neighbor. 
Again, among the cruelest actions of SS was the imperative that no prisoner help another 
prisoner. Recall Sherman’s memory of the woman who left roll call to run toward the electrified 
fence in an attempt to commit suicide. As Sherman relates, before the woman can reach the fence 
the dogs attack her: and there is no attempt on the part of SS to call the dogs back. The woman is 
mauled to death. Sherman writes: “Every horrified one of us wants to rush out and help – no one 
does. Silence … At rare times we can help, furtively, secretly … Help is sabotage, going against 
the order.” Not only is the action or lack of it on the part of the SS cruelty for cruelty’s own sake, 
it is also strategic in its attempt to systematically destroy the human subject.  
Wiesel’s forced inability to help his own father at pain of death reflects the attempt by the 
Nazis to destroy the most basic fact of human being, our status as subject rather than an object, 
and the fundamental human relation of one subject to another. The Nazis attempted to 
subordinate their victims’ humanity to a willingness (at pain of death) to treat other prisoners as 
objects. However, their failure to accomplish this diabolical goal is manifest in the acts of human 
kindness on the part of prisoners (even if “furtive and in secret”) to each other that are recounted 
in Sherman’s and Wiesel’s narratives.  
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Wiesel’s and Sherman’s narratives are in themselves acts of resistance to the Nazis. Their 
narratives help to reconstitute the subjectivity lost, experienced by so many Holocaust survivors, 
in the daily effort to stay alive.  
Again, as Jackson writes: 
 
To reconstitute events in a story is no longer to live those events in passivity, but 
to actively rework them, both in dialogue with others and within one’s own 
imagination.201 
 
 
In writing their stories, Sherman and Wiesel not only attempt to give meaning, as Wiesel 
suggests, to meaningless experience, but also restore the experience of the subject, of the human 
person, which it was the express goal of the Nazis to destroy. In both their narratives, Sherman 
and Wiesel answer the question which Arendt describes as primordially and specifically human: 
“Who are you?” And they answer this question not only for themselves, but also on behalf of 
others, including those who, through death, no longer have voices with which to respond 
themselves.   
 
 
E. The Narrator as Witness 
 
Inasmuch as Scarry demonstrates that it is of the greatest importance to the oppressor to 
“steal” or destroy the voice of the oppressed, it is an action of resistance to testify or give witness 
against him or her. In fact, the continued proclamation and witness of the very voice the torturer 
endeavors to destroy entails a powerful affirmation. As Sherman acknowledges, the attempt to 
give verbal expression to that which is unspeakable must entail further pain to a person who has 
already endured extreme suffering. But if Arendt and Jackson (and Sherman) are correct, it also 
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augments an empowerment and sense of agency on the part of the person who gives witness, to 
which so much effort has been directed at repressing if not eliminating altogether.  
Sherman and Wiesel bear witness to the horror of the Holocaust. Indeed, the words of 
witnesses speak for themselves: Their words bespeak resistance – the same “resistance” Sherman 
frequently credits with her own survival. 
Sherman exercises resistance in another instance, where after having been forced to go to 
the camp medical clinic and told after treatment to return, she does not.  
 
I feel incredible shame of being a subject of experiments, an involuntary subject 
to what end? … this is horror. I feel totally controlled by evil. An involuntary 
subject. This is how it is with animals, they have no say. My life they declare 
worthless, my medical condition is of value to German medical ‘science.’202 
 
As earlier noted, it is very likely that modern bioethics takes its starting point from the 
testimony at Nuremburg of those who witnessed and/or were subjects of Nazi atrocities. Such 
testimony gave a voice to the suffering of subjects of medical experimentation in the camps. In 
addition, the witness of these subjects sounded an alarm and accompanying caution that 
continues today concerning experimentation upon human subjects, most recently in third-world 
countries.   
 
F. Theological Context 
 
Some of the men spoke of God: His mysterious ways, the sins of the Jewish 
people, and the redemption to come. As for me I had ceased to pray. I concurred 
with Job! I was not denying His existence, but I doubted His absolute justice.203 
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Whether Wiesel does not actually deny God’s existence is arguable. That is, reading 
Wiesel, one thinks again of the philosopher frequently discussed in conjunction with Emmanuel 
Levinas: Jean-Luc Marion, who writes of “The god-less thinking which must abandon the God 
of philosophy, God as causa sui, [and which] is thus perhaps closer to the divine God.”204 
Reading Wiesel, one also thinks of Richard Kearney, who quotes Rabbi Irving Greenberg, 
former chair of the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Council: 
 
no theological statement should be made that could not be credible in the presence 
of burning children. For what could you say about an omnipotent God when an 
innocent infant is burning alive? Nothing.205 
 
Kearney continues by citing the famous Hasidic line that “no heart is so whole as a 
broken heart.” Greenberg adds: “no faith is so whole as a broken faith.”206 
 
G. Pastoral Applications 
Again, Job. Just as Job’s friends endeavor to mute the vivid pain of Job’s narration with 
what are arguably theological platitudes, it may also be argued that Job represents an unwelcome 
reality to these men. Like Sherman and Wiesel, Job gives free utterance to his pain, and speaks in 
the bitterness of his soul. 
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The caveat here in terms of pastoral practice is the question whether we as pastoral 
ministers are willing to be discomforted, and perhaps sometimes terrified, by the narratives of 
those who suffer. For example, for Roman Catholics, Gaudium et Spes sends forth laity and 
ordained as pastoral ministers and messengers of the Gospel. It does not promise “protection” 
from faith-challenging experience. Perhaps Job’s friends, who are kind and good enough to sit on 
the ground with Job, present to his evident suffering, are not as yet prepared for their own 
theology to be challenged by the immanence of Job’s suffering. Job’s pain is palpable and 
immediate, and narrated. Narratives of suffering today are omnipresent. Sometimes these are 
from third-world countries where millions endure unimaginable poverty. Sometimes they are 
from citizens of our own “first world” country, whether the poor or the abandoned elderly or the 
terminally ill, any of whom may likewise dislodge in us a false sense of moral security. We, like 
Job’s friends, naturally cling to whatever grants a sense, however fragile, of having morally 
“done okay” – we may call it “conscience.” But that belief in conscience may ultimately be as 
vulnerable as belief in God in the presence of a thirteen-year-old child’s body, still in death 
throes after being hanged, swinging in agony upon the gallows in Auschwitz. For pastoral 
ministers, it means that we are deeply, inexcusably arrogant if we enter into the presence of 
suffering people with theological “certitude.”  
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Chapter 7: A Philosophy and Theology of Narrative: Suffering and 
Transcendence in Emmanuel Levinas and Gustavo Gutiérrez 
 
 
 
I had heard of you by the hearing of 
            the ear, 
 but now my eye sees you… 
 Job 42:5 
 
 
 
A. Introduction 
 
New ways of expressing the value of pastoral care may be found, but an effective means 
of doing so stops short of enfolding the unique meaning and power of pastoral care into a 
language that is not its own and which can, in excess, represent a capitulation to the language 
and methodology of external disciplines without ever fully understanding and embracing the 
power of its own unique resources. A goal of this thesis has been to give attention to the deep 
power and capacity of a pastoral care grounded in language, and well-assessed through the 
literary-critical tool of narrative analysis. To the objection that this argument itself grounds 
religious and theological meaning in an external discipline of literary criticism, it may be argued 
that it is the other way around; that is, it is literary analysis that is subsequent to the ancient 
biblical literature of spiritual and existential pain, for example in Job. To meet the challenge of 
the continuing viability and meaningfulness of religious language in today’s pluralistic and 
secular culture, this chapter treats the philosophy and theology of Emmanuel Levinas, whose 
God cannot be described through “adverbs of height that are modifications of the verb ‘to be,’” 
in conjunction with the theology of liberation theologian Gustavo Gutiérrez, who, like Levinas, 
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prioritizes ethics over ontology.  Or, if that is to describe matters too broadly, it is at least the 
case that Gutiérrez prioritizes the practice of Christianity over theologizing. 
Levinas’s essay “God and Philosophy” represents a distillation of some important 
themes, and so I begin with a discussion of it.207 In the second part of the chapter I hope to 
further demonstrate some affinities between the thought of Levinas and of Gutiérrez. My 
discussion of Gutiérrez’s theology is drawn primarily from his book On Job: God-Talk and the 
Suffering of the Innocent. 
Levinas and Gutiérrez may seem an unlikely comparison, and certainly there are 
profound differences between them. However, the thought of both writers is, as I argue, deeply 
informed by the reality of suffering. Moreover, my purpose throughout this discussion is to 
attend to the suggestion, present in both, that suffering takes precedence both in a philosophical 
and a theological context. 
 
B. Levinas: On God and Philosophy 
 
1. Levinas and Heidegger: From Influence to Disappointment 
 
Levinas is distinctive in his concern to make ethics rather than ontology the starting point 
in his philosophy. The reason is arguably the radical failure of the Western philosophical canon, 
with its prioritizing of ontology, to prevent the massive suffering that occurred throughout 
Europe during the last century under Nazism. Levinas is well-known as naming ethics as “first 
philosophy.” As Gutiérrez asks implicitly throughout his writing, “how are we to speak of God 
in the presence of the suffering of the poor in Latin America,” so Levinas asks in his essay 
“From the Carefree Deficiency,” how are we to speak of the human: 
 
                                               
207 In Levinas, Of God Who Comes to Mind. 
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We wonder whether the human, considered from the starting point of ontology as 
freedom … if the human considered from the starting point of the ontology to 
which is subordinated, and on which is founded, and from which would derive … 
and wherein would reside, European philosophy’s law and its moral and political 
obedience and all that the Bible seemed to bring it – we wonder whether this 
humanity is still equal to that which … strikes the modern intelligence. Modern 
intelligence is that which saw in Auschwitz, the outcome … of law and obedience 
– flowing from the heroic act – in the totalitarianisms, fascist and nonfascist, of 
the twentieth century. Modern intelligence has its reasons, even if eternal Reason 
had, one day, to renounce them.208 
 
 
This quotation summarizes much that is important to bear in mind in understanding 
Levinas. Far too briefly put, Levinas questions whether the understanding of human beings that 
begins from a starting point of human freedom, and which founds European moral and political 
philosophy. is tenable after Auschwitz. To ask this is to call into question whether European 
moral philosophy is correct in beginning from a starting point of human freedom. Levinas goes 
on to develop a conception of the human being as instead “hostage” to the suffering of the other. 
This is a very different anthropology, but one that arguably bears similarities to Gutiérrez’s.  
Levinas’ essay “God and Philosophy” begins: 
 
 
Not to philosophize is still to philosophize. The philosophical discussion of the 
West asserts the amplitude of an all-inclusiveness [englobement] or an ultimate 
comprehension. It compels every other discourse to justify itself before 
philosophy. Rational theology accepts this vassalage.209 
 
 
Levinas’ critique of the “vassalage of rational theology to philosophy” may be argued as 
bearing affinities with certain aspects of the critique of liberation theology, specifically in the 
writing of Gutiérrez. Still, “Not to philosophize is still to philosophize.” Levinas asserts that “not 
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philosophizing” nevertheless finds meaning in the language of philosophy and as such does not 
represent a significant enough departure. But why not philosophize? 
To answer this requires some reference to the influence of Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit 
upon Levinas. In his book Ethics and Infinity, which represents a series of conversations with 
Philippe Nemo, Levinas describes his early admiration for Heidegger. Levinas describes 
Heidegger’s delineation of “philosophy in relation to other forms of knowledge as ‘fundamental 
ontology.’”210 When asked by Nemo to elaborate on the term “fundamental ontology,” Levinas 
replies: 
 
It is precisely the comprehension of the verb ‘to be.’ Ontology would be 
distinguished from all the disciplines which explore that which is, beings, that is, 
the ‘beings,’ their nature, their relations – while forgetting that in speaking of 
these beings they have already understood the meaning of the word being, 
without, however, having made it explicit.211 
 
 
In other words, “These disciplines [which] do not worry about such an explication” 
presume an understanding of that which they purport to explore. 
   Levinas continues that it is his impression that, contrariwise, Heidegger’s “way of 
presenting philosophy” was novel and indeed brilliant.212 Why? Because: 
 
In Sein und Zeit’s analyses of anxiety, care and being-toward-death, we witness a 
sovereign exercise of phenomenology. This exercise is extremely brilliant and 
convincing. It aims at describing man’s being or existing – not his nature.213  
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Levinas replies further that what particularly “struck [him]… in Heidegger’s 
phenomenological method”214 was: 
 
The intentionality animating existing itself and a whole series of ‘states of the 
soul’ which, before Heideggerian phenomenology, passed for ‘blind,’ for simple 
contents; the pages on affectivity, on Befindlichkeit and, for example, on anxiety; 
anxiety appeared to banal study as an affective movement without cause or, more 
exactly, as ‘without object’; now it is precisely the fact of being without object 
which in the Heideggerian analysis, shows itself to be truly significant.215 
 
 
That is, Heidegger gives language to what is phenomenologically true for every living 
person. Levinas admired Heidegger for his privileging of “objectless anxiety.” The suggestion of 
“objectless anxiety” itself puts to rout, or at least fairly represents an arguable putting to rout, of 
anxiety and “a whole series of states of the soul” as simple affectivity. Heidegger’s achievement 
consists at least in part in attending to the “objectless anxiety” that indeed permeates the pages of 
human living, history, literature and experience: it is anxiety before the inevitability of death.  
Earlier in the discussion, Levinas states: 
 
One speaks habitually of the word being as if it were a substantive, even though it 
is verb par excellence. In French, one says the being or a being. With Heidegger, 
‘verbality’ was awakened in the word being, what is event in it, the ‘happening’ 
of being. It is as if things and all that is ‘set a style of being,’ ‘made a profession 
of being.’ Heidegger accustomed us to this verbal sonority. This re-education of 
our ear is unforgettable, even if banal today.216  
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I present these rather lengthy quotes from Levinas in part to establish his admiration for 
the earlier work of Heidegger in Sein und Zeit and its influence on Levinas’ own thought, an 
influence that is essential to note in considering Levinas’ own writing.  Levinas acknowledges, 
“My admiration for Heidegger is above all an admiration for Sein und Zeit. I always try to relive 
the ambiance of those readings when 1933 was still unthinkable.”217 Levinas writes: 
 
I think the later work of Heidegger, which does not produce in me a comparable 
impression, remains valuable through Sein und Zeit. Not, you well know, that it is 
insignificant; but it is much less convincing. I do not say this owing to 
Heidegger’s political engagements, taken several years after Seit und Zein, even 
though I have never forgotten those engagements, and though Heidegger has 
never been exculpated in my eyes from his participation in National Socialism 
[italics mine].218  
 
 
Thus, Levinas’s remark, “I do not say this owing to Heidegger’s political engagements,” 
should probably not be taken at face value; rather, it is absolutely essential in considering 
Levinas to realize that his making of ethics “first philosophy” is a reaction to Heidegger. Also, it 
may be argued that this “praise” is a concession to Heidegger as well as delineating a limitation, 
that is, Levinas nevertheless describes Heidegger’s delineation of philosophy from other forms 
of knowledge as “fundamental ontology” – but ontology nonetheless, and Levinas’s is a critique 
of the primacy accorded ontology in the Western tradition and a resituating in its place of ethics 
as “first philosophy.” Why? Arguably, because a philosophical tradition that accorded primacy to 
ontology failed to prevent the murder of six million Jews, besides some five million other 
victims of National Socialism.  
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2. On the ‘Vassalage of Rational Theology to Philosophy.’ 
This raises the unwieldy and very large issue of the relationship between philosophy and 
religion. Moreover, this particular point might be as well discussed in connection with the 
theology of Gutiérrez. Nonetheless, simply put, Levinas points to the fact that, insofar as 
theology’s self-understanding is, whether acknowledged or implicit, derivative of Western 
philosophy, then theology in its effort to speak of God inevitably inherits the shortcomings of 
philosophy.  
Interestingly, Gutiérrez likewise writes in A Theology of Liberation that 
 
Many ideas must be reconsidered in the light of a history that advances 
inexorably, simultaneously confirming and rejecting previous assertions. Ideas 
must be reconsidered in light of praxis, which is the proving ground of all theory, 
and in light of socio-cultural realities very different from those from which the 
ideas emerged. But all this should not lead us to an attitude of distrustful reserve 
toward these ideas; rather it should suggest that the task to be undertaken is 
formidable.219 
 
Levinas writes with a degree of irony that “an ultimate and royal discourse comes to 
Western philosophy by virtue of the rigorous coincidence between the thought in which 
philosophy stands and the reality in which this thought thinks.”220 He continues:         
 
For thought, this coincidence signifies the following: not to have to think beyond 
that which belongs to the ‘gesture or movement of being [geste d’être]’; or at least 
not to have think beyond that which modifies a previous adherence to the ‘gesture 
of being,’ such as ideal or formal notions.221 
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Further: 
 
 
For the being of the real, this coincidence signifies: to illumine thought and what 
is thought by showing itself. To show itself to be illumined, is precisely to have a 
meaning; it is precisely to have intelligibility par excellence, underlying any 
modification of meaning.222  
 
 
Levinas’s text is complex. However, perhaps a tentative and admittedly partial 
explication of the above is that Levinas points to a more “primitive” (literally understood) 
thought or rationality to which “Meaningful thought, thought of being: these would-be 
pleonasms and equivalent pleonasms”223 are, in other words, superfluous. Levinas recognizes 
that these notions have a justification in the necessities of everyday life, but they are not 
“illuminative.” For this, Levinas has recourse to the “gesture of being,” the rationality of which 
should not be understood “as an eventual characteristic that would be attributed to it [the gesture 
of being] when some reason comes to know it.”224 Rather: 
 
Intelligibility is precisely that a thought might know the rationality of the gesture 
of being. It is necessary to understand rationality as the incessant upsurge of 
thought driven by the energy of the gesture of being or by its manifestation, and 
we must understand reason starting from this rationality.225 
 
 
It is understatement to note that Levinas’ choice of words is idiosyncratic; nevertheless, 
clearly the influence of Heidegger and his “awakening of ‘verbality’ in the word being” is very 
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much present here. But more importantly, Levinas’ critique of ontology as evident in the 
discourse of Western philosophy is incipient.  
 
3. Levinas: On the God of the Bible. 
Levinas continues: “Philosophical discourse must therefore be able to embrace God – of 
whom the Bible speaks – if, that is, this God has a meaning. But once thought, this God is 
immediately situated within the ‘gesture of being.’ He is situated therein as a being [étant] par 
excellence.”226 Again, as soon as God is “assimilated” to Western philosophical parlance, He is 
likewise assigned a “place,” as it were, within what is, if we are to speak of God as transcendent, 
a necessarily limited vocabulary. Levinas states that “in thematizing God, theology has brought 
him into the course of being, while the God of the Bible signifies in an unlikely manner the 
beyond of being, or transcendence.”227  
 
But Moses said to God, ‘If I come to the Israelites and say to them, “The 
God of your ancestors has sent me to you,” and they ask me, “What is his name?” 
what shall I say to them?’ God said to Moses, ‘I AM WHO I AM.’ He said 
further, ‘Thus you shall say to the Israelites, “I AM has sent me to you.”’ God 
also said to Moses, ‘Thus you shall say to the Israelites, “The LORD, the God of 
your ancestors, the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob, has 
sent me to you”’: 
This is my name forever, 
And this my title for all generations.228 
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For Levinas, the “God of the Bible signifies without analogy to an idea subject to criteria, 
without analogy to an idea exposed to the summons to show itself true or false. And it is not by 
accident that the history of Western philosophy has been a destruction of transcendence.”229  
Levinas continues: “Rational theology, fundamentally ontological, endeavors to 
accommodate transcendence within the domain of being by expressing it with adverbs of height 
applied to the verb ‘to be.’”230 But for Levinas, these represent “modifications of meaning” 
which fundamentally distort the idea of the Infinite. Nevertheless, it is obvious that 
transcendence, or that which, for Levinas, is infinitely beyond its meager expression through 
adverbs of height (or for that matter of any other category) applied to the verb “to be,” inevitably 
misappropriates any effort at a genuine translation into language of “transcendence,” as though 
the latter were even possible without (and even with) endless qualification. In short, as Levinas 
writes: “One can, to be sure, also claim that the God of the Bible has no meaning; that is, he is 
not thinkable properly speaking.”231  
Levinas writes: 
 
‘The concept of God is not a problematic concept, it is not a concept at all,’ writes 
Jeanne Delhomme in a recent book, prolonging a major line of the philosophical 
rationalism, that refuses to receive the transcendence of the God of Abraham, or 
of Isaac and Jacob, among those concepts without which there would be no 
thought.232 
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For Levinas, it is instead the earlier-mentioned “incessant upsurge of thought driven by 
the energy of the gesture of being” manifest in the Bible.”233 And yet, Levinas does not here 
wholly disagree with Delhomme. This is important, because it is in fact precisely Levinas’ 
argument that “God is not a concept.” Rather, for Levinas, transcendence, the transcendence of 
the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, is constitutive of conceptuality but in a manner prior to 
all conceptuality, prior to all notions of “being,” and therewith and most importantly prior to 
ontology as understood within the Western philosophical canon. 
 
4. The Idea of the Infinite 
 
Indeed the inscrutable One is out of the reach of every rational process. Nor can 
any words come up to the inexpressible Good, this One, this Source of all Unity, 
this supra-existent Being. Mind beyond mind, word beyond speech, it is gathered 
up by no discourse, by no intuition, by no name. It is and it is as no other being is. 
Cause of all existence, and therefore itself transcending existence, it alone could 
give an authoritative account of what it really is.234 
 
 
 Levinas references Malebranche: “there is no idea of God, or God is his own idea.”235 
Levinas continues elaborating on his reference to Malebranche: “We are out of the order in 
which one passes from the idea to the being. The idea of God is God in me, but it is already God 
breaking up the consciousness that aims at ideas, already differing from all content.”236 And yet, 
writes Levinas, there is: 
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an idea of God, or God in us, as though the not-letting-itself-be-encompassed 
were also an exceptional relation in me, as though the difference between the 
Infinite and that which had to encompass and comprehend it were a non-
indifference of the Infinite to this impossible encompassing, a non-indifference of 
the Infinite for thought: the placing of the Infinite in thought, but wholly other 
than thought … This is a placing-in that is like a passivity unlike any other [mise 
comme passivité non pareille] because it cannot be assumed (it is perhaps in this 
passivity – from beyond all passivity – that we must recognize awakening 
[reveil]).237 
 
 
Levinas is here elucidating his understanding of transcendence. One might almost 
reference Pseudo-Dionysius as quoted at the beginning of this section, “Mind beyond mind, 
word beyond speech, it is gathered up by no discourse, by no intuition, by no name. It is” … 
until we reach the last eight words of the sentence (“and it is as no other being is”) wherein a 
significant difference between Levinas and Pseudo-Dionysius becomes clear. That is, the idea of 
the Infinite in Levinas arguably stems from the revelation at Mount Sinai in which the Lord 
refuses to be subsumed to the level of a being, even if a “Being” among other “Beings.”  
Historically, the Biblical passage references the predilection of ancient Near Eastern 
peoples for “substantive, nameable, powerful warrior deities.” Such history likewise reiterates 
the now well-known reciprocal relation perhaps originally described by anthropologist Clifford 
Geertz concerning the parallel ideation of heaven and earth among indigenous (as well as first-
world) peoples.238 However, the God of Moses on Mount Sinai refuses such an identification: 
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“God said to Moses, ‘I AM WHO I AM.’ He said further, ‘Thus you shall say to the Israelites, “I 
AM has sent me to you.”’”239  
The God whom Moses encounters on Mount Sinai is a wholly gratuitous insertion of the 
Infinite into the finite, of the “not-letting-itself-be-encompassed” become [reveil] “an 
exceptional relation within me,” “as though the difference between the Infinite and that which 
had to encompass and comprehend it were a non-indifference of the Infinite to this impossible 
encompassing, a non-indifference of the Infinite for thought: the placement of the Infinite in 
thought, but wholly other than the thought.” Indeed, for Levinas, the “non-indifference” of the 
Infinite is central to and constitutive of his broader discussion, of the “not-letting-itself-be-
encompassed” become “an exceptional relation within me.”  
Levinas goes on to speak instead of something wholly different, of a “passivity unlike 
any other” in which the “non-indifference of the Infinite for thought: the placing of the Infinite in 
thought” “were also an exceptional relation within me,” constituted by the negation of the finite 
by the infinite, but again not after the formalism of negative judgment but rather in itself 
constitutive of subjectivity. 
Levinas’ text is complex but it can be loosely paraphrased thus:  
The “idea of the Infinite” or the “Infinite in me”240 does not follow from reflection but 
rather breaks in upon us, as a “trauma,” as something “undergone.”241 Levinas describes this as 
“a passivity more passive than any passivity”242 and as “a depth of undergoing that no capacity 
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comprehends.”243 For Levinas, it is “This trauma …. this affectation of presence by the Infinite 
… that takes shape as a subjection to the neighbor.”244 Levinas writes of this responsibility for 
the Other: “as a responsible I, I never finish emptying myself … an infinite increase in one’s 
exhaustion …. The subject as hostage has been neither the experience nor the proof of the 
Infinite, but the witnessing of the Infinite, a modality of this glory, a witnessing that no 
disclosure has preceded.”245 
To summarize, for Levinas the Infinite breaks upon one as a trauma in which the self 
experiences “a passivity more passive than any passivity.” This passivity takes shape as 
responsibility to the Other. And it is through this being “hostage” to the Other and coincident 
responsibility that transcendence “occurs” to which we give witness.  
 
The referring to another is awakening [reveil], awakening to proximity, which is 
responsibility for the neighbor to the point of substitution for him. We have 
shown elsewhere the substitution for another at the heart of this responsibility, 
which is thus an enucleation of the transcendental subject, thus also the 
transcendence of goodness, the nobility of pure enduring, an ipseity of pure 
election. Love without Eros. Transcendence is ethical, and the subjectivity which 
in the final analysis is not the ‘I think’ (which is at first sight), or the unity of the 
‘transcendental apperception,’ is, as responsibility for the other [italics mine], 
subjection to the other. The I is a passivity more passive than any passivity, 
because it is from the outset in the accusative, oneself – which had never been in 
the nominative – under the accusation of another, although without sin. The 
hostage for another, the I obeys a commandment before having heard it; it is 
faithful to an engagement that it never made, and to a past that was never present 
[italics mine].246 
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Parenthetically, it is possible to point to a very important similarity between Kant and 
Levinas while acknowledging a significant difference as well. For Kant, the concept of God is 
unthinkable. Likewise, for Levinas it is the case that although we have a notion of the Infinite “in 
us” we cannot comprehend it. Both Kant and Levinas “eliminate” metaphysics. Contrariwise, for 
Kant the self is autonomous and self-legislating, while Levinas conceives the self as “caught 
hostage.”  
Regarding responsibility to the other, Levinas writes of the obeisance of the I “to a 
commandment before having heard it;” fidelity of the I “to an engagement that it never made, 
and to a past that was never present.”  
Perhaps not wholly dissimilar is Gustavo Gutiérrez’s point that “God is first 
contemplated when we do God’s will and allow God to reign; only after that do we think about 
God. To use familiar categories: contemplation and practice together make up a first act; 
theologizing is a second act.”247 My question is whether Gutiérrez’s point is wholly different 
from a calling into question of such “formal” epistemological categories or “assumptions” as 
Levinas finds interesting. Gutiérrez, in his prioritizing of the practice of Christianity to 
theologizing about it, shares at least a likeness to Levinas in as much as for Levinas 
responsibility to the suffering of the other person likewise takes precedence. Levinas writes of 
this responsibility as going “to the point of substitution for the other, up to the condition – or the 
noncondition – of a hostage.”248 
  
As unreplaceable for this responsibility, I cannot slip away from the face of the 
neighbor [italics mine] without avoidance, or without fault… here I am pledged to 
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the other without any possibility of abdication. I cannot slip away from the face of 
the other [italics mine] in its nakedness without recourse. I cannot escape it in its 
forsaken nakedness, which glimmers through the fissures that crack the mask of 
the personage or his wrinkled skin, in his ‘with no recourse,’ which we must hear 
as cries already cried out toward God, without voice or thematization.249  
 
 
A “slipping away from the face of the neighbor” is precisely that which Job’s friends, 
Eliphas, Bildad, and Zophar, are held accountable. That is, Job’s friends arguably abdicate “the 
problem of the relationship between the suffering of the I and the suffering that an I can feel 
before the suffering of the other man.”250 Levinas implies this in his essay “Transcendence and 
Evil,”251 in which he considers Philippe Nemo’s book Job and the Excess of Evil. Moreover, 
Job’s friends abdicate responsibility for the suffering of the other man through recourse to the 
ontological structure of the Law of Retribution, which intellectual luxury Job himself “with no 
recourse” [italics mine] does not have. In addition, the text of Job includes frequent references to 
“the face” of the other – whether Job’s or God’s. Levinas continues in the essay “Transcendence 
and Evil”: 
 
The face puts into question the sufficiency of my identity as an I, it compels me 
toward an infinite responsibility toward another. An original transcendence 
signifying the concreteness, which is ethical from the outset, of the face.252  
 
 
Again, Levinas considers that subjectivity itself is established through responsibility to 
the suffering of the other person. This in itself is a remarkably powerful and original suggestion, 
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that is to say, Levinas is suggesting that the very constitution of the subject before God is 
dependent upon service to others, and most particularly to those who suffer. If there were a 
“judgment” of subjectivity, then for Levinas, compassionate presence to others who are suffering 
is all that would survive it. And yet Levinas strives to avoid the easy reduction of the latter back 
again to ontology. He writes: 
 
The Infinite is not ‘in front of’ me; it is I who express it [italics mine] … A 
marvelous accusative: here I am under your gaze, obliged to you, your servant. In 
the name of God. Without thematization! The sentence in which God comes to be 
involved in words is not ‘I believe in God.’ The religious discourse prior to all 
religious discourse is not dialogue. It is the ‘here I am,’ said to the neighbor 
[italics mine] to whom I am given over, and in which I announce peace, that is, 
my responsibility for the other. In making language flower upon their lips … 
Peace, peace to him who is far off, and to him who is near, says the eternal.253 
 
 
Again, Levinas works to dismantles any attempt to reintegrate transcendence into the 
more traditional Western ontology of Being: “The Infinite is not ‘in front of’ me; it is I who 
express it.” 
 
Transcendence as signification, and signification as the signification of an order 
given to subjectivity before any statement: a pure-one-for-the-other. Poor ethical 
subjectivity, deprived of freedom! Unless this would be but the trauma of a fission 
of oneself come to pass in a venture risked with God or through God.254  
 
 
In other words, quite contrary to a “formalism” of ideas, Levinas speaks instead of 
something wholly different, of again, a “passivity unlike any other” in which the “non-
indifference of the Infinite for thought: the placing of the Infinite in thought” “were also an 
exceptional relation within me, constituted by the negation of the finite by the infinite,” but again 
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not (indeed, especially not) after the “formalism of negative judgment” but rather is itself 
constitutive of subjectivity: “Poor ethical subjectivity, deprived of freedom!” For Levinas, we are 
hostage to the imperative to respond to the suffering of the other person. However, it is precisely 
here that transcendence occurs which we witness.  
It is this last point that is most significant in the foregoing discussion. That is, for 
Levinas, our very subjectivity is coincident with the imperative “to be” for others. This is an 
imperative we cannot hide from. We constitute ourselves from our response or lack thereof to the 
suffering of the neighbor. It is precisely this that most differentiates Levinas from Heidegger. 
The Heideggerian self confronts anxiety before its own death, an inward movement. For Levinas, 
the self confronts responsibility to the suffering of the neighbor, an outward movement. And for 
Levinas, it is in this turning to the neighbor that transcendence is witnessed. 
 
 
C. Gutiérrez: On Job  
 
Like Levinas, Gutiérrez shares a mistrust of many formal notions inherited from the 
Western philosophical tradition, but he does not wholly abandon them. To begin with a very late 
passage from Job (42:1-6): 
 
Then Job answered the Lord: 
 
          “I know that you can do all  
            things, 
    and that no purpose of yours can 
           be thwarted. 
     ‘Who is this that hides counsel  
                 without knowledge?’ 
      Therefore I have uttered what I did 
                 not understand, 
          things too wonderful for me, which 
                 I did not know. 
      ‘Hear, and I will speak; 
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           I will question you, and you declare 
                   to me.’ 
       I had heard of you by the hearing of 
                   the ear, 
          but now my eye sees you; 
       therefore I despise myself, 
           and repent in dust and ashes.” 
 
 
 
Gutiérrez writes of Job’s theological transformation and experience of transcendence: 
 
 
God assails the pretended knowledge of Job and even more than that of his 
friends, who regard everything as foreseen and think they know for certain when 
and how God has punished sinners. What God is criticizing here is every theology 
that presumes to pigeonhole the divine action in history and gives the illusory 
impression of knowing it in advance. The outlook God is rejecting is obviously 
the one Job’s theologian friends defend and, despite himself, Job shares at bottom. 
God will bring him to see that nothing, not even the world of justice, can shackle 
God; this is the very heart of the answer.255 
 
 
 It would seem this is likewise the very heart of the answer to the question of God’s care 
for the suffering of the indigent innocent in Latin America today, or in any place or time wherein 
God’s faithful servants, like Job, endure a fate that surely cannot reasonably be accorded them, 
not according to the calculus of the Law of Retribution, as we have seen, nor according to any 
human calculi whatever. It would seem also that there is at least arguably a likeness present 
between Gutiérrez’s questioning of “the world of justice” and Levinas’ of the Western 
ontological tendencies which have so radically failed.  
 Gutiérrez analyzes 42:1-6 as follows. Job’s response contains three steps: “an 
acknowledgement that God has plans and that these are being carried out; a discovery of 
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previously unrecognized aspects of reality; a joyous encounter with the Lord.”256 
 First, Job has been right to maintain his innocence. There is no mention in any of God’s 
speech of Job’s fate being on account of guilt. However, having listened to God’s speeches Job 
now realizes that God and God’s freedom are far beyond his ability to grasp:  
 
     Therefore I have uttered what I did 
                not understand, 
         things too wonderful for me, which 
                I did not know. 
 
 
 Gutiérrez points out the preceding verse: 
 
 
       I know that you can do all  
            things, 
     and that no purpose of yours can 
           be thwarted. 
 
 
This represents a recognition on Job’s part that God does indeed have plans even if these 
are not such as Job can comprehend. This, writes Gutiérrez, is an acknowledgement by Job that 
the world is not a chaos as in his darkest moments he imagined. It is not God’s world that Job 
was rejecting, but the imagined world of his friends and its “presumed” theological order beside 
“the God to whom they appealed.”257 That is: 
 
 
If there is no alternative to the doctrine of temporal retribution, then for someone 
who has experienced what Job has experienced, the conclusion is inevitable: the 
world is indeed a chaos. If the only possible order is the order of justice that his 
friends proclaim, then Job must become, even against his will, a defender of 
disorder, because his fate will be the same whether or not he is upright and 
innocent (9:15-20). The proof that this position into which he has been forced 
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never satisfied him is his ardent plea that he might debate the matter not with his 
friends but with God. In his lamentation [italics mine].258   
    
   
Job, like Jeremiah, was close to God, closer than were his friends with their theology. 
Again, there seems to be here a comparison with Levinas inasmuch as Gutiérrez questions the 
presumptions of received theologies. 
Gutiérrez concludes, “Job has at various moments acknowledged the greatness of God 
(see 9:4, 34-35; 12:19; 13:21-22; 23:4-6); now he knows that God has plans and carries them out 
in an utterly free manner.”259  
 Gutiérrez notes Job’s repetition of God’s words in v. 3 … 
 
     ‘Who is this that hides counsel 
                   without knowledge? 
 
… and in v. 4: 
    
 
  ‘Hear, and I will speak; 
          I will question you, and you declare 
                  to me.’   
 
This indicates that it is God with whom Job has been speaking, and by whose word he is 
ultimately transformed. It is the fullness of meaning and message of the Word of God as 
expressed in Scripture that ultimately best supports the liberation of both Job and likewise of all 
God’s suffering people. Moreover, this bears a comparison to Levinas who writes: 
“Philosophical discourse must therefore be able to embrace God- of whom the Bible speaks – if, 
that is, this God has a meaning.”260  
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I had heard of you by the hearing of 
            the ear 
   but now my eye sees you; 
 therefore I despise myself, 
     and repent in dust and ashes.” 
    (Job 42:5-6) 
 
Job’s final words suggest, at least as Gutiérrez reads the text, that finally in what is a 
face-to-face encounter with the Lord (like Paul’s on the Road to Damascus), Job is emboldened 
to shed the robe of Jeremiac lamentation for a mantle of joy. 
 Gutiérrez goes even so far as to suggest that Job’s final repentance in dust and ashes 
signifies a repentance of his earlier attitude of lamentation. To this reading I would only add 
Carol Newsom's comment: 
 
Does he say, as the Authorized version and its descendents have rendered, 
‘Therefore I despise myself and repent in dust and ashes’ (i.e., in humiliation)? Or 
does he say, ‘Therefore I retract my words and repent of dust and ashes’ (i.e., the 
symbols of mourning)? Or, ‘therefore I retract my words and have changed my 
mind concerning dust and ashes’ (i.e., the symbols of religion)? This ambiguity 
gives Job’s words something of … a ‘loophole,’ that is, ‘the retention for oneself 
of the possibility of altering the ultimate, final meaning of one’s words’ [italics 
mine] … This potential other meaning, that is, the loophole left open, 
accompanies the word like a shadow.261  
 
 
Perhaps the ambiguity Newsom highlights also holds a key to the continuing relevance of 
Job. That is, the ambiguity throughout the book arguably lends it a more universal reference and 
audience. 
 
 I had heard of you by the hearing of 
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              the ear, 
  but now my eye sees you… 
 Job 42:5 
 
Again, Gutiérrez writes that it is not God’s world that Job was rejecting but the imagined 
world of his friends and its “presumed” theological order besides “the God to whom they 
appealed.”  
 I continue to wonder whether there might not be a profound similarity between 
Gutiérrez’s rejection of a presumed theological order and Levinas’s of the ontology upon which 
the latter is based. 
 
D. Fidelity to the Other: The Narrative of Job 
As stated in the preceding chapter, of particular interest is the sense of agency potentially 
reclaimed through narrative, the making public of the individual (and collective) experience of 
suffering and injustice. I believe the Scriptural referent that best expresses this is found in the 
Book of Job. Of course, there is ambiguity. Whether Job’s truth-telling actually benefits him is, 
given the structure of the book, held in abeyance (i.e., does God ever truly respond to Job?). I 
suppose it could be argued God does – if perhaps thousands of years later: Sometimes wrongs 
really are recognized if at a later date and attempts are made to right them (e.g., the Nuremburg 
Code). Still, that is not an argument I would make. Moreover, the question of suffering and 
especially the suffering of the individual remains painful and unanswered. Job expresses all 
these. 
Sickness and pain inevitably characterize the sufferer as “Other.” There is a sense in 
which time spent in pain and illness is “time out of time,” and separates the sufferer from the 
community. However, the attempt to communicate that experience to a larger community, as do 
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Wiesel and Sherman – and Job – represents an effort, often laborious and painful, on the part of 
the subject to reintegrate experience into the larger cultural vocabulary. It is to bear witness. 
Arthur Frank writes: 
 
Levinas’s most important lesson is that for everyone rendered ‘other’ by suffering 
who speaks, perhaps in that act of witness some nameless suffering is opened. 
The suffering person is always the other, reduced and isolated. To tell any story of 
suffering is to claim some relation to the inter-human. Any testimony is a 
response to the half opening of nameless suffering.262  
 
Indeed, Job bears faithful witness and in return receives censure. This is the fidelity of 
Job.  
The next chapter concludes the thesis with extended reflection on personal narrative and 
in particular its clinical pastoral significance.  
 
E. Theological Context 
 
 Finally, why are these considerations important within the context of theological 
reflection and its implementation in pastoral ministry? Although it is not difficult to imagine the 
implications of Gutiérrez’s thought for pastoral ministry, the latter seems more “abstract” in the 
case of Levinas. Moreover, what is the relationship between the Book of Job and Levinas’s and 
Guiterrez’s writing? And how are these related to Wiesel’s, Sherman’s, and Arendt’s concerns?  
And why bring all these together? 
 The Book of Job calls our attention to the suffering of the other. Both Levinas and 
Gutiérrez do likewise. Job’s voice – the narrating of his experience – is a crucial constituent of 
the book. Assuming God “responds” to Job, this happens in consequence of Job’s giving free, 
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unbridled expression to his pain. Wiesel’s and Sherman’s writings give ample testimony to how 
challenging, painful, and dangerous the latter may be. And yet it is precisely owing to the 
narration of experience that the first ethical code in modern times, the Nuremburg Code, is due. 
Both attention to the other and the personal narrative of the other are costly, whether one is the 
narrator or the listener. However, both are, I would argue, inextricably linked with ethics, 
particularly bioethics, in our time.  
 They are also constitutive of pastoral ministry to the sick. Effective listening requires the 
willing suspension of preconceptions that might otherwise impede our freely hearing the other. 
Levinas and Gutiérrez, and the Book of Job, caution that preconceptions, whether philosophical, 
theological, or moral, potentially divert our attention from the suffering of the other before us. 
Levinas and Gutiérrez both direct the reader to the immanence of suffering and challenge us not 
only to suspended our philosophical and theological preconceptions but even and especially to 
imagine transcendence differently. 
 Levinas writes of transcendence as the consequence of our becoming “hostage” to the 
suffering of the other, which takes shape in responsibility to the neighbor and which later 
becomes our witness to transcendence. Levinas challenges us to give scrutiny to the God who is 
predicated by “adverbs of height,” and rather to witness transcendence in the response to the very 
immanent suffering of the other. Gutiérrez similarly challenges us to find God in the suffering 
faces of the poor. 
 
F. Pastoral Application 
 As suggested above, we may ask whether a “slipping away from the face of the neighbor” 
is that which Job’s friends are to be held accountable for. We may well ask the same question of 
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ourselves.263 Job’s friends arguably abdicate “the problem of the relationship between the 
suffering of the I and the suffering that I can feel before the suffering of the other man.”264 In 
addition, Job’s friends abdicate responsibility for the suffering of the other man through recourse 
to the ontological structure of the Law of Retribution, which intellectual luxury Job himself with 
no recourse does not have.  
 The concept of alterity, associated with the thought of Levinas, reminds us, too, of the 
“otherness” so often imposed upon, and experienced by, the sick. It has been the argument of the 
foregoing chapters that faithful listening to the stories of patients potentially restores 
narratability, and hence meaning, to experience. It is the radical import of Levinas’ thought, in 
particular, that inasmuch as we are, to use Levinas’ language, “hostage” to the suffering of the 
other, subjectivity itself is produced through our compassionate response. In other words, the 
very constitution of our subjectivity before God is dependent upon our service to others, and 
most particularly to those who suffer. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
 
 
 
A. Common Themes 
 
In this concluding chapter I would like to bring together common and related threads of 
meaning present throughout the preceding chapters. The sequence of topics treated has been 
broad-ranging – from Job and Job’s friends to Elie Wiesel, Judith Sherman, Hannah Arendt, 
Elaine Scarry, Emmanuel Levinas, and Gustavo Gutiérrez. These are disparate authors sharing 
some common meanings. Thus, the chapter that follows similarly has a diverse character, but 
hopefully one well-suited to bear both faithful and fruitful witness to its multiple authors. 
Throughout the preceding chapters there have been multiple voices. In summarizing, 
there are no direct linear conclusions to be drawn from these voices, but that is, in a way, the 
point. The essence of both Levinas and Gutiérrez on the subject of received understanding, 
whether philosophical or theological, and indeed as they shape one another within the Western 
canon, is that ideas must be ever reconsidered in the context of contemporary practice, and in 
fact held tentative pending their service in ameliorating the suffering of the neighbor. Levinas 
questions the continuing meaning of moral philosophy conceived as derivative of ontology as 
freedom in the wake of Auschwitz.265 Relatedly, Gutiérrez writes, “Ideas must be reconsidered in 
light of praxis, which is the proving ground of all theory, and in light of socio-cultural realities 
very different from those from which the ideas emerged.”266 Connected with this is an emphasis 
upon bearing witness. For example, Gutiérrez writes of what communion with those who suffer 
requires: 
                                               
265 Levinas, Of God Who Comes to Mind, 47. 
 
266 Gutiérrez, On Job, 101. 
 148 
 
 
Commitment to the alleviation of human suffering, and especially to the removal 
of its causes as far as possible, is an obligation for the followers of Jesus … Such 
a commitment presupposes genuine human compassion, as well as a measure of 
understanding of human history and the factors that condition it … It also requires 
a firm and stubborn determination to be present, regardless of the consequences, 
wherever the unjust abuse the innocent.267  
 
 
Gutiérrez characterizes this as “a firm and stubborn determination to be present.” Surely 
this is bearing witness “regardless of the consequences, wherever the unjust abuse the innocent.”  
 Similarly, writes Levinas: 
 
I cannot slip away from the face of the other [italics mine] in its nakedness 
without recourse. I cannot escape it in its forsaken nakedness, which glimmers 
through the fissures that crack the mask of the personage or his wrinkled skin, in 
his ‘with no recourse,’ which we must hear as cries already cried out toward God, 
without voice or thematization.268   
 
 
Perhaps the idea of the transcendent, for Levinas, bears comparison with the question of 
how we are to speak about God, for Gutiérrez.  
 
How are to do theology while Ayacucho lasts? How are we to speak of the God of 
life when cruel murder on a massive scale goes on in ‘the corner of the dead’? 
How are we to preach the love of God amid such profound contempt for human 
life? How are we to proclaim the resurrection of the Lord where death reigns, and 
especially the death of children, women, the poor, indigenes, and the 
‘unimportant’ members of our society?269  
 
 
In addition, Wiesel and Sherman both bear poignant witness to the suffering of 
themselves and others and in addition describe the great danger and cost entailed in doing so, 
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while Arendt and Scarry detail the importance of such expression and the threat this poses to 
those who would squelch their voice and their narrative. Finally, all of this returns to the 
beginning and Job and his autonomous insistence on a “hearing” as well as his tirelessness in 
publicly “telling his story.” Job is perennially the “other man” and the responsibility for 
“hearing” Job’s story falls to his friends no less than the imperative to “hear” the suffering of 
others is incumbent upon us today.  
 
Only when we have come to realize that God’s love is freely bestowed do we 
enter fully and definitively into the presence of the God of faith. Grace is not 
opposed to the cause of justice or does it play it down; on the contrary it gives it 
its full meaning. God’s love, like all true love, operates not in a world of cause 
and effect but of freedom and gratuitousness. This is how persons successfully 
encounter one another in a complete and unconditional way: without payment of 
any kind of charges and without externally imposed obligations that pressure 
them into meeting the expectations of the other.270  
 
 
Gutiérrez further writes that what Job understands at last is that justice alone does not 
have “the final say” concerning how we are to speak about God. 
 
These are our questions, and this is our challenge. Job shows us a way with his 
vigorous protest, his discovery of concrete commitment to the poor and all who 
suffer unjustly, his facing up to God, and his acknowledgement of the 
gratuitousness that characterizes God’s plan for human history [italics mine]. It is 
for us to find our own route amid the present sufferings and hopes of the poor of 
Latin America, to analyze its course with the requisite historical effectiveness, 
and above all to compare it anew with the word of God.271  
 
                                               
270 Gutiérrez, On Job, 87-88. 
 
271 Gutiérrez, On Job, 102. 
 
 150 
 
For Levinas, “philosophical discourse must … be able to embrace God – of whom the 
Bible speaks – if, that is, this God has a meaning.”272 However, if it is the case, as Levinas 
believes, that thought of God does not reach to the level of philosophical discussion, it is not 
because theology has not made clear the “being of this being”273 but rather because “in 
thematizing God, theology has brought him into the course of being, while the God of the Bible 
signifies in an unlikely manner the beyond of being, or transcendence.274 
For Gutiérrez, we speak rightly of God when we speak prophetically, in solidarity with 
the poor, which, says Gutiérrez, is required by Job (and us) by our faith in a God who has “a 
special love for the disinherited, the exploited of human history.”275 For Levinas, we must, 
indeed cannot but, ignore the suffering of the other, and it is in our “being for” the other that we 
witness transcendence. 
And lastly, in speaking of “being for” the other,276 what about Job’s friends? Do they 
listen? Do Job’s friends, much less God, grant Job a “hearing”? And most important, how are we 
to behave so as not to become “sorry comforters” ourselves?277  
The foregoing discussion of Job 19:13-22, Sherman, Wiesel, Arendt, Levinas, and 
Gutiérrez situates us well in considering how we may become “comforters” and good listeners to 
others. 
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B. Nadja 
Narrative – literary, biblical, and personal storytelling – bears witness to a re-visioning of 
human experience. As Newsom writes: 
 
Job’s language has … configured himself as frozen in space, hedged in. He is the 
one who waits in dread, while ‘turmoil comes,’ bringing with it the ceaseless 
agitation that cannot be shaped into purposeful activity. In responding to Job, 
Eliphaz recognizes the necessity of restoring to Job a sense of the narratability of 
his experience.278 
 
We learn from Scarry that the experience of intense pain cannot be imagined by anyone 
who has not experienced it. Pain explodes the “dictionary” of ordinary consciousness with 
experience for which there are no “ordinary” words. Moreover, Scarry describes this as the 
“crushing presence” of the body in pain – the always unexpected, overwhelming preeminence of 
the otherwise relatively silent body and the muting of the ordinary voice. As Sherman, Wiesel, 
and Scarry demonstrate, pain may easily unravel all those convictions and ideas that at other 
times enable us to recognize ourselves and that define our, even in the best of circumstances, 
fragile understanding of ourselves.  
A question arises, however, whether chronic illness may as well. The next section details 
through dialogue the erosion of all that enables one to recognize oneself, in this case through an 
experience of the chronicity of illness.  
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NADJA: A CASE STUDY 
Although there are striking differences, illness and its limitations may nonetheless 
challenge self-identity in “everyday” ways as well as through the “crushing presence of the 
body” that mutes the voice of the sufferer of torture that Scarry describes. Consider Nadja. Nadja 
is a 70-year-old woman who was born and raised in Russia. Her husband is living and she has 
four grown children, two of whom live at home with her.  
I first met Nadja in the waiting area of the Day Oncology department, where we talked 
briefly about Nadja’s feeling discouraged concerning the length of time she’d been ill, and 
particularly about the pain in her ankle. Nadja was accompanied by her daughter, Theresa, who 
typically drove Nadja to her chemotherapy and radiation appointments. When I next met Nadja, 
it was in the waiting room of Radiation Oncology. Nadja wore a green cloth cap that concealed 
her hair loss, a white sweatshirt, black sweatpants, white crew socks and tasseled black loafers.  
Nadja’s face is pleasantly attractive but very pale, very white. She is 70 but looks at least 
10 years older and is very thin. She was in a wheelchair, as at our first meeting in Day Oncology 
the previous week where she was awaiting her chemotherapy treatment. As before, Theresa 
accompanied her mother. Theresa is taller than her mother. She’s attractive, thirtyish; her hair is 
long, full, curly and dark. She wears jeans. As I entered the waiting area, my eye caught Nadja’s, 
and she smiled in recognition. 
 
‘Hello, Nadja. How is your ankle? Is it feeling any better?’ 
Nadja replied, shrugging, ‘P-s-h-t … [Disgusted] No better … Never any 
better …’ 
‘I’m sorry. It must be very painful.’ 
‘They [meaning Radiation Oncology] want me to wear it [a support she 
wears together with sneakers and that keeps Nadja’s lower left leg relatively 
immobile] … but today … I don’t wear it! [She points to the sock and loafer she 
wears instead.] What’s the point! It doesn’t help.’ 
[Theresa sits thumbing through Yachting magazine.] 
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‘Six years I’ve been going through this. Six years! First it was my 
chest…Now it’s my head…and [pointing to her leg that is raised and supported 
by the footrest of her wheelchair] the radiation is no help … It’s hard!’ 
[I’ve been stooping at the side of Nadja’s wheelchair. Theresa sits in one 
of the chairs against the wall, turning pages of her magazine. I’d like to be sitting 
in the chair next to Theresa, but in doing so I would be facing away from Nadja. 
Nor does Theresa invite me to sit down or in any way acknowledge my presence. 
I get up anyway and begin repositioning Nadja’s chair so that I can be seated 
instead of crouching in discomfort. At this point Theresa gets up to help turn her 
mother’s wheelchair. Then she goes back to her magazine.] 
‘Look at my clothes! [Nadja grasps the cloth of her right pant leg between 
her thumb and index finger.] I’ve lost 50 pounds! [She laughs.] Everything’s so 
baggy … I  need new clothes.’ 
‘Yes, I see, Nadja!’ 
‘I do nothing … Nothing! No cooking [smiling] … no laundry … nothing! 
She [inclining her head toward Theresa] … she does everything, now. Everything 
… P-s-s-h-t … What am I good for? I tell you what! Nothing … Nothing! 
[Gestures toward her leg] And this! ... Tell me, do you cook?’ 
‘Sometimes … sometimes my husband does. This must be so hard for you 
after being used to doing so much.’ 
‘Hmmph!’ [Silence.] 
[Nodding toward Theresa] ‘So. Theresa does everything now.’ 
[Theresa pays no attention. More silence.] 
‘And your husband, Nadja? Is he able to help?’ 
‘Him? [Smiling] Nothing … nothing! He can do nothing.’ [Nadja’s 
husband suffers from macular degeneration.] 
[Smiling] ‘Oh ….’ 
The radiology technician calls ‘Nadja!’ 
‘Oh well, I have to go.’ 
‘Perhaps I’ll see you upstairs.’ 
[As the radiation technician wheels Nadja inside] ‘Yes, maybe I’ll see you 
there. We’ll talk! [Squeezes my hand tightly] Goodbye.’ 
[Smiling] ‘Goodbye, Nadja.’ 
 
Nadja’s statement that she does “nothing…Nothing!” speaks volumes. For example, all 
those activities that previously structured a typical day in Nadja’s life are no longer possible for 
her in her present state of health. What is more, it is Nadja’s daughter Theresa who, in addition 
to raising two sons of her own, “does everything now.” Thus, asks Nadja, “What am I good for? 
I tell you what! Nothing…Nothing!” Nor is Nadja’s experience uncommon among sufferers of 
both chronic and acute illness who often experience themselves as “useless” and, what is perhaps 
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worse, a burden upon their children. In addition, Nadja suffers the chronic leg pain produced by 
the cancer’s metastases to her bone. 
Reading between the lines of the conversation, the question of Theresa’s continuing 
commitment to Nadja’s care, at least in Nadja’s mind, possibly looms as well. Theresa is 
undoubtedly tired and overworked herself, as is hinted at in the snippet above (and borne out in 
subsequent conversations not recorded here). 
In addition, Nadja cannot even recognize herself in the most basic, physical sense: “Look 
at my clothes! I’ve lost fifty pounds! Everything’s so baggy … I need new clothes.” Clothes 
define us according to our state in life. Something of this world-dissolution is already at work. 
In so many ways, Nadja can no longer recognize herself. As Arendt writes: 
 
the primordial and specifically human act must … contain the question asked of 
every newcomer: ‘Who are you?’ Both acute and chronic suffering and illness 
challenge our ability to engage in this … primordial and specifically human act.279  
 
 And Scarry:  
 
 
 The process of perception Sartre describes [writing of a political context], 
obviously not dependent upon a political context, belongs anywhere where death 
is near and so belongs to aging. Sometimes assisted by younger human beings, the 
body works to obliterate the world and self of the old person. Something of this 
world dissolution is already at work even in the tendency of those in late middle 
age, no longer working, to see their former jobs, their life actions, their choices as 
wrong or trivial, jobs, actions, and choices that are probably no more insignificant 
than Ibietta’s Spain [again, a reference to Sartre’s ‘political’ story, The Wall] but 
that seem insignificant by virtue of the same process … As the body breaks down 
it becomes increasingly the object of attention, usurping the place of all other 
objects, so that finally, in very old and sick people, the world may exist only in a 
circle two feet out from themselves; the exclusive content of perception and 
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speech may become what was eaten, the problems of excreting, the progress of 
pains, the comfort or discomfort of a particular chair or bed.280 
 
Scarry continues that so central is this experience of aging, she describes the constantly 
diminishing world it represents as “a given in representations of aging.”281 “As Ibietta’s bench 
dissolves beneath him, so the ground beneath the old grows insubstantial, ceases to belong to 
them.”282 Scarry writes of Sophocles’ Oedipus, Shakespeare’s Lear, and Beckett’s Winnie, and 
says of them that although they are dense with many meanings, each is nevertheless in part a 
dramatization of “the struggle to stay alive, to stay a little, to maintain one’s extension out into 
the world.”283 For each, the voice becomes a final means of self-extension, for “their ceaseless 
talk articulates their unspoken understanding that only in silence do the edges of the self, become 
coterminous with the edges of the body it will die with.”284 
 Obviously, the pain inflicted in torture is of a different kind and degree, and Scarry 
comments that “only in the prolonged and searing pain caused by an accident or by disease or by 
the breakdown of the pain pathway itself is there the same brutal senselessness as in torture.285 
However, they bear in common the element of betrayal inasmuch as extreme pain either 
contracts the entire universe to the parameters of the body, or causes it to swell such that it fills 
the universe, and through it, language disintegrates, the content of one’s world disintegrates, 
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even the self, disintegrates, so that even that which would express the self in time, the voice, is 
stolen.286 
 
C. Final Reflections 
  Thus, the burden of the preceding pages has been to emphasize the significance of the 
voice and of the narrative voice and of the importance of the chaplain’s witness in creating a 
hospitable place for it. This is no meager feat in the setting of the hospital where even today so 
much of the medicalized environment unwittingly conspires to constrain the patient’s voice. 
Sherman and Wiesel tell us of the vast, horrifying, uniquely inhuman experience of the 
holocaust. We may ask if their trauma, in very broad strokes, nonetheless bears respectful 
comparison with what may be experienced in quieter ways. They grant significance and 
visibility, through the telling of their own suffering, to the suffering of other vulnerable human 
beings, among them, the sick, the elderly, the poor, the lonely. It is in one sense, immaterial that 
there is a vast, gaping divide in scope between the pain of trauma, and the pain of terminal illness 
and imminent death. If this were not the case, it would make little sense to read Lear or 
Sophocles, that we might better live our smaller lives. Wiesel, Sherman, and Arendt grant 
powerful expression to the intimate relation between the voice and vulnerable human selfhood. 
Similarly, although it may more readily be appreciated that there is, perhaps, some logical 
connection between the priest and liberation theologian Gustavo Gutiérrez and chaplaincy, it 
strains the imagination more to see a relationship between Levinas and pastoral care. I think the 
relationship is an intimate one, as I can think of no theologian or philosopher who better 
articulates what may be both the very worst and the most common mistake it is possible to 
                                               
286 Scarry, The Body in Pain, 35. 
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commit in pastoral care, which is to be insensitive to the preconceptions we all inevitably carry 
with us. Levinas’ almost tortured effort to locate that which signifies “the beyond of being” or 
transcendence commits us to a similar effort to probe those things which stand between us and an 
empathic response. Inevitably these are concepts, ideas, and preconceptions, all of them 
dangerous to the degree that we are not aware of them or unwilling to recognize them when they 
are shown to us. Again, however, personal predilections are determinative of my choice of 
Levinas as a thinker whose thought deeply challenges me, inasmuch as I am a Roman Catholic 
Christian of a particular age and history, and find excruciatingly painful the (i.e. my own) 
unconscious imposition of values and assumptions that may distort my perception of, and 
personal availability to, the patients I visit. I began this project with a critique of popular 
spirituality and its hidden agenda or susceptibility to assuming one. I am concluding with a 
critique of my own.  
Narrative – which may include literary, biblical, and personal storytelling – bears witness 
to the experience of the other, and may carry an ethical imperative. 
 
The face puts into question the sufficiency of my identity as an I, it compels me 
toward an infinite responsibility toward another. An original transcendence 
signifying the concreteness, which is ethical from the outset, of the face.287  
 
 
The face of the sick or of suffering “puts into question the sufficiency of my identity as 
an I.” Indeed, Arthur Frank writes that, “Thinking with stories is the basis of narrative ethics.”288 
Levinas prioritizes ethics as “first philosophy.” This idea has, in addition to the transformative 
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potential of narrative and witness, been a premise of the preceding chapters. Prefaced with 
Maria’s story and beginning with Job’s, I have attempted to highlight personal narrative as 
communicative of truths, including ethical truth, in ways that current understandings of 
spirituality may not facilitate.  
Lastly, I’d like to add that the previous discussion of Levinas and of ethics as “first 
philosophy” is not to suggest that traditional ontology has no place, or that chaplains must 
personally approach ethics as first philosophy. Certainly not, especially in a religion that has long 
grounded ethics in and derived it from a rich ontological framework. It is merely to say that in 
adapting chaplaincy to the contemporary medical scene and to a population that is increasingly 
untethered to traditional religious formulations, an approach based on narrative and witness is 
likely to be more effective than a catechetical attitude on the one hand or a bland, watered-down, 
feel-good spirituality on the other. And for purposes of applying this approach, a deep 
acquaintance with more narrative-based literature (and philosophies), especially those that have 
arisen directly from deep experiences of loss and grief, is highly useful if not essential. 
As a chaplain, I am always amazed by the endurance of family and friends. I experience 
the waiting rooms of intensive-care units as places of great suffering – where gradually, 
relentlessly, the presence of pain seems to wear away everything but itself. And so, the continued 
presence of loved ones is indeed a phenomenon of witness and of transcendence. Otherwise, why 
be there? Why go through this? There are many possible ordinary explanations, but in the face of 
extreme pain, these begin to lose their power of argument. Rather, something extraordinary 
compels this advocacy of friends and relatives, and their willingness to bear witness to the 
suffering of another. Family and friends often seem to sense something that Job’s friends do not.  
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Hospital chaplains do, too, and indeed, properly understood, that is their job, their calling, 
and their unique value in the hospital setting. Ideally, the role of chaplains is neither to simply 
provide the rituals of organized religion nor to support the feel-good bromides of a bland and 
unobjectionable, contemporary corruption of “spirituality.” Indeed, both of these can be – and 
often are – deeply challenged by the experience of pain and existential suffering at the end of 
life. The disintegration of the self that accompanies extreme pain calls the efficacy and meaning 
of both into question. 
What then, is the role of the chaplain? To bear witness of the experience of the patient, 
and to create a space hospitable to the patient’s voice, the patient’s narrative, whether verbalized 
or actualized in some more subtle manner, that gives meaning to his or her situation. To facilitate 
the patient’s healing of a self that may be attacked as effectively, or nearly so, by cancer or other 
diseases as it can be by torturers, or the privations of the poor in Latin America. To enable 
patients to once again “say their name,” and perhaps, even at times, to experience a measure of 
authority over their bodies, even if doing so means they will make choices contrary to those of 
well-meaning doctors or relatives. 
This is the meaning of hospital and hospice chaplaincy. It is what we do that other 
members of the health care team cannot do and are not trained to do. Grounding chaplaincy in 
witness and narrative does not limit it to one particular religious tradition, but neither does it 
abandon it to a traditionless “spirituality” that is easily co-opted by others’ agendas. It bases 
chaplaincy on something common to many religious traditions, the wholeness to be derived not 
from spiritual platitudes but from a genuine encounter with the Other.  
This type of chaplaincy is not easy. It is far easier, like Job’s friends, like Maria’s doctor, 
or like the hospital administrator who wants only “positive” messages, to reach for simple 
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solutions rather than to abandon oneself to the uncertainty and turmoil of truly being with 
another person who experiences pain and grief. Yet, this is the role. It is what enables patients to 
find meaning and purpose in the chaos, and it is the best way for chaplains themselves to find 
meaning and purpose in the uncertain professional situation in which they currently find 
themselves. 
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